Although it is a common trope that Hegel’s philosophy marks a seminal shift in the historical orientation of philosophical thought in general, some of the historical problems confronting the reader of the Science of Logic remain relatively neglected. This is not to say that there is any lack of historical work on various dimensions of the Logic. Rather, what remains neglected are the hidden difficulties involved in construing how historical materials contribute to the logical project developed in Hegel’s Science of (...) Logic. These difficulties play an important role in determining the heterogeneous significance of these historical materials, because the role they play in the logical developments is markedly different in different portions of the text being examined. This essay (1) demonstrates that a reader must keep in mind this lack of uniformity when developing a critical interpretation of the Logic, and (2) develops guidelines to facilitate this approach. (shrink)

Here, I consider three issues in Jon Stewart’s Hegel’s Interpretation of the Religions of the World chapter on Hegel’s treatment of Chinese religions in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. First, I show how Stewart’s compilation of multiple courses into one unified entity hides the substantial promotion of its status in the 1831 lectures. Second, I contend that rather than identifying Hegel’s Chinese religion with the ancient Zhou practices as Stewart does, Hegel sees it as referring to state Ruism (...) up to and including Hegel’s time. Finally, I posit that the main challenge is distinguishing Hegel’s method of philosophical history from other forms of history and the consequences this has for evaluating the determinate religions. In the process, I argue for a broad dialectical interpretation over one committed to each step in Hegel’s treatment of these religions. (shrink)

In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel describes at length and in detail the particular workings of animal digestion and excretion, referring to the empirical research of his day (Berzelius, Spallanzani, Traviranus). By becoming engaged in the scientific disputes and insights of the time—regarding, for example, the mechanical versus chemical nature of digestion, immediate digestive assimilation and the chemical composition of feces—Hegel arrives at the novel idea that what the animal excretes as superfluous is its own particular entanglement with inorganic otherness. (...) The animal’s subsequent feeling of triumph and satisfaction constitutes the affirmation of individual purposiveness, a form of immediate ideality that Hegel presents as animal subjectivity. (shrink)

This article responds to Andrew Komasinski’s “History and Philosophical Method: Hegel, Stewart, and Chinese Religion,” which provides a valuable discussion of my book, Hegel’s Interpretation of the Religions of the World. Specifically, he discusses my chapter on Hegel’s treatment of the Chinese religion (in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion) and also offers some important reflections on methodology. I argue that, although the conceptual understanding of religion is essential for Hegel, the historical aspect of his approach cannot be dismissed. (...) Moreover, I agree that Hegel’s account of the Chinese religion is diverse and changes during the various iterations of his lectures and that much work remains to be done on this important topic in Hegel studies. (shrink)