“I myself still find my way of philosophizing new, & it keeps striking me so afresh, & that is why I have to repeat myself so often. […] [R]epetitions […] [f]or me […] are necessary.” (CV 1998: 3e) Wittgenstein's style is well known for its recursive—and according to some interpreters, even obsessive-compulsive—quality, but they are part of a thinking method: “I suggest repetition as a means of surveying the connections.” (AWL 1979: 43) The style also mirrors recurring ideas such as (...) “concepts are not for use on a single occasion” (Z 1981: 568), or the “bustle (Getriebe) of life […] comes about only through constant repetition” (RPP 1980b: 625 – 626). The aim of this essay is to show how the notion of repetition (Wiederholung) plays a significant role in the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought. It is the manifestation of a philosophical praxis, and although the notion of repetition remains in the background, it is a constant presence in his production, often featuring alongside his best-known concepts, like rule following, aspect seeing, and his thoughts on music and mathematics. This article will examine the different ways in which Wittgenstein reflects on the question of repetition in relation to the idea of identity, variation, and diversity, and as a fundamental aspect of human practice that is not the mere manifestation of underlying rules or principles, but a necessary condition for their emergence. (shrink)

The main goals of this paper are to highlight the new philosophical aspects emerging from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and to analyze some of the philological questions that should be considered by editors and translators of Wittgenstein’s writings and by scholars of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. There are undoubtedly advantages to be had from exploring Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and this contribution will be focused on them. However, there are also some critical issues to be taken into account. They concern Wittgenstein’s way of writing and doing (...) philosophy as well as the status of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and the history of their publication. The advantages of investigating Wittgenstein’s movements of thought through and across the Nachlass and the resulting critical issues will be argued from the perspective of direct work editing Wittgenstein (e. g., the edition of two discovered letters of 1934 from Wittgenstein to Sraffa) and through the semantic reconstruction of crucial concepts from Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This reconstruction has been realized by the searching of Wittgenstein’s concepts occurrences and the recording and exploration of the nuances of meaning represented by each occurrence within the project to compose a Wittgenstein dictionary from the Nachlass. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's manuscript volumes from 1929: Reflections on the Chronology of MSS 105 – 107. In this paper I identify the evidence that might be used to establish a viable chronology for Wittgenstein’s writing of his manuscript volumes 105 – 107 and sections thereof. Since Wittgenstein omits to date his entries in these three 1929 volumes between February 15 and September 11, the evaluation of these different chronologies must remain somewhat speculative, but the justifications for each can, as I will show, (...) be revealingly compared. I also argue that such attempts at a genealogical appreciation of Wittgenstein’s remarks is not only worthwhile on its own terms but it also further paves the way for an increased understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I articulate and evaluate three possible chronologies for the year 1929 and argue for the one I take to be the most plausible. (shrink)

Truth in Wittgenstein′s Later Philosophy. In this paper I attempt to examine Wittgenstein′s understanding of truth in his later period. In doing so, I orient myself primarily on the remarks published as Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. My primary aim in the destructive part is to show that his later philosophy neither espouses a redundancy and deflationary, nor an epistemic and anti-realist conception of truth. Both strands of interpretation are strongly represented in the debate. An examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on (...) the correspondence theory of truth will also shed some light on his thoughts about truth. Furthermore, in the preceding constructive part of this paper, I will try to demonstrate that (1) for Wittgenstein there is a strong link between truths that we accept based on our certainties and our use of the term “truth” and (2) that skepticism about truth, which claims that all accepted truths in our Weltbild (“world-view”) could be actually false, fails to give any meaning to its use of “truth”. This culminates in Wittgenstein′s insight, that the question of what truth is can only be answered relative to the Weltbild. Therefore, talking about truths that transcend our Weltbild becomes nonsense. (shrink)

Determining the copyright status of a literary work is not always straightforward, because copyrights are territorial and the relevant laws differ significantly country by country. In some legislations, for example, a work’s copyright status may depend on the publication date, on whether the publication was posthumous, on the quantity and quality of editorial interventions the manuscript underwent before publication, etc. 2021 marked the 70th anniversary of Wittgenstein’s death. In many countries, the duration of the copyright term is the author’s life (...) plus 70 years. Thus, as of the moment of this writing, it is important to attempt a comprehensive analysis and to try to determine whether, where and why his manuscripts and his published works are in the public domain. This paper clarifies the general principles of copyright and describes the rules and best practices that must be followed in the context of internet publications. Additionally, it examines the factors that make it particularly challenging to ascertain the copyright status both of Wittgenstein’s published works and of the transcriptions of his manuscripts. Lastly, it provides a detailed account of the copyright status of some of Wittgenstein’s works that were published in the second half of the 20th century, proving that they are in the public domain in most countries. (shrink)

On the Association of Names with Private Sensations – A Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument (PI 256 – 265). This commentary on PI 256 – 265, informed by Wittgenstein’s Nachlass and the recently published Skinner dictations, shows that Wittgenstein uses a particular method in these sections: He investigates what kind of meaning one might give to the parts of a philosophical sentence. Wittgenstein recommended this method already in TLP and BBB – it marks a continuity in his thought. The (...) sentence under investigation is the following: “And now I simply associate names with sensations” (PI 2009: 256). PI 257 – 265 discuss three proposals of what it might mean to associate a name with a private sensation. PI 257 investigates the claim that the association is set up by means of inventing a name, PI 258 proposes that it consists in a private ostensive definition, and PI 262, 263 suggest that it works by (inwardly) resolving to call this like that. All of these ideas turn out to be unsatisfactory. The reason why PI 258’s private ostensive definition fails is that for a private sensation there is by definition no difference between “it is the same” and “he recognized it”. This is why one cannot talk of recognition here, and therefore the private ostensive definition is an empty ceremony. The result of PI 256 – 265 is not a proof of the impossibility of a private language, but these sections show that the meaning of “And now I simply associate names with sensations” cannot satisfactorily be explained by means of the three aforementioned proposals. (shrink)

In 2000 the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) published the CD-ROM edition of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE). Moreover, since then WAB has worked towards complementing the static CD-ROM edition with an interactive web platform that additionally allows more user-specific and more user-tailored utilizations of WAB’s Nachlass resources. The paper describes two specific web service tools of this platform: Interactive Dynamic Presentation (IDP) of the Wittgenstein Nachlass and Semantic Faceted Search and Browsing (SFB) of Wittgenstein (...) domain metadata. The paper argues that it is only when these two tools are fully implemented and functional that WAB can adequately serve the scholarly needs of the Wittgenstein Nachlass user community. The paper discusses some selected features and functionalities of the two tools in detail. An earlier version of this paper was published as „Complementing Static Scholarly Editions with Dynamic Research Platforms: Interactive Dynamic Presentation (IDP) and Semantic Faceted Search and Browsing (SFB) for the Wittgenstein Nachlass“ in Selected Papers from the CLARIN Annual Conference 2020, ed. by C. Navarretta & M. Eskevich (Utrecht: CLARIN ERIC). In writing this paper I have benefitted from comments by K. De Smedt, N. Gangopadhyay, Ø. Gjesdal, J. Hendrickson, C. Huitfeldt, H. Al Ruweh, the Clarin 2020 conference reviewers and editors as well as Jasmin Trächtler. (shrink)

In my paper I will discuss the difference between Wittgenstein’s notebooks, personal diaries and his so called diaristic remarks scattered throughout the Nachlass. This includes a distinction between his philosophical and his diaristic entries. Secondly, I will outline the editing history of Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914 – 1916, his Secret Diaries (Geheime Tagebücher 1914 – 1916), Culture & Value and his diaries of the 1930s (Denkbewegungen). Finally, I will focus on Wittgenstein’s coded remarks (in the wartime notebooks and in his diaristic (...) remarks found in the Nachlass) and then discuss their significance not only in terms of his personal attitude toward life, ethics and religion but also in terms of their role in the context of his philosophizing. In doing so, I will discuss the question of the extent to which Wittgenstein’s method of encoding can be seen as a means for a special type of text, conceived for a sphere not readily accessible to normal language and science – a sphere he avoided talking about in the context of strict philosophical dispute. (shrink)

Tree-Structured Readings of the Tractatus : I argue that the numbering system of the Tractatus lets us see how it was constructed, in two closely related senses of that term. First, it tells us a great deal about the genesis of the book, for the numbering system was used to assemble and rearrange a series of drafts, as recorded in MS 104. Second, it helps us understand the structure of the published book, as cryptically summarized in the opening footnote. I (...) also discuss an unpublished letter from Anscombe to von Wright from 1948 which contains the very first sketch of a tree-structured reading, and what I believe is Stenius’s response to Anscombe’s proposal. The paper critically evaluates previous work on tree-structured readings and contends that we need to read the Tractatus in both the number order used in the published book and the tree order that Wittgenstein used to draft it. It also considers some of the main ways of turning this complex branching structure into a linear, printed text, and so serves as an introduction to the three tree-structured editions of the Tractatus that accompany the original English-language publication of this paper in NWR 11 (the German text, and the translations by Ogden & Ramsey and Pears & McGuinness). (shrink)

“The ethical is no fact of the matter.” On Wittgenstein’s ethical paradox discusses Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Ethics” of 1929. In this lecture to the Heretics Society at Cambridge he proposes an ethical paradox based on two incompatible types of facts, the natural facts offered by science and the supernatural facts, which he claims to be the core of ethics. The paradox is partly due to his Tractarian belief that ethics has no descriptive content. Yet, although it has no descriptive content (...) the ethical is represented by a feeling which has a metaphysical and an undeniable factual character too, as Wittgenstein claims. This kind of fact is his personal, private if not solipsistic feeling. The paper tries to clarify this highly controversial type of feeling. It seems probable that the change from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations resolves the ethical paradox along the new therapeutical lines of PU. It is argued that this is not the case. The content of the ethical paradox remains unchanged. (shrink)