Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):278-283 (2018)
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Abstract

Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have developed a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, via which they defend the theoretical legitimacy of vague objects. In this paper, we argue that while the Barnes–Williams theory supplies a viable account of genuine metaphysical vagueness, it cannot underwrite an account of genuinely vague objects. First we clarify the distinction between these two key theses. Then we argue that the Barnes–Williams theory of metaphysical vagueness not only fails to deliver genuinely vague objects, it in fact provides grounds for rejecting them

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Author Profiles

Ali Abasnezhad
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Carrie Jenkins
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness.Ali Abasnezhad - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):381-393.
Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think).James Andow - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.
Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.
Précis of Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):921-928.

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