Indirect learning and the aims-curricula fallacy

Journal of Philosophy of Education 27 (2):223–232 (1993)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT I have two main theses. The first is that the inference from accepting an educational aim, especially an ideal aim such as self-realization or critical thinking, to a conclusion as to the content or structure of a curriculum is fallacious. The first thesis should not be controversial. But even if so, the aims-curricula fallacy is readily committed, and that calls for explanation. My second thesis is that the aims–curricula fallacy is often committed because the possibilities for realizing educational aims through indirect methods or learning is ignored.

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The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.Gerald Dworkin - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Aristotle on learning to be good.Myles F. Burnyeat - 1980 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. University of California Press. pp. 69--92.

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