I (mostly) accept Ancell’s argument that my proposal for dealing with the radical behavioral challenge entails what he calls ‘the excessive recusal problem’. I argue that this is no reason to reject my proposal, but rather an opportunity for further reflection on what behavioral and normative ethicists can learn from each other. I make some suggestions for future lines of inquiry for both fields.

Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2022) employ Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom’s institutional design principles to develop two models of stakeholder governance. They argue that these “community governance” models will help achieve a fairer distribution of stakeholder value compared with approaches that centralize governance in the hands of management. We identify four characteristics, however, that thwart any straightforward application of these community governance models to business firms: ease of exit; lack of legacy social capital; heterogeneity of interests; and power imbalances. We then conclude, (...) following Ostrom herself, that governance often requires external institutional arrangements that stakeholder theorists have not fully appreciated. (shrink)