Gendered knowledge — Epistemology and artificial intelligence

AI and Society 7 (4):311-322 (1993)

Abstract

The paper proposes that gender can be used to explore alternative epistemologies represented within AI systems. Current research on feminist epistemology is reviewed then criticisms of the main philosophical position dominant in AI are outlined. These criticisms say little about epistemology and nothing about gender. It is suggested that the way forward might be found within the sociology of scientific knowledge as its approach is in accord with the postmodernist view of feminist epistemology in seeing knowledge as a cultural product. However, the sociology of knowledge must brush up its feminist credentials and feminist epistemology must supply more concrete examples with which to test out our theories in AI

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Citations of this work

A Feminist Critique of Artificial Intelligence.Alison Adam - 1995 - European Journal of Women's Studies 2 (3):355-377.

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