Synthese 170 (1):97-114 (2009)

Authors
Marcus P. Adams
State University of New York, Albany
Abstract
In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the double dissociation of knowledge-that and knowledge-how and that is also able to do explanatory work elsewhere.
Keywords Philosophy   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language   Logic   Epistemology   Computer Science, general   Philosophy of Science
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9349-z
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Place in Nature.Hilary Kornblith - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Against Intellectualism.Alva Noë - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):278-290.

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Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism.Ephraim Glick - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):398-434.
Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Know-How, Intellectualism, and Memory Systems.Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):720-759.

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