Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):223-237 (2017)

Authors
Ron Aboodi
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract
De dicto moral motivation is typically characterized by the agent’s conceiving of her goal in thin normative terms such as to do what is right. I argue that lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation would put the agent in a bad position for responding in the morally-best manner in a certain type of situations. Two central features of the relevant type of situations are the appropriateness of the agent’s uncertainty concerning her underived moral values, and the practical, moral importance of resolving this uncertainty. I argue that in some situations that are marked by these two features the most virtuous response is deciding to conduct a deep moral inquiry for a de dicto moral purpose. In such situations lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation would amount to a moral shortcoming. I show the implications for Michael Smith’s argument against Motivational Judgment Externalism and for Brian Weatherson’s argument against avoiding moral recklessness: both arguments rely on a depreciating view of de dicto moral motivation, and both fail; or so I argue.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10677-016-9742-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,039
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.
In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.
Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What’s Right.Nathan Howard - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (3).
Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons.Amelia Hicks - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):765-789.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Wrong Time to Aim at What's Right: When is De Dicto Moral Motivation Less Virtuous?Ron Aboodi - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):307-314.
Are Desires de Dicto Fetishistic?Jonas Olson - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):89 – 96.
De Dicto Desires and Morality as Fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.
Externalism, Motivation, and Moral Knowledge.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2011 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
Smith on Moral Fetishism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):187–195.
Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation.James Dreier - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation.Julia Jorati - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (4):748-766.
Running Risks Morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
What’s Wrong with Morality?C. Daniel Batson - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):230-236.
Moral Motivation Pluralism.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation in Confucian Role-Based Ethics.A. T. Nuyen - 2009 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 8 (1):1-11.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-08-25

Total views
91 ( #128,092 of 2,506,001 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,628 of 2,506,001 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes