RESUMO O artigo tem por objetivo analisar a mudança no regime do signo que ocorreu na filosofia de Husserl entre os anos de 1890 e 1901. Para tanto, partimos da reconstrução da teoria do simbolismo apresentada em Sobre a Lógica dos Signos, de 1890, e analisamos a recepção de algumas de suas teses centrais em Investigações Lógicas, de 1901. Querse, com isso, sublinhar a relevância histórica deste pequeno tratado de 1890 para a fenomenologia madura de Husserl. Ver-se-á, específicamente, que a (...) crítica ao princípio da economia do pensar apresentada em Prolegômenos à Lógica Pura é o prolongamento de uma tese de 1890 e que o conceito de intenção simbólica vazia de 1901 é a resposta de Husserl aos impasses de sua primeira teoria do signo enquanto substituto. Conclui-se, por fim, mostrando como essa mudança no regime do signo é condição de possibilidade para a análise correlativa característica de Investigações Lógicas. ABSTRACT The article aims to analyze the changes in the regime of sign that occurred in Husserl’s philosophy between the years of1890 and 1901. To do so, we start with the reconstruction of the theory of symbolism presented in On the Logic of Signs, from 1890, and analyze the reception of some of its central theses in the Logical Investigations, from 1901. It is intended to emphasize the historical relevance of this small treatise of 1890 for Husserl’s mature phenomenology. It will be seen specifically that the critique of the principle of the economy of thought presented in Prolegomena to Pure Logic is the extension of a thesis from 1890 and that the concept of symbolic empty-intention from 1901 is Husserl’s answer to the impasses of his first theory of the sign as a substitute. We conclude, in the end, by showing how this change in the regime of sign is condition ofpossibility for the correlative analysis characteristic of the Logical Investigations. (shrink)

Hubert Dreyfus once noted that it would be difficult to ascertain whether Edmund Husserl had a computational theory of mind. I provide evidence that he had one. Both Steven Pinker and Steven Horst think that the computational theory of mind must have two components: a representational-symbolic component and a causal component. Bearing this in mind, we proceed to a close-reading of the sections of “On the Logic of Signs” wherein Husserl presents, if I’m correct, his computational theory of mind embedded (...) in a language of thought. My argument goes like this: the computational theory of mind is the idea, following Haugeland, that the mind comes prepackaged as, or is endogenously constrained to be, an automatic formal system; this explains, according to Husserl, why automatic trains of thought without logical intent resemble arguments exhibiting deductive structure with logical intent. In general, an automatic formal system yields true results provided that the syntactic symbols with which they compute are univocal and are semantically evaluable, and the mechanized inferences they perform are valid and preserve truth. These two conditions describe a computational cognitive process: the first condition connects representations to syntax, and the second condition uses the syntax, in inauthentic judging, to arrive at true conclusions through blind causality. Now, in point of textual fact, these are the conditions which Husserl attributes to our “natural psychological mechanism of symbolic inference” which typically yields true results. Since a formal system attributed to the “internal structure” of the mind, and guided by blind causality, just is the computational theory of mind, it follows, I think, that Husserl had a computational theory of mind. This computational theory is, moreover, embedded in a language of thought, since Husserl attributes a language-like form to our thoughts so that they may be mechanically processed. I conclude with a discussion of my results. (shrink)

This paper accomplishes two tasks. First, I examine in detail Edmund Husserl’s earliest philosophy of surrogates, as it is found in his 1890 “On the Logic of Signs ”. I analyze his psychological and logical investigations of surrogates, where the former is concerned with explaining how these signs function and the latter with how they do so reliably. His differentiation of surrogates on the basis of their genetic origins and degrees of necessity is discussed. Second, the historical importance of this (...) text is disclosed by showing how Semiotic serves as both the inspiration for, and the foil to, Husserl’s 1901 First Logical Investigation. Husserl not only adopts the idea that linguistic signs can function via association, but also maintains that such signs can motivate me to execute one of two experiences. The key difference between the texts is that Husserl abandons his theory of surrogates in 1901, instead holding that I can experience absent objects by means of empty intentions. The reasons why Husserl found it necessary to transform this tenet of his philosophy are discussed at length. (shrink)

This paper examines the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy of nonintuitive intentions. The analysis has two stages. First, I expose a mistake in Husserl’s account of non-intuitive acts from his 1901 Logical Investigations. I demonstrate that Husserl employs the term “signitive” too broadly, as he concludes that all non-intuitive acts are signitive. He states that not only meaning acts, but also the contiguity intentions of perception are signitive acts. Second, I show how Husserl, in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical (...) Investigation, amends his 1901 theory of non-intuitive acts, which he now calls “empty” intentions. He there accurately distinguishes empty meaning acts from the empty intentions of perception. In the conclusion, I reveal how Husserl’s alterations to his theory of non-intuitive intentions can inform our understanding of a larger shift in his philosophy. (shrink)