The Òrìs.à Legal Tradition

Philosophia Africana 20 (2):107-128 (2021)
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Abstract

This article advances the claim that the Òrìṣà tradition is best conceived of as a legal tradition. Notwithstanding the fact that scholars have written extensively about the tradition from the perspectives of religion, philosophy, the arts, and many other domains of inquiry, I maintain that the extant scholarship has underrated the significance of tradition, and has almost completely overlooked the fact that the primary function of Òrìṣà is the improvement of social interaction through the governance and regulation of conduct—which makes it a legal tradition.

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Law as tradition.Martin Krygier - 1986 - Law and Philosophy 5 (2):237 - 262.

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