The sensibilities suggested by the notion tianrenheyi have pervaded the Chinese philosophical narrative since, at the earliest, the Spring and Autumn Period, triggering ever novel and enriching interpretations. This paper, far from searching for some ostensible essence of the notion, engages tianrenheyi philosophically from a contemporary perspective. Investigating, inter alia, the kind of unity stipulated by the notion, its moral and spiritual entailments, as well as its relation to transcendence clears the way - now freed from some metaphysical barriers - (...) to a fresh outlook on the interplay of oneness and particularity in Chinese natural cosmology. The relation between oneness and particularity will thereby emerge as necessarily vague and as mutually co-implicative, and resist any assertion of a preference for the one over the other. (shrink)

In this article, I compare WANG Bi’s 王弼 rendition of Dao 道 as the nameless, unfathomable root of language and the totality of beings, with Derrida’s analysis of the term khōra. Both cases include a text that presents itself as a commentary on another text, namely the Laozi 老子 for Wang Bi and Plato’s Timaeus for Derrida, whose matter is declared as elusive and ungraspable. I analyze the analogies between these two attempts to convey the unsayable, as well as the (...) philosophical differences in highlighting the “ipseity,” or the “otherness,” of what resides beyond the edge of discourse. On the basis of my analysis, I claim that decisive parallelisms can be found in the homology between text and theme, in the linguistic strategies and common metaphors, whereas the main difference lies in the metaphysical background. Whereas the Dao presumes a harmonious ability for self-ordering, khōra is centered on the concept of absolute otherness, whose unsayability is that of an entity that is constantly removing itself from any determination and which properly consists in dispossessing itself. (shrink)

Both an emphasis on logic and an emphasis on rhetoric lead to a kind of care for language. However, in early Greece this care for language through the lens of logic manifested in the drive to ‘get it right’, whereas in early China the care for language manifested in the pervasive concern for zhengming, for using names properly. For the early Chinese thinkers, especially the early Confucians, this was not predominantly a linguistic affair—zhengming is a key component of moral cultivation. (...) As we explore the ethical import of Confucian role ethics, we need to pay attention to the philosophical vocabulary of this worldview and to how our understanding of these crucial terms changes if persons are seen as relational—a central premise of Confucian role ethics. In this essay I argue against reading zhengming as fagu, merely a conservative retrieval of historical meaning, as suggested by the political philosopher Hsiao Kung-chuan, among others. Instead, I argue for three theses: (1) although stubbornly persistent, ‘rectification of names’ is not an adequate translation for zhengming; (2) the conservative reading of zhengming is problematic and needs to be rethought as an hermeneutic process intersecting past meanings, present circumstances, and future possibilities; and (3) zhengming is, in an important sense, the ‘art’ of Confucian role ethics, for achieving moral competency in this tradition is a matter of constantly revising one's roles and relationships. (shrink)

In this essay, we present a theory of intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy, drawing on both hermeneutics and analytic philosophy. We advocate the approach of “de-essentialization” across the board. It is true that similarities and differences are always to be observed across languages and traditions, but there exist no immutable cores or essences. “De-essentialization” applies to all “levels” of concepts: everyday notions such as green and qing 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion(s) and qing 情, and philosophical categories such (...) as forms of life and dao 道. We argue that interpretation is a holistic multi-directional process constrained by the principle of mutual attunement. It is necessary to assume that “the other” is a human being, who, in most cases, is consistent and stating that which is true or right. This is the condition of possibility for intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy. No more necessary conditions are needed. There is no need to presuppose concepts or categories that are universal for all humans and their languages (such as emotion(s) and qing 情). (shrink)

This paper reflects on the problems of cross-cultural interpretations and translations analysing how these are rooted in theories and philosophical assumptions. Inquiring the concept of philosophy per se, the paper discusses key passages of Heidegger and the related problem of 有 and 無. The conclusion is that to translate such terms, it is necessary to revise the coercive onto-theological assumptions of metaphysics. This can trigger a process of re-grounding grounds with the consequent possibility of language transformation, which, in turn, activates (...) new relations between cultural diversities. Thus, philosophy itself becomes an eminently comparative dialogue between cultures. Without setting a single method for all these problems, the paper argues that comparisons themselves call for necessarily different methodological approaches. Hence, whilst Daoism helps to illuminate these issues defining one of the possibilities that a philosophy of comparisons entails, this same reasoning opens a way for another reading of the Daodejing. (shrink)

This essay develops a Confucian theory of shame within a framework of related concepts, including concepts of value, personhood, and human flourishing. It proposes that all of these concepts should be understood in terms of a metaphysical concept of harmony. Moreover, it argues that this concept of harmony entails a relational experience of value, such that the experience of self-value and ‘other value’ are deeply intertwined. An important implication of this theory is that the harmonic realization of value that is (...) required for human flourishing necessarily involves heightened sensitivity to shame. The goal of this essay is not only to describe Confucian shame but also to view the human experience of shame through a distinctly Confucian lens. Accordingly, it offers a Confucian take on the pathology of shame, as well as recent debates concerning the role of shame in modern society. (shrink)