On the Foundations of Beliefs in Free Will: Intentional Binding and Unconscious Priming in Self-Agency

Psychological Science 22 (4):532-537 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The concept of an ability to make choices and to determine one’s own outcomes fits well with experiences that most people have, and these experiences form the basis for beliefs in free will. However, the existence of conscious free will is challenged by modern research findings highlighting the unconscious origins of goal-directed behavior that gives rise to free-will beliefs. This report expands on these insights by revealing that both conscious and unconscious processes play an important role in free-will beliefs. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrates that free-will beliefs are strengthened when conscious intentions to produce action outcomes bind the perception of action and outcome together in time. Experiment 2 shows that these beliefs are strengthened when unconscious priming of action outcomes creates illusory experiences of self-agency when the primed outcomes occur. Together, these findings suggest that beliefs in free will are associated with self-agency and are enhanced by both conscious and unconscious information processing of goal-directed behavior.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Role of Unconsciousness in Free Will.Paula Droege - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5-6.
The Conditions of Free Agency.Sarah Buss - 1989 - Dissertation, Yale University
Neuroscience, Free Will and Responsibility.Walter Glannon - 2009 - Journal of Ethics in Mental Health 4:1-6.
Free agency: A non-reductionist causal account.Wilhelm Vossenkuhl - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):113-132.
Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy and the Sovereign Individual.Christopher Janaway - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):339-357.
Accommodating unconscious beliefs.Luis M. Augusto - 2010 - Princípios 17 (28):129-154.
Unconscious Evidence.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262.
Free Agency: A Non-Reductionist Causal Account.Wilhelm Vossenkuhl - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):113-132.
Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy and the Sovereign Individual.Ken Gemes & Christopher Janaway - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):321-357.
Self-Trust and Knowledge of Action.Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (9):471-491.
Free Agency.Wilhelm Vossenkuhl - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):113-132.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-03-09

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?