La réflexion sur l’Europe dans la période de l’entre-deux-guerres a surtout été étudiée en tant que préhistoire de la construction européenne vue comme un projet politique et économique. Plus rares ont été les travaux sur les racines philosophiques et intellectuelles des idées d’Europe. Or, il paraît pertinent, en particulier dans le contexte actuel où la construction européenne et la démocratie libérale font l’objet de remises en question, de reconstruire certains termes des débats sur l’Eur...

The aim of this essay is to examine the parallel Scheler assumes between the individual person and collective person (or culture). I argue that Scheler’s early and late analyses of the experience of aging and death inform his idea of history and what it means to be at the “end” of one’s own history. An aging culture is one afforded with the opportunity to reckon with its past and take responsibility for its failures and prejudices.

I won’t here sketch out completely the contentions of all phenomenologists about the question of Europe, what would rather refer to a book-project. By taking over some of the statements, I will rather try to situate Max Scheler’s original contention, while showing, to begin with, how he concurs with some aspects of Husserl’s pionneer-conception, but also strongly disagree on some others. As a second step, the map of the contentions of the different phenomenologists on Europe will allow to draw a (...) fairly enough dividing line between euro-centrists or europeo-centrists on the one side and, on the other side, the promotors of an alternative Europe, of an « alter-Europe », of a euro-excentrism, or again, in more contemporary terms, of a « globalisation » or an « alter-mondialism ». Max Scheler is clearly on this latter side of the line, as we will see. But this dividing line becomes still more complex and generates other distinctions, according to the « valence » that is attributed to Europe, positive (its opening future) or negative (its foreseen decline), or, in other terms, if it is its metaphysical meaning (principle, idea, essence, value) that is underlined, or its social, legal, economic and political historicisation. With such a multifactorial configuration in mind, I will seek to place the author of Politisch-pädagogische Schriften and, namely, of « L’idée de paix et le pacifisme » on the chessboard of Europe. (shrink)

Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986) is worldwide renowned as the principal author (with Ernesto Rossi) of the Ventotene Manifesto (1941), whose second edition (1944), prefaced by Eugenio Colorni, is one of the founding documents of the European Union. Less known is the width and depth of Spinelli's thought, not only as a political theorist of supra-national democracy and institutional designer of a possible European Federation but also as a philosopher of civilization and history. While the sources of his federalism have been largely (...) investigated, much less have those of his more comprehensive philosophy. This paper discusses, on a philological basis, the dialogue Spinelli certainly has with some of Max Scheler's writings while going into this dialogue more in-depth, in a philosophical more than philological attitude. (shrink)

This article examines the proximity of the conceptions of Europe defended by Edmund Husserl and Paul Valéry during the interwar period, their common diagnosis of a European crisis and their attempt to give a non-geographical definition of Europe, based on the notion of spirit. It is shown that, behind the common use of the term and lexicon of spirit, the two authors actually put forward two different paradigms to account for Europe’s cultural specificity (a dynamic paradigm in Valéry and a (...) teleological paradigm in Husserl), and that this duality is reflected in the way they understand European modernity, the significance of science, and finally the idea of a Europeanization of the world. In so doing, the article enters into a critical discussion with those readings that have noted the proximity of the two authors only to see in them the same spiritualism, suspected of perpetuating the Eurocentric prejudice. (shrink)

Whilst arguing for sounds as repeatable objects does not seem suitable to our auditory experience, considering them as events can then help us understand some of their main features. In this sense, sounds are events happening to material objects; they have a beginning and an end; they are ephemeral entities that we cannot grasp as ordinary objects. Nevertheless, supporters of event theory usually focus on the autonomous status that sounds manifest from the things in the world. Conversely, when we hear (...) sounds, we hear what and where they are sounding even in those theories that I will call detached-sound theories; in hearing them we hear how different materials create different sounds. Within the different positions of the event theory to pure-event or acousmatic proposal, the importance and role that the material has in the creation of diverse sounds does not always seem to be recognized. In this paper, I therefore aim to show how the materiality of resonating bodies and objects is given in all forms of auditory experience, not until analyzed the differences between object and event accounts in the philosophy of sound. (shrink)

This paper investigates the development of Scheler’s concept of upheaval (Umsturz) within the political context of the turmoil in the time from World War I to the Weimar Republic. I will argue that Scheler’s concepts and philosophical developments cannot be understood without taking the political and social events into account. In a first step, the essential points of the political context will be roughly outlined. In a second step, I will take a closer look at the development of “upheaval” in (...) his political and social writings. My conclusion will be that while the Scheler of the middle period, rethinking and using Nietzsche’s idea of the revaluation of values is indeed a catalyst of his era, the later Scheler comes into his own, finally going beyond the mainstream ideas of his time. (shrink)

At the time of the fragile Weimar Republic, when the crisis of parliamentary democracy was accompanied by a “frightening massification of life” and of public opinion, Scheler posed a challenge: How to achieve a cultural and spiritual transformation that can contribute to a true rebirth of Germany and Europe? If this renaissance is to be achieved, Germany and Europe must be examined as a whole, and the ideas underlying their institutions must be renewed. Cosmopolitanism and the age of integration – (...) for example the integration of rationalism, which has traditionally characterized Europe, and irrationalism, of which the “revolt of pulsions” is, according to Scheler, an eloquent testimony – impose this renewal. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the possible “costs and benefits” of a Freudian-inspired sublimation from a Schelerian perspective, with particular attention to the problem of Bildung. (shrink)

Since the outbreak of the First World War, Max Scheler has been interested in political and cultural constellations within Europe. But he also thinks about Europe as a plural entity and its relationship to other world regions. Thus, he analyses processes of globalisation, in his view a Europeanisation of the world, from political, economic and cultural points of view. In his analyses of such a “Europeanisation of the world”, Scheler refers to the great studies on the history of capitalism by (...) Werner Sombart and Max Scheler, from which he takes the talk of the “capitalist spirit of modernity”. Scheler's analysis of globalisation leads to a critique of the European claim to cultural hegemony. He pleads for a preservation of differences and a new vitalisation of cultural values through productive conflicts such as wars on a global scale. Scheler's texts still provoke their readers today, at least to think about them. (shrink)

According to Scheler, since the 12th century, Europe and the West have gradually lost their way. They abandoned the Pascalian “logic of the heart”, that is, the knowledge of holy values, spiritual values and vital values through intentional feeling (Fühlen) of the heart, in favour of the logic of reason or understanding, that is, the knowledge of domination of the external world by reason. Nevertheless, Scheler notes that since that time, European thinkers have occasionally succeeded in rediscovering this knowledge of (...) the heart, and that there is even a powerful contemporary movement in this direction in Europe. The challenge for Europe, then, is to build on this momentum and rediscover the “logic of the heart” in order to achieve a harmony of knowledge forms, and then a harmony of world civilization. (shrink)

Scheler’s impact on Non-conformism points to an affinity between the phenomenology of affectivity and the antibourgeois movement in interwar France. Scheler himself calls on the vitalism of Guyau and Bergson to argue against projective concepts of empathy. He broadens affective situations into an interaction between bourgeois tendencies to narrow ressentiment and generous cultural dynamics. Non-conformists appropriate these modes of affectivity, pried from faith contexts. Jankélévitch transforms Scheler’s value ethic into an aggressive virtue ethic. Corbin draws from Scheler the inspiration for (...) a syncretistic anthropology of responsiveness. With reference to Scheler, Aron develops an ethic of value decisions that is free from ressentiment. (shrink)

This article examines some of Scheler's short writings, written near the end of and shortly after the First World War. Scheler applied his phenomenology of social forms, developed in “Formalism in Ethics,” especially that of the “life community,” which has its model in the true and ancient Christian idea of community, to the problem of the spiritual and intellectual reconstruction of Europe, Germany, and the Christian churches after the end of the First World War in the hope that this would (...) ease the tensions between them. However, the changed social, political and economic conditions after the war made Scheler's analyses and suggestions irrelevant, and Scheler looked for new ways to achieve the social engagement of philosophy. (shrink)

In confrontation with the current events of his time, Max Scheler develops his idea of a “new Europe”, which is to emerge from the ruins of the First World War in confrontation with “capitalist England” and through the awakening of a new religiosity. From the 1920s onwards, the idea of unity under Catholicism is overcome and raised to a higher level to a global and cosmopolitan level. Scheler speaks of a “cosmopolitanism” that needs to be learned and will ultimately entail (...) a balancing process (Ausgleichsgeschehen). Scheler understands this Ausgleich and cosmopolitanism as an educational task (Bildungsaufgabe). According to Scheler, only in and through the education (Bildung) of persons towards this idea can national, cultural and religious one-sidedness be overcome. Scheler's new conception of knowledge and Bildung plays an essential role in this, culminating in the concept of the all-man (Allmensch), who, as a relative all-man, is to be both a model and a goal. (shrink)

Drawing on Max Scheler’s political-programmatic writings produced during and after World War I, this contribution intends to examine the content and consistency of the ideal of a cultural-spiritual unity of Europe (as distinct from its political, legal, or economic unity), and to provide a basis for discussing its plausibility and fruitfulness for the present time. About 100 years ago, the philosopher thought about the future of Europe, and claimed to be able to infer concrete orientations for political action from fundamental (...) philosophical insights. Thus, the paper proceeds from conceptual foundations to their application to concrete practical problems. The first section intends to outline the concept of cultural unity and the principle of solidarity between cultural unities; this makes it possible, in the second part, to distinguish the European cultural sphere from others; the final section gives a positive determination of the specific unity of European culture, including some educational consequences. (shrink)

Recently there has been a spate of interest in Max Scheler’s social phenomenology (Schloßberger, 2016; Szanto & Moran, 2016; Cusinato, 2018). In this paper I aim to show that his philosophical contribution on Europe and Europeanism has its focal point on the concepts of rebuilding (Wiederaufbau) and rebirth (Wiedergeburt). My idea is that, for Scheler, the essential condition of any attitude towards socio-cultural change (Umkehr) have its center in the idea of the formation and the development of the personal singularity (...) (Personbildung) (Scheler, 2009a; Scheler, 2010a; Scheler, 2013). And this means the growth and the expression, in a solidaristic perspective, of one’s own ethical singularity (An-sich-Gutes für mich) and of one’s own vocations. The idea of solidarity declined in terms of Bildung is therefore strictly interdependent on the testimony coming from Otherness-exemplar (Vorbild) (Scheler, 2009f). (shrink)

In the theory and philosophy of law, war is often considered as a legal remedy. For example, according to H. Kelsen, war is a sanction of international law. These sanctions, like sanctions in national law, consist in the forcible deprivation of life, liberty, and other goods, notably of economic value. In war, human beings are killed, maimed, imprisoned, and national or private property is destroyed. By way of reprisals, national or private property is confiscated and other legal rights are infringed. (...) At the same time, it seems clear that the human experience in conditions such as suffering, pain, and death, has nothing in common with law. The decision of a sovereign state to start a war means a rejection to recognize both the norm of law as well as the generalized Other. Then, despite all the norms and guarantees of international law, the living experience of human beings during war is an experience of lawlessness, because they are harmed and at the same time not even recognized as legal subjects. Therefore, in order to answer the question about whether law is possible during war, we have to clarify in what way law exists outside the traditional norms of law, whether positive or natural. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine phenomenologically the structure of the normative noema, which I call the “nomothetic noema.” I distinguish the meaning content, its normative characters, which I call “ductive forces”, and its modes of givenness. Next, I introduce the traditional difference between modalities de re and de dicto. I argue that the current tendency, in deontic logic, to treat deontic expressions as operators over sentences induces, at least on the syntactic surface, a de dicto reading. I then discuss some (...) of the theoretical decisions that underlie deontic logic, starting from two basic asymmetries between modal alethic logic and deontic logic. The decisive point is to recover a strong sense of permission that I equate with the factor of free agency, which is difficult to formalize. Finally, I return to the analysis of the nomothetic noema and try to show how a de re reading is better suited to account for normative intentionality. I simultaneously introduce the concept of status-imposing norms, which must be formulated with a normative use of the copulas “is” and “has.” I conclude that the treatment of normative expressions is more appropriate when they are understood as complex copulas, irreducible to assertive sentences, rather than as operators over whole sentences. I emphasize on this occasion that, from a phenomenological point of view and within the framework of genetic analysis, the primitive basic datum is the freedom of agency, on which the normative domain of assigning statuses to agents, obligations, and prohibitions is built. (shrink)

The essay focuses on the rethinking of the conceptual circle normativity-truth-validity as regards its projection on the theory of law. Starting from the perspective of the “law in action”, that is to say by considering the experience/behaviour of the “common man”, the classical distinction between truth-validity can be rediscussed. This perspective is based on the concept of “common sense”: it is a very complex dimension composed by different strata and entails a new meditation on the pair “deontic-psychological” also in light (...) of some Edmund Husserl’s clues. Accordingly, it is possible to grasp the pair truth-validity “in action” (i.e. within the common legal experience), in order to propose some “open” conclusions concerning the dimensions of law as well as the legal theory. (shrink)

The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using the word “true”, on the one hand when it is used to refer to a property of what we say or believe, here called “words’ truth”, on the other when it is used to refer to a feature of things in general (as when we say “he is a true friend”), here called “things’ truth”. I will point out how such similarities and differences may be usefully (...) described starting from the feature of truth called “transparency” which is often considered as exclusively pertaining to words’ truth. The upshot of the paper will be that Aquinas was right in considering the two kinds of truth as species of the unique genus “adaequatio rei et intellectus”, but that this conclusion can be reached without any commitment to the ideology (in the Quinean sense) of the correspondence theory of truth. (shrink)

The paper concerns the following two questions: (i) is the general exclusive norm a proper legal norm? (ii) if the general exclusive norm is a proper legal norm, is it universally valid? It will be held that the general exclusive norm is a proper legal norm and not a logical principle. Therefore, as a legal norm, it can be said to be valid or invalid. The answer to the second question will be negative: the general exclusive norm, as a proper (...) legal norm, is valid only in those legal systems in which it is positively established. (shrink)

The investigation of concept of “true” and “false” has long privileged in contemporary philosophy apophantic truth, that is, the truth of dicta (sentences or propositions). To which entities, though, beyond dicta, the predicate ‘true’ pertains? This paper sheds a light on the less frequently investigated cases where we speak of a truth of things, or res. We say, for instance, that a 17 euros banknote is not a true banknote, or that a true soldier ought to be brave. The paper, (...) thus, distinguishes, beside the concept of de dicto (apophantic) truth, the concept of de re truth and two of its subspecies: eidological truth and idiological truth. (shrink)

In Adelaster (2016), A. G. Conte proposes a distinction between de dicto and de re attributions of truth and falsity, which he illustrates mostly with documents of legal standing, but also with an artificial object (a false tooth). The present aim is to propose an analogous distinction between monadic (one-place) and polyadic uses of “true” and “false”, and to sketch some features of its logical functioning with closer attention to the monadic pole than is usual. One proposal is that, in (...) these uses, “true” and “false” do not function as opposites under negation. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop a concept of matter as something both knowable and relevant for the empirical test of our knowledge statements. In light of the debate between logical empiricism and phenomenology, the paper discusses the forms of realism and theory of experience revolving around the observable/unobservable and visible/invisible distinctions. On this basis, a notion of matter is outlined that is based on the concept of forceful quality, rather than on givenness. Finally, it is shown that the concept of (...) forceful quality can be a good candidate for solving the paradox of categorization, by moving beyond the solutions proposed so far. (shrink)

The notion of de re truth (Conte, 2016) is put to work in this paper (§ 1). It introduces us to a confrontation between a metaphysics of desertic landscapes, as presented in a stunning poem by Achille Varzi and Claudio Calosi, The Tribulations of Philosophye (§ 2), and an ontology of the lifeworld, as a long-term project based on the key concept of bonds (De Monticelli, 2018). The rich and structured objects of the everyday world are infinite sources of information (...) and cognitive adventure (§§ 3, 3.1., 3.2). Or so I will claim against Varzi’s skepticism about ordinary language, common sense, and ontological realism (§ 4). Far from encouraging our minds to stick to concrete individual things, Ockham’s Razor has been the murder weapon in the dismission of concreteness and the sensible world from the intellectual horizon of Modernity (§§ 5, 6). The “Unitarian Tradition” is a half-playful denomination of a quite real, albeit ignored, alternative theory of individuality (and hence concreteness), brilliantly represented by Boethius, Duns Scotus, and Leibniz. Classic phenomenology quite independently revived it and brought it up to modern analytic standards of rigor and formality (§ 7). (shrink)

Contemporary reflection on the concept of value oscillates between positions that advocate absolutist realism and positions that propose total relativism. The present paper aims to distance itself from these two ways of reading the topic, rejecting any monolithic conception, and proposing a stratified theory of value. Beginning with an analysis of values that differentiates them from both “goods” and “valuations,” the author outlines an understanding of value that must be investigated in its multiple, interconnected layers. The stratification starts from the (...) role of the emotional sphere and comes down to a formal and absolute conception of the concept. The goal of the paper is to outline the different levels of validity of each proposed layer, which must be recognized and differentiated, with the aim of also capturing the difficulties and ambiguities that characterize the transition from one level to another. (shrink)

The paper aims to analyze the problems that religious truth, particularly Christian truth understood as an event, poses to the category of de re truth. How does the conception of truth ‘as event’ stand phenomenologically in relation to the contemporary analytical debate on truth? Statements in the catechism such as “true God and true man” referring to Jesus, or the same words attributed to Jesus in John’s gospel (14:6) such as “I am the way, the truth or the life” how (...) can they be understood in relation to the category of recently called ‘dual character concepts’? Is there a difference between the notion of ‘true warrior’ and that of ‘true God’? When is a person appropriately categorized as a true man? When is a person appropriately categorized as a true God? What is the relationship between faith and truth? (shrink)

This paper attempts to answer whether the property of “efficacy” can be attributed to constitutive rules. In particular, according to Di Lucia, I will point out some problems that the “semantic conception of efficacy” has concerning constitutive and regulative rules. Then, the main goal of the paper will be to reflect on the possibility of the efficacy of constitutive rules by means of a complex case that the semantic conception seems to disregard: The case of the cheater. Does the action (...) of the cheater show the inefficacy of constitutive rules? Does she play the game while breaking the rule? Can the semantic conception of efficacy explain this situation, or do we need a more flexible concept of efficacy that takes nomotropism into account? These are some of the questions I will try to answer. (shrink)

In his explanation of human action Alfred Schutz resorts mainly to Max Weber’s notion of subjective meaning and Husserl’s notion of type. For him subjective meaning seems more important to understand human action than the fact that social actors internalize normative values. Accordingly, validity has mainly to do with projects of action, with fulfilled (or unfulfilled) expectations and to the stock of knowledge available, along with the actor’s system of relevances. This raises two characteristic Schutzian problems: 1) the relation between (...) the subjective meaning of an action and the objective criteria (namely, the juridical and the ethical ones) according to which any action can be evaluated; 2) the relation between an actor and his fellow human beings that arguably share the same system of relevances and act in the same normative framework. In this paper, I intend to offer an analysis of these issues, resorting mainly to Schutz’s 1934 book Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt, and in some unpublished manuscripts. (shrink)

Saul Kripke’s paradoxical argument in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) has generated an extravagant number of responses. A major debate prompted by this book has focused on the plausibility and role of the supposed normative character of meaning; the argument itself is often taken to rely on the assumption that meaning is irreducibly normative. Following Boghossian (1989), the normativity of meaning has been understood as closely tied to the existence of semantic correctness conditions. After a brief introduction to (...) the background of the debate, this work will focus on whether the normativity of meaning may be better understood as stemming from a different type of correctness, namely linguistic correctness. Linguistic correctness differs from semantic correctness insofar as it is related to conventional, and not truth-functional, meaning. I will begin by clarifying some of the features of linguistic correctness. First, I will outline some reasons why the distinction between linguistic and semantic correctness should be maintained. Then, I will anticipate a possible criticism and argue that linguistic correctness does not belong to the domain of pragmatics, as it is relevant to our understanding of conventional meaning. Finally, I will try to show that linguistic “oughts” are constitutive of meaning. Having established these basic features of linguistic correctness, I will investigate whether the fact that it is constitutive of meaning can vindicate the idea that meaning is robustly, irreducibly normative. By applying arguments from the realm of moral philosophy – within which, too, there have been attempts to show that constitutive facts can give rise to categorical moral norms – I will argue that linguistic correctness cannot give rise to categorical semantic norms. Linguistic correctness may be, nevertheless, a useful tool for explaining some of our intuitions about meaning. (shrink)

This paper deals with custom in action, namely, with the relationship between custom and action against the background of Amedeo Giovanni Conte’s nomotropism. Starting with Frerichs’ provocation of the peculiarity of saying ‘handeln nach der Sitte’ (acting according to custom) in favor of ‘sich handelnd nach was üblich ist’ (acting after what is usual), this paper will begin an exploratory research regarding the semantics and the ontology of custom to investigate the possibility of a nomotropic behavior in the field of (...) custom. Therefore, this paper will quote, at first, Rudolf von Jhering’s theory, and, at second, Ferdinand Tönnies’ theory. In conclusion, this paper suggests that an inquiry into custom in action (and in particular Tönnies’ ontology of the normative) could benefit from the nomotropic categories of analysis – such as adeontic and deontic regularities. (shrink)

Truth is not only a semantic notion, because it can involve our whole being, both intellectual and emotional. The emotional character of the truth determines its relevance for us. In this paper I will first discuss Ronald de Sousa’s theory of emotional truth and the idea of the appropriateness of emotions in relation to judgment. Secondly, I will deal with Meinong’s conception that emotions have both an evaluative and a cognitive character, allow us to know what the world is like, (...) and consequently are related to truth. Truth then turns out to be a value. If something is valuable to me, it stirs an emotion. That is why truth is capable of attracting feelings. Emotional truth is that truth which attracts a justified knowledge-feeling. This is the basis on which we might develop an aesthetics of concepts whereby theories, in order to be established, need not only to be regarded as true but to produce an emotional involvement of the subjects. (shrink)

The present paper investigates the nature of norms in correlation to the philosophical notions of intentionality and disposition. Following Amselek (2017; 2020), norms are here understood as tools giving the measure of what is possible to do. Intentionality, understood as “being-about”, in relation to norms allows us both to form a description of reality in the norm, and to correct our actions in order to correspond to the norm. Through the notion of disposition, i.e., on the one hand, the linguistic (...) manifestation of the norm and, on the other hand, the physical presence of individual mental states or social states-of-affairs, the paper investigates the “force of norms” and the “mystery of effectiveness”. Elaborating on the notion of “nomotropism”, which highlights the different ways in which a norm may work or operate, and drawing inspiration from Dennett’s philosophy of mind, the paper suggests that legal norms, which allow for the expectation that social behaviors will be measured by specific standards or yardsticks, clearly offer an evolutionary advantage in the regulation of human relationships. (shrink)

In the following paper we relate to the terms such as ‘true’ and ‘real’ in conjecture with dual character concepts such as ‘scientist’ and ‘artist’. They are often integrated into phrases broadly viewed as persuasive definitions. We argue that persuasive definitions are usually intended to marginalize individuals, sub-groups, and even objects, within a group. They may also be employed to elevate or preserve the status of a group by disassociating it with its marginal members, their actions, and characteristics. For example, (...) ‘true’ art may be stipulatively defined as having certain features to persuade us to accept the marginalization of those objects of art that lack them, and to elevate the social status of the authors of the objects that have them. ‘No true Scotsman is cruel’ is uttered to distance the normative Scots from those who run afoul, so that they can maintain untarnished reputation and positive identity. (shrink)

The value of solidarity, which implies mutual concern and support, is often conveyed in our everyday moral and political language. But what is its conceptual relationship with justice? Influential positions in this debate may argue for the opposition between the two concepts: justice is impartial and universal, while solidarity is partial and limited. The present paper aims to shortly explore a range of theories that may exemplify possible answers to this position, from communitarian and realist views, which ultimately confirm the (...) opposition, to political solidarities, which claim an instrumental need for solidarity as a reaction to injustices. Special attention will be paid to Habermas’s compatibilist account of solidarity as the “reverse side” of justice. The paper contends that a compelling answer should preserve the difference between the two spheres and the essential features of solidarity by also sketching a concept of solidarity as a social duty arising from our moral interdependence. (shrink)

Are there things that we must never do, no matter how untypical the circumstances and “unorthodox” our deontic ideas might be? In this essay I try to make evident that acts I call “pure sadist acts” satisfy this description. I discuss several examples of such acts and alert to their being not always easy to distinguish from certain others. Norms prohibiting such acts I call “true”, and I suggest that other, less suggestive, norms might also be (derivatively) true, if the (...) pertinent acts stand in certain relations with the former ones. I incorporate some ideas from Hume, as well as from elementary model theory, to make mine clearer. (shrink)