Reply to Russow

Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65 (1993)
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Abstract

In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not exist.

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10.1080/09515089308573078

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Citations of this work

Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks.Bryan Frances - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.

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References found in this work

A modal argument for narrow content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.
Fodor's modal argument.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
Fodor, Adams and causal properties.Lilly‐Marlene Russow - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.

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