Love and Morality in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas

Dissertation, Cornell University (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One of the more attractive features of Greek moral philosophy and its medieval dependents is that it provides an obvious motivation for being moral: rational self-interest. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas are all rational egoists, and each argues that acting only for the sake of one's own happiness is compatible with treating other people morally. Each bridges the gap between egoism and altruism by arguing that a rational person has sufficient reason to care about other people. This raises two main problems: can egoistic or "selfish love" count as genuine love, and even if it can, can "selfish love" insure that an egoist will have the proper moral respect for all who are worthy of moral respect? ;Socrates believes that nothing can be loved or desired both as an end and as a means, and so he cannot justify any but an exploitative love which cares for the other not for the other's own sake, but only for the instrumental benefits he, she or it provides the lover. ;Plato succeeds in justifying love for another for the other's own sake by arguing that one's beloved is a constituent of and not just an instrumental means to one's own happiness. Nevertheless, Plato does not justify respect for the other as an independent end-chooser, and this prevents him from justifying moral respect for the autonomy of the other. ;Aristotle makes up for this deficiency of Plato's by founding the best sort of love on the mutual respect required by co-operation in deliberation, decision and action in mutually valued projects. This solution, however, prevents Aristotle from justifying moral respect for anyone who is not sufficiently virtuous, and this threatens to limit severely the number of people for whom Aristotle can justify proper moral respect. Aristotle can disarm this threat, even in the form in which it is posed by Christian charity. ;Aquinas argues that Aristotelian love is insufficient for justifying Christian charity. The difference between them, however, does not concern the theory of what love consists in, but in how to apply the theory of love

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Plato: White and Non-white Love.Amo Sulaiman - 2009 - Kritike 3 (1):78-93.
Love: gloriously amoral and arational.Nick Zangwill - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):298 - 314.
Love: a history.Simon May - 2011 - New Haven: Yale University Press.
Love and friendship in Plato and Aristotle.A. W. Price - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The essence of ethics.Frederick R. Bauer - 2004 - Worcester, Mass.: Ambassador Books.
Love in Vain.Robert Johnson - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):45-50.
The Lysis on Loving One's Own.David K. Glidden - 1981 - Classical Quarterly 31 (01):39-59.
Aristotle's Theory of Friendship.Michael Pakaluk - 1988 - Dissertation, Harvard University

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-04

Downloads
2 (#1,787,337)

6 months
1 (#1,516,429)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references