I argue in opposition to Sam Rakover that the current lack of fully adequate theories of the subjective and qualitative aspects of mind does not justify the adoption of what he calls “methodological dualism” (Rakover, this issue). Scientific understanding of consciousness requires the continuation of attempts to explain it in terms of the neural mechanisms that support it. It would be premature to adopt a methodological stance that could foreclose on the possibility of more reductionistic approaches. The effects of such (...) a stance would be especially pernicious insofar as methodological dualism lacks rigorous methods for testing specific models. (shrink)

Rakover has thought about the nature of explanation for a long time and he has written some insightful pieces on the possibility of incorporating mentalistic language into serious explanations of our activities. Here he takes an extreme tack and grounds his arguments on the oldest of all chestnuts, the mind/body problem. Ironically, as an undergraduate he may have misinterpreted the words of his favorite professor so as to lead him to agonize for decades over the proper interpretation of private experience (...) [for him it’s “mentalistic”]. This has ultimately led to this article, proposing a Multi-Explanation Framework that mixes what he calls “mentalistic” and “mechanistic” elements in behavioral sequences, incorporating a Mentalistic Purposive Explanation Scheme that has the virtue, in his eyes, of adding what “radical behaviorism” lacks. The reader is left with the impression that the explanations produced using this framework would seem more satisfying only because the vocabulary involved is the one we learned as children, and that their usefulness would be no more than that of the folk psychology that has always prevailed. Rakover and many others confuse radical behaviorism with behavior analysis, which leads to tiresome and pointless critiques of the former. (shrink)

This monograph introduces the functional characteristics and conceptual significance of a simulation software system called CyberRat (Ray, 1996a, 2003a, 2012a, 2012b). CyberRat expands upon prior illustrations (Ray & Delprato, 1989; Ray, 1992) of how such computer-based simulations can serve to formatively enhance, and eventually validate, the descriptive research methodology upon which their development relies. To illustrate this process I also review highlights of previous publications (cf. Ray & Brown, 1975, 1976; Ray & Delprato, 1989), detailing the unique research methodology used (...) to collect data that guided CyberRat’s development. This methodology integrates interbehavioral psychology (Kantor, 1959) and general systems analysis (von Bertalanffy, 1968), and thus is referred to as interbehavioral systems analysis (IBSA). CyberRat’s validation of IBSA methods involves a process analogous to Turing’s (1950) famous test for simulation authenticity, in that it relies upon “phenomenological equivalence” criteria for observers to compare experiences of real vs. simulated events. And because IBSA stresses three convergent strategies for research, including structural analysis, functional analysis, and operations analysis, my organizing theme addresses how closely CyberRat comes to passing a trilogy of hypothetical Turing tests—one for each of these three analytic strategies. (shrink)

The transparency of qualia to introspection has been given as reason for favoring a representationalist view of phenomenal character. Qualia realists, notably Block (1996, 2000), A.D. Smith (2008), and Kind (2003, 2008), have denied that qualia are transparent. What is clear is that the phenomenology of introspection alone cannot decide the case, but a theory of introspection could. If the qualia realist could show that our introspective access to mental properties is akin to the perceptual access we have to perceived (...) properties, then she has grounds for denying the transparency claim. On the other hand, if introspection does not provide access to intrinsic mental properties, then the representationalist has a basis for defending the transparency claim. Armstrong’s theory of introspection has been taken to be typical of perceptual theories; however, this paper will give reasons for thinking not only that his theory does not in fact constitute a perceptual theory but that such theories of introspection do not afford qualia realists with the means of denying the transparency of qualia to introspection. (shrink)