In Defining Racism, I offer the first comprehensive examination of the philosophical literature on racism and argue for a new methodological approach that I call conventionalism. Framing my argument within this approach, I defend an oppression theory of racism. In this article, I will attempt to accomplish two goals: offer a reply to the thoughtful comments of my critics, and lay out the main argument and major themes of my book in an accessible manner. First, I will describe the philosophical (...) problem of defining “racism” and explain why I think a new methodological approach is necessary to address this problem. Second, I will present the moralist presupposition of my project and extend my oppression theory of racism in response to the challenge of assigning responsibility for oppression. Finally, I will address several criticisms to my prescriptive approach, including: my prescriptive approach unjustifiably privileges moralist explanation over social explanation ; the tool of semantic clarification, which my conventionalist framework draws upon, is inadequate for resolving conceptual disagreement; my call for scholars to negotiate the meaning of “racism” is unlikely to succeed and would be insufficient to inspire social change if it were to succeed; and, finally, my conventionalist approach is wedded to a misguided intensionalist semantics, for an extensionalist semantics is more appropriate for the term “racist.”. (shrink)

A structural harm results from countless apparently innocuous interactions between a great many individuals in a social system, and not from any agent’s intentionally producing the harm. Iris Young has influentially articulated a model of individual moral responsibility for such harms, and several other philosophers have taken it as their starting point for dealing with the phenomenon of structural injustice. In this paper, I argue that this social connection model is far less realistic and socially effective than it aims to (...) be. This is because the model systematically neglects the key role played by the emotions in human moral life. (shrink)

Do those of us living in the present have an obligation to rectify injustices committed by others in the distant past? This article is an attempt to revisit the problem of historical injustice by bringing together recent work on structural injustice in relation to the problem of wrongful benefit. The problem of benefitting from injustice, I argue, provides firmer grounds of obligation in forward-looking accounts of responsibility for historical injustice specifically. I argue (1) that if the negative effects of historical (...) injustice endure into the present, and (2) if we participate in structures that allow for its reproduction, then (3) our moral responsibility to set matters straight increases to the extent that we derive a benefit from the perpetuation of an unjust _status quo_. Finally, (4) a general moral obligation to make the world less unjust generates a motive for individuals to learn more about their place in a structure that reproduces the negative effects of historical injustice. (shrink)

Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s seminal book Epistemic Injustice, philosophy of education scholarship has been mostly limited to analyses of culprit-based epistemic injustice in education. This has left structural manifestations relatively underexplored with great detriment to those who are most vulnerable to experience such injustice. This paper aims to address this oversight and open avenues for further research by exploring approaches to theorizing structural epistemic injustice in education and envisioning efficacious remedies. The author identifies three approaches: one that focusses (...) on educational institutions; one that focusses on institutional processes that impact educational outcomes; and one that focusses on epistemological processes that are internal to education. Whilst the approaches differ as to their explanatory power and ease of implementation, it is argued that all three demonstrate that epistemic injustice in education is often the result of structural factors which cannot be attributed to individual epistemic agents. The author concludes by suggesting that educational philosophers must examine each of these approaches in greater depth to make significant progress in disrupting the impact of epistemic injustice in education. (shrink)

In his recent monograph, defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis, Alberto G. Urquidez invites the reader to take a fresh look at the confused and complicated concept of racism. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, Urquidez argues that debates over racism are not about discovering what racism really refers to in the world but the appropriate rule of representation— the standard of the correct use of the term. Discovering racism is a normative endeavor and, he argues, a prescriptive one. My comments (...) here are not intended as a critique of Urquidez’ account so much as an opportunity to reflect on where he might go from here in developing his account. In particular, I focus on lingering questions over the relationship between the critique of structures and practices licensed by political morality and that of individual behaviors. I explore how Urquidez grounds claims of individual moral responsibility for racism. (shrink)

The concept of “structural injustice” has a long intellectual lineage, but Iris Marion Young popularised the term in her late work in the 2000s. Young’s theory tapped into the zeitgeist of the time, providing a credible way of thinking about transnational and domestic injustices, illuminating the importance of political, economic and social structures in generating injustice, theorising the role of individuals in perpetuating structural injustice, and the responsibility of everyone to try to correct it. Young’s theory has inspired secondary and (...) novel research. In this paper, I outline the main topics in this recent literature: what structural injustice is, responsibility for structural injustice, acting on responsibility, avoiding responsibility, and historical injustice. I conclude by noting how the influence of structural injustice theory is spreading beyond the confines of political theory. Any field that is concerned with structural inequalities, disadvantage, or oppression, can utilize structural injustice theory. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 569-586, Winter 2021.

Iris Marion Young presents a social connection model on which those, and only those, who participate in structural processes that produce injustice have a forward-looking responsibility to redress the resulting injustice by challenging the structures that produce it. In Young's view, this is an all-things-considered, albeit discretionary, responsibility. I argue that participation in a structural process that produces injustice is neither necessary nor sufficient for having political responsibilities, and that therefore the social connection model must be rejected. A subtler model (...) is needed, one that depicts participation in a structural process that produces injustice as sufficient for having pro tanto forward-looking responsibilities to redress the process, unless the participating agent satisfies certain excusing conditions. I suggest the intuitive force of the thought that mere participation gives us political responsibilities can be explained by more fundamental considerations. Hastily, we might conclude that all participants have political responsibilities simply because most of them satisfy at least one of the following conditions: they cause injustice to continue, they are morally responsible for injustice, they benefit from injustice, they have communal ties with the victims of injustice, or they have the capacity to redress injustice. (shrink)

What does it mean to be responsible for structural injustice? According to Iris Marion Young, the ongoing and socially embedded character of structural injustice imposes a future-oriented obligation to work with others toward creating remedial, institutional change. Young explains, ‘Political responsibility seeks less to reckon debts than to bring about results’ (Young, 2003, p. 13). This paper conceptually develops how the goal of remediation bears on responsibility in relation to structural injustice. Does the attribution of responsibility in this context call (...) upon individuals to simply do anything in efforts to affect progressive change? If not, then to what extent are these attributions of responsibility action guiding? On what basis do they direct agents to effectively intervene on relevant conditions and processes rather than act in ways that exacerbate the injustice? I explore the role of etiological explanation in the attribution and acceptance of corrective responsibility, which refers to diagnosis of the operative causation of unjust outcomes. After probing tensions within prominent models of corrective responsibility, I offer my own model attempting to resolve those issues. I argue the forward-looking nature of the call to participate in remedying social problems includes a demand for agents to do so in a way that is itself responsible. I theorize a framework of taking responsibility responsibly. This framework accounts for the moral difference between a conscientiously formulated program of remedial action and a quixotic exercise in reckless delusion. (shrink)

Some of the most invidious injustices are seemingly the results of impersonal workings of rigged social structures. Who bears responsibility for the injustices perpetrated through them? Iris Marion...

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In ‘Equity and Marxist Buddhism,’ Tzu-wei Hung engages with the Marxist Buddhism developed by Taiwanese philosopher Lin Qiu-wu in the 1920s, brings this underexplored theory to the table and discusses a few merits and insights of the theory. Building on Hung’s analysis, this paper paper elaborates on the lessons and insights that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism provides for modern times. The first three lessons are distinctive points that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism brings to the discussion on combining Marxism and Buddhism: the connections (...) between the ethical and political, the responsibility for pursuing social justice and the nonviolence means towards social justice. The last lesson comes at the meta-philosophical level, focusing on how Hung’s engagement with Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism sheds light on the issue of diversifying the discipline philosophy. Overall, I argue that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism not only makes contributions to theoretical frameworks while providing a practical means for pursuing equity and social justice, but it also manifests the epistemic and moral values for engaging with under-represented philosophical traditions. (shrink)