For more than 20 years, research has proven the beneficial effect of natural frequencies when it comes to solving Bayesian reasoning tasks (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). In a recent meta-analysis, McDowell & Jacobs (2017) showed that presenting a task in natural frequency format increases performance rates to 24% compared to only 4% when the same task is presented in probability format. Nevertheless, on average three quarters of participants in their meta-analysis failed to obtain the correct solution for such a task (...) in frequency format. In this paper, we present an empirical study on what participants typically do wrong when confronted with natural frequencies. We found that many of them did not actually use natural frequencies for their calculations, but translated them back into complicated probabilities instead. This switch from the intuitive presentation format to a less intuitive calculation format will be discussed within the framework of psychological theories (e.g., the Einstellung effect). (shrink)

ABSTRACTProbability judgements entail a conjunction fallacy if a conjunction is estimated to be more probable than one of its conjuncts. In the context of predication of alternative logical hypothesis, Bayesian logic provides a formalisation of pattern probabilities that renders a class of pattern-based CFs rational. BL predicts a complete system of other logical inclusion fallacies. A first test of this prediction is investigated here, using transparent tasks with clear set inclusions, varying in observed frequencies only. Experiment 1 uses data where (...) BL makes dominant predictions; Experiment 2's predictions were less clear, and we additionally investigated judgements about the second-most probable hypotheses. The results corroborated a pattern-probability account and cannot be easily explained by other theories of CFs. IFs were not limited to conjunctions, but rather occurred systematically for several logical connectives. Thus, pattern-based prob... (shrink)

Barbey & Sloman (B&S) relegate the logical rule of the excluded middle to a footnote. But this logical rule is necessary for natural sampling. Making the rule explicit in a logical tree can make a problem easier to solve. Examples are given of uses of the rule that are non-constructive and not reducible to a domain-specific module.

Cognition is both empowered and limited by representations. The matrix lens model explicates tasks that are based on frequency counts, conditional probabilities, and binary contingencies in a general fashion. Based on a structural analysis of such tasks, the model links several problems and semantic domains and provides a new perspective on representational accounts of cognition that recognizes representational isomorphs as opportunities, rather than as problems. The shared structural construct of a 2 × 2 matrix supports a set of generic tasks (...) and semantic mappings that provide a unifying framework for understanding problems and defining scientific measures. Our model's key explanatory mechanism is the adoption of particular perspectives on a 2 × 2 matrix that categorizes the frequency counts of cases by some condition, treatment, risk, or outcome factor. By the selective steps of filtering, framing, and focusing on specific aspects, the measures used in various semantic domains negotiate distinct trade-offs between abstraction and specialization. As a consequence, the transparent communication of such measures must explicate the perspectives encapsulated in their derivation. To demonstrate the explanatory scope of our model, we use it to clarify theoretical debates on biases and facilitation effects in Bayesian reasoning and to integrate the scientific measures from various semantic domains within a unifying framework. A better understanding of problem structures, representational transparency, and the role of perspectives in the scientific process yields both theoretical insights and practical applications. (shrink)

A diagnostic judgment of a teacher can be seen as an inference from manifest observable evidence on a student’s behavior to his or her latent traits. This can be described by a Bayesian model of in-ference: The teacher starts from a set of assumptions on the student (hypotheses), with subjective probabilities for each hypothesis (priors). Subsequently, he or she uses observed evidence (stu-dents’ responses to tasks) and knowledge on conditional probabilities of this evidence (likelihoods) to revise these assumptions. Many systematic (...) deviations from this model (biases, e.g. base-rate neglect, inverse fallacy) are reported in literature on Bayesian reasoning. In a teacher’s situation the information (hypotheses, priors, likelihoods) is usually not explicitly represented numerically (as in most research on Bayesian reasoning), but only by qualitative esti-mations in the mind of the teacher. In our study, we ask to which extent individuals (approximately) apply a rational Bayesian strategy or resort on other biased strategies of processing information for their diagnostic judgments. We explicitly pose this question with respect to non-numerical settings. To investigate this question, we developed a scenario that visually displays all relevant information (hypotheses, priors, likelihoods) in a graphically displayed hypothesis space (called “hypothegon”) – without recurring to numerical representations or mathematical procedures. 42 pre-service teach-ers were asked to judge the plausibility of different misconceptions of six students based on their responses to decimal comparison tasks (e.g. 3.39 > 3.4). Applying a Bayesian classification proce-dure, we identified three updating strategies: A Bayesian update strategy (BUS, processing all probabilities), a combined evidence strategy (CES, ignoring the prior probabilities but including all likelihoods), and a single evidence strategy (SES, only using the likelihood of the most probable hypothesis). In study 1, an instruction on the relevance of using all probabilities (priors and likelihoods) only weakly increased the processing of more information. In study 2, we found strong evidence that a visual explication of the prior-likelihood interaction led to an increase of processing the interaction of all relevant information. These results show that the phenomena found in general research on Bayesian reasoning in numerical settings extend to diagnostic judgments in non-numerical settings. (shrink)

(2013). Evolutionary modules and Bayesian facilitation: The role of general cognitive resources. Thinking & Reasoning: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 27-53. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.713177.

Humans have long been characterized as poor probabilistic reasoners when presented with explicit numerical information. Bayesian word problems provide a well-known example of this, where even highly educated and cognitively skilled individuals fail to adhere to mathematical norms. It is widely agreed that natural frequencies can facilitate Bayesian reasoning relative to normalized formats (e.g. probabilities, percentages), both by clarifying logical set-subset relations and by simplifying numerical calculations. Nevertheless, between-study performance on “transparent” Bayesian problems varies widely, and generally remains rather unimpressive. (...) We suggest there has been an over-focus on this representational facilitator (i.e. transparent problem structures) at the expense of the specific logical and numerical processing requirements and the corresponding individual abilities and skills necessary for providing Bayesian-like output given specific verbal and numerical input. We further suggest that understanding this task-individual pair could benefit from considerations from the literature on mathematical cognition, which emphasizes text comprehension and problem solving, along with contributions of online executive working memory, metacognitive regulation, and relevant stored knowledge and skills. We conclude by offering avenues for future research aimed at identifying the stages in problem solving at which correct versus incorrect reasoners depart, and how individual difference might influence this time point. (shrink)

Can the general public learn to deal with risk and uncertainty, or do authorities need to steer people’s choices in the right direction? Libertarian paternalists argue that results from psychological research show that our reasoning is systematically flawed and that we are hardly educable because our cognitive biases resemble stable visual illusions. For that reason, they maintain, authorities who know what is best for us need to step in and steer our behavior with the help of “nudges.” Nudges are nothing (...) new, but justifying them on the basis of a latent irrationality is. In this article, I analyze the scientific evidence presented for such a justification. It suffers from narrow logical norms, that is, a misunderstanding of the nature of rational thinking, and from a confirmation bias, that is, selective reporting of research. These two flaws focus the blame on individuals’ minds rather than on external causes, such as industries that spend billions to nudge people into unhealthy behavior. I conclude that the claim that we are hardly educable lacks evidence and forecloses the true alternative to nudging: teaching people to become risk savvy. (shrink)

People often struggle with Bayesian reasoning. However, research showed that people’s performance (and rationality) can be supported by the way of representing the statistical information. First, research showed that using natural frequencies instead of probabilities as format of statistical information increases people’s performance in Bayesian situations thoroughly. Second, research also yielded that people’s performance increases through using visualization. We build our paper on existing research in this field. The main aim is to analyse people’s strategies in Bayesian situations that are (...) still erroneous although statistical information is represented by natural frequencies and visualizations. In particular, we compare two pairs of visualization with similar numerical information (tree diagram vs. unit square and double-tree diagram vs. 2x2-table) concerning their impact on people’s erroneous strategies in Bayesian situations. For this aim, we conducted an experiment with 540 university students. The students were randomly assigned to four conditions that are defined by the four different visualizations of statistical information. The students were asked to indicate a fraction as response in four Bayesian situations. We documented the numerator and the denominator of the students’ responses representing a basic set and a subset in a Bayesian situation. Our results show that people’s erroneous strategies are highly dependent on the visualization. A central finding is that the visualization’s characteristic of making the nested-sets structure of a Bayesian situation transparent has a facilitating effect on people’s Bayesian reasoning. For example, compared to the unit square, a tree diagram does not explicitly visualize the set-subset relations that are relevant in a Bayesian situation. Accordingly, compared to a unit square, a tree diagram partly hinders people to find the correct denominator in a Bayesian situation, and, in particular, triggers to select a wrong numerator. By analyzing people’s erroneous strategies in Bayesian situations, we contribute to investigating approaches to facilitate Bayesian reasoning and to further develop the teaching of Bayesian reasoning. (shrink)

This paper discusses the ecological case for epistemic innocence: does biased cognition have evolutionary benefits, and if so, does that exculpate human reasoners from irrationality? Proponents of ‘ecological rationality’ have challenged the bleak view of human reasoning emerging from research on biases and fallacies. If we approach the human mind as an adaptive toolbox, tailored to the structure of the environment, many alleged biases and fallacies turn out to be artefacts of narrow norms and artificial set-ups. However, we argue that (...) putative demonstrations of ecological rationality involve subtle locus shifts in attributions of rationality, conflating the adaptive rationale of heuristics with our own epistemic credentials. By contrast, other cases also involve an ecological reframing of human reason, but do not involve such problematic locus shifts. We discuss the difference between these cases, bringing clarity to the rationality debate. (shrink)

In teaching statistics in secondary schools and at university, two visualizations are primarily used when situations with two dichotomous characteristics are represented: 2×2 tables and tree diagrams. Both visualizations can be depicted either with probabilities or with frequencies. Visualizations with frequencies have been shown to help students significantly more in Bayesian reasoning problems than probability visualizations do. Because tree diagrams or double-trees (which are largely unknown in school) are node-branch-structures, these two visualizations (compared to the 2×2 table) can even simultaneously (...) display probabilities on branches and frequencies inside the nodes. This is a teaching advantage as it allows the frequency concept to be used to better understand probabilities. However, 2×2 tables and (double-) trees have a decisive disadvantage: While joint probabilities (e.g., P(AB)) are represented in 2×2 tables but no conditional probabilities (e.g., P(A|B)), it is exactly the other way around with (double-) trees. Therefore, a visualization that is equally suitable for the representation of joint probabilities and conditional probabilities is desirable. In this article, we present a new visualization—the frequency net—in which all absolute frequencies and all types of probabilities can be depicted. In addition to a detailed theoretical analysis of the frequency net, we report the results of a study with 249 university students that shows that “net diagrams” can improve reasoning without previous instruction to a similar extent as 2×2 tables and double-trees. Regarding questions about conditional probabilities, frequency visualizations (2×2 table, double-tree, or net diagram with natural frequencies) are consistently superior to probability visualizations. The frequency net performs as well as the frequency double-tree. Only the 2×2 table with frequencies—the only visualization that participants were already familiar with —led to higher performance rates. If, on the other hand, a question about a joint probability had to be answered, all implemented visualizations clearly supported participants’ performance, and no uniform format effect becomes visible. Participants reached the highest performance in the versions with probability 2×2 tables and probability net diagrams. Furthermore, after conducting a detailed error analysis, we report interesting error shifts between the two information formats and the different visualizations and give recommendations for teaching probability. (shrink)

The commentaries indicate a general agreement that one source of reduction of base-rate neglect involves making structural relations among relevant sets transparent. There is much less agreement, however, that this entails dual systems of reasoning. In this response, we make the case for our perspective on dual systems. We compare and contrast our view to the natural frequency hypothesis as formulated in the commentaries.

In the rationality debate, Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues have argued that human’s apparent inability to follow probabilistic principles does not mean our irrationality, because we can do probabilistic reasoning successfully if probability information is given in frequencies, not percentages (the natural frequency hypothesis). They also offered an evolutionary argument to this hypothesis, according to which using frequencies was evolutionarily more advantageous to our hominin ancestors than using percentages, and this is why we can reason correctly about probabilities in the (...) frequency format. This paper offers a critical review of this evolutionary argument. I show that there are reasons to believe using the frequency format was not more adaptive than using the standard (percentage) format. I also argue that there is a plausible alternative explanation (the nested-sets hypothesis) for the improved test performances of experimental subjects—one of Gigerenzer’s key explananda—which undermines the need to postulate mental mechanisms for probabilistic reasoning tuned to the frequency format. The explanatory thrust of the natural frequency hypothesis is much less significant than its advocates assume. (shrink)

Gerd Gigerenzer's views on probabilistic reasoning in humans have come under close scrutiny. Very little attention, however, has been paid to his evolutionary component of his argument. According to Gigerenzer, reasoning about probabilities as frequencies is so common today because it was favored by natural selection in the past. This paper presents a critical examination of this argument. It will show first, that, _pace_ Gigerenzer, there are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not more adaptive than (...) using the standard (percentage) format and, second, that Gigerenzer's evolutionary argument and his other arguments such as his historical description of the notion of probability are in tension with each other. (shrink)