The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Lean toward: yes | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept: Platonism | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept: objective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Lean toward: yes | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | I am answering this question on the assumption that views like Conee/Feldman mentalism is a form of internalism. | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept: non-skeptical realism | | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept: compatibilism | Compatibilism in principle, but not willing to commit on the question of whether determinism is true. | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: atheism | But I would be very excited if someone can convince me I am wrong | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept both | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Accept: invariantism | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: non-Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Other | I'm not sure whether to regard the question as unclear or myself as insufficiently familiar with the question. | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | The question is too unclear to answer | "Content" is simply used in too many ways by too many people for me to know what this question purports to be asking. Though I suspect on most views, I would accept externalism. | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept: moral realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | If this is asking something like arm-chair vs. ex-phi, then I have an opinion, but I can't tell if that is what the question is asking about, in part because I am not sufficiently familiar with the literature on metaphilosophy | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept: physicalism | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: cognitivism | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | The question is too unclear to answer | If the question is asking what I would do in the scenario, I would pick one box. If the question is asking what I think is rational to do in the scenario, I lean towards two-boxes. | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Lean toward: virtue ethics | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Reject one or two, undecided between others | I reject disjunctivism and sense-data theory. I am insufficiently well informed about the distinctions among the others to have a settled view. | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | I am reasonably sure I do not adhere to libertarianism. | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Accept: Millian | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Accept: scientific realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Lean toward: death | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Lean toward: switch | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept more than one | I accept both Correspondence and Deflationary | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible | | |