Both Hippolytus of Rome and Sextus Empiricus attribute a concept of λόγος to Empedocles, relying on fragments that seem to have nothing to do with this claim. This article aims to show how the identification and clarification of their common Stoic source helps us to understand these texts better, and to reconstruct an interpretation of Empedocles’ epistemology that has not attracted critical attention so far.

In this paper I offer a close reading of Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114a31–b25 and try to show that despite considerable interpretive difficulties, some clear structure can nevertheless be discerned. While Aristotle’s main concern in this passage is to refute the so-called asymmetry thesis – the thesis that virtue is voluntary, but vice is not – there is much more in it than just a dialectical encounter. Aristotle wants to respond to a more general objection, which has as (...) its target the voluntariness of both virtue and vice, and which is provoked by some of his ideas in EN 3.4 and 3.5. Further, I will try to show why Aristotle thinks that we are only co-causes of our dispositions. In my opinion, his reasons have nothing to do with compatibilist or incompatibilist considerations as they are commonly understood in modern philosophy. In particular, he does not want to argue that nature is aitios of our dispositions just as ourselves are. Rather, we are co-causes of our dispositions because we are causal origins of actions without which a certain good, which is the final cause of our actions and of our dispositions, cannot be achieved. Finally, I will try to show that Aristotle’s discussion implies that there is no more to the responsibility for dispositions than there is to the responsibility for actions. (shrink)

One of Plato’s goal in the Phaedo is not only to define what philosophy is, but also to describe what ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ philosophy consists of. This description of ‘authentic’ philosophy reveals a tension. Indeed, if Socrates feels the need to speak of a genuine philosophy, is it not a sign that there is another type of philosophy, which is inauthentic and fake? If Plato emphasizes the legitimacy of some philosophers, is it not because he believes that there are others, (...) who resemble the former but are a mere imitation of them? In fact, there is in the Phaedo an implicit description of ‘false’ philosophers, which culminates with the presentation of a precise case: the antilogician. Sometimes called a sophist, often described as an eristic, the antilogician is a perfect example of philosophy gone wrong. Criticised more than once in his dialogues, Plato condemns vivaciously the antilogician as he diverts real philosophical inquiry and immerses people in absolute relativism. (shrink)

Recent attempts at giving meaning to Empedocles’ enigmatic metaphor of a ‘pathway’ and ‘summits’ suffer from weaknesses logical no less than philological. Contrary theses do not have to be contradictory. Does Empedocles express a preference for ‘summits’ as opposed to a ‘pathway’, or for a ‘pathway’ as opposed to ‘summits’? Very possibly neither. The context in which the two verses are quoted points rather to a graceful peroration. However many ‘summits’ there may have been on the way, the traveller has (...) to complete his journey. However many the fascinating topics Cleombrotus has spoken of, he has to know how to bring his speech, his ‘path of words’, to a successful conclusion. (shrink)

This paper argues that Synesios’ De regno is a mirror for princes and a splendid example of Neoplatonic political philosophy. It is based on Plato’s Politeia and its model of philosopher-kingship. Synesios makes his audience compare the current political reality with the ideal of the philosopher-kings, who are the image of the transcendent god in the political realm. In doing so he recommends political virtue in general, especially phronesis and sophrosyne. Particularly he argues for reforming the recruitment of military and (...) civil officials with reference to Plato’s concept of friendship in the Politeia. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that in the Sophist Plato develops a dialectical strategy that appeals to necessary conditions of language as a fundamental step toward establishing some principles of his ontology. This strategy constitutes a clear antecedent of the elenctic refutation offered by Aristotle in Metaphysics Gamma 4 against the denier of the principle of non-contradiction and could be described as transcendental because it refers to conditions without which there wouldn’t be any speech. The paper aims (...) to show that such a strategy is used both by Plato and Aristotle to deal with radical adversaries whose refutation allows the establishment of basic theses of their own philosophies. (shrink)

The paper offers an analysis of Protagoras’ fr. DK 80 B 1 and rejects the traditional reading of Protagoras as relativist. By considering the ipsissima verba that Protagoras makes use of in his passage, it is argued that alternative interpretations are possible, of which epistemological reism and psychological individualism are proposed. On a more general level, it is discussed to what extent Protagoras’ fragment contains descriptive rather than normative claim.

Despite intensive exegetical work, Plato’s description of dialectic in the Sophist still raises many questions. Through a close reading of this passage that contextualizes it in the general organisation of the Sophist, this paper provides answers to these questions. After presenting the difficult text, I contend that the “vowel-kinds” are necessary conditions for the blending of kinds. Then, I interpret the “cause of divisions” mentioned by the Stranger as the kinds responsible of the dichotomous division in the first half of (...) the dialogue. In the next part, I show that 235d5-e2 does not describe a procedure of “meta-divison” as some commentators have it, but that it describes the method of division itself. Finally, I connect the difficulty and the obscurity of the passage to the fact that dialectic is the supreme science and I explain why dialectic is the science of free men. (shrink)