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  1. Why does myopia decrease the willingness to invest? Is it myopic loss aversion or myopic loss probability aversion?Stefan Zeisberger, Thomas Langer & Martin Weber - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (1):35-50.
    For loss averse investors, a sequence of risky investments looks less attractive if it is evaluated myopically—an effect called myopic loss aversion (MLA). The consequences of this effect have been confirmed in several experiments and its robustness is largely undisputed. The effect’s causes, however, have not been thoroughly examined with regard to one important aspect. Due to the construction of the lotteries that were used in the experiments, none of the studies is able to distinguish between MLA and an explanation (...)
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  • Risk preferences and development revisited.Ferdinand M. Vieider, Peter Martinsson, Pham Khanh Nam & Nghi Truong - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (1):1-21.
    We obtain rich measures of the risk preferences of a sample of Vietnamese farmers, and revisit the link between risk preferences and economic well-being. Far from being particularly risk averse, our farmers are on average risk neutral and, thus, more risk tolerant than typical Western subject populations. This generalises recent findings indicating that students in poorer countries are more risk tolerant than students in richer countries to a general population sample. Risk aversion is, furthermore, negatively correlated with income within our (...)
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  • Behavioural and heuristic models are as-if models too – and that’s ok.Ivan Moscati - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-31.
    I examine some behavioural and heuristic models of individual decision-making and argue that the diverse psychological mechanisms these models posit are too demanding to be implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, by actual decision makers. Accordingly, and contrary to what their advocates typically claim, behavioural and heuristic models are best understood as ‘as-if’ models. I then sketch a version of scientific antirealism that justifies the practice of as-if modelling in decision theory but goes beyond traditional instrumentalism. Finally, I relate my account (...)
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  • How (in)variant are subjective representations of described and experienced risk and rewards?David Kellen, Thorsten Pachur & Ralph Hertwig - 2016 - Cognition 157 (C):126-138.
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  • Parameters of social preference functions: measurement and external validity.Christoph Graf, Rudolf Vetschera & Yingchao Zhang - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (3):357-382.
    Most of the existing literature on social preferences either tests whether certain characteristics of the social context influence individual decisions, or tries to estimate parameters of social preference functions describing such behavior at the level of the entire population. In the present paper, we are concerned with measuring parameters of social preference functions at the individual level. We draw upon concepts developed for eliciting other types of utility functions, in particular the literature on decision making under incomplete information. Our method (...)
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  • Cognitive models of risky choice: Parameter stability and predictive accuracy of prospect theory.Andreas Glöckner & Thorsten Pachur - 2012 - Cognition 123 (1):21-32.
  • Risk behavior for gain, loss, and mixed prospects.Peter Brooks, Simon Peters & Horst Zank - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):153-182.
    This study extends experimental tests of (cumulative) prospect theory (PT) over prospects with more than three outcomes and tests second-order stochastic dominance principles (Levy and Levy, Management Science 48:1334–1349, 2002; Baucells and Heukamp, Management Science 52:1409–1423, 2006). It considers choice behavior of people facing prospects of three different types: gain prospects (losing is not possible), loss prospects (gaining is not possible), and mixed prospects (both gaining and losing are possible). The data supports the distinction of risk behavior into these three (...)
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  • Noisy preferences in risky choice: A cautionary note.Sudeep Bhatia & Graham Loomes - 2017 - Psychological Review 124 (5):678-687.
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