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Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame

Oxford University Press (2014)

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  1. The sociocognitive approach in critical discourse studies and the phenomenological sociology of knowledge: intersections.Daniel Gyollai - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (3):539-558.
    This article argues that phenomenological sociology has great potential to provide a strong theoretical support to the Sociocognitive Approach in Critical Discourse Studies. SCA is interested in the interconnections between knowledge, discourse and society while placing subjectivity in the centre of its framework. It looks into the correlative relationship between personal- and socially shared knowledge, and the significance of these correlations to discourse production and interpretation. Analogously, phenomenological sociology explores the interrelated structures of subjectivity, knowledge and the social world. It (...)
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  • Psychedelic-Assisted Psychotherapy for the Treatment of Major Depression: A Synthesis of Phenomenological Explanations.Riccardo Miceli McMillan & Christopher Jordens - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25 (2):225-237.
    Psychedelic-assisted Psychotherapy combines the use of psychedelic compounds, such as psilocybin, with psychotherapy. PAP has shown some promise as a novel treatment for Major Depressive Disorder, and empirical research suggests that its efficacy turns on the altered states induced by psychedelic compounds. In this paper we draw on the literature of phenomenology to explain the therapeutic potential of psychedelic experiences. Svenaeus characterises mental illness as a form of suffering that entails three distinct but related experiences of alienation or “unhomelike being-in-the-world”: (...)
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  • The Empathetic Soldier.Kevin Cutright - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2):265-285.
    ABSTRACTEmpathy’s relation to the conduct of war is ambiguous. It is mentioned sporadically in international relations theory and, perhaps surprisingly, in official military doctrine. Yet empathy’s role in the military profession remains obscure, partly because it sits uneasily in military culture. Many military professionals struggle with how it is to be integrated with other, more clearly martial, virtues. Add to this struggle the confusion over what empathy actually is, and it quickly becomes easier to dismiss it or keep it at (...)
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  • No Empathy for Empathy: An Existential Reading of Husserl’s Forgotten Question.Iraklis Ioannidis - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2):201-223.
    Empathy is a term used to denote our experience of connecting or feeling with an Other. The term has been used both by psychologists and phenomenologists as a supplement for our biological capacity to understand an Other. In this paper I would like to challenge the possibility of such empathy. If empathy is employed to mean that we know another person’s feelings, then I argue that this is impossible. I argue that there is an equivocation in the use of the (...)
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  • New Perspectives on Person-Centered Care: An Affordance-Based Account.Juan Toro & Kristian Martiny - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (4):631-644.
    Despite the growing interest and supporting evidence for person-centered care, there is still a fundamental disagreement about what makes healthcare person-centered. In this article, we define PCC as operating with three fundamental conditions: personal, participatory and holistic. To further understand these concepts, we develop a framework based on the theory of affordances, which we apply to the healthcare case of rehabilitation and a concrete experiment on social interactions between persons with cerebral palsy and physio- and occupational therapists. Based on the (...)
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  • Sharing Lives, Sharing Bodies: Partners Negotiating Breast Cancer Experiences.Marjolein de Boer, Kristin Zeiler & Jenny Slatman - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (2):253-265.
    By drawing on Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy of ontological relationality, this article explores what it means to be a ‘we’ in breast cancer. What are the characteristics—the extent and diversity—of couples’ relationally lived experiences of bodily changes in breast cancer? Through analyzing duo interviews with diagnosed women and their partners, four ways of sharing an embodied life are identified. While ‘being different together’, partners have different, albeit connected kinds of experiences of breast cancer. While ‘being there for you’, partners take care (...)
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  • The Phenomenology of Shame in the Clinical Encounter.Luna Dolezal - 2015 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 18 (4):567-576.
    This article examines the phenomenology of body shame in the context of the clinical encounter, using the television program ‘Embarrassing Bodies’ as illustrative. I will expand on the insights of Aaron Lazare’s 1987 article ‘Shame and Humiliation in the Medical Encounter’ where it is argued that patients often see their diseases and ailments as defects, inadequacies or personal shortcomings and that visits to doctors and medical professionals involve potentially humiliating physical and psychological exposure. I will start by outlining a phenomenology (...)
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  • Selfless Memories.Raphaël Millière & Albert Newen - 2022 - Erkenntnis.
    Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of `selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. (...)
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  • Sympathetic Respect, Respectful Sympathy.John Drummond - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):123-137.
    To be more than a meta-ethical stance, moral phenomenology must provide an account of moral norms. This paper unites two sorts of phenomenological considerations. The first considers the teleological character of intentional experiences as ordered toward "truthfulness" in all the spheres of reason and toward a notion of self-responsibility for our beliefs, attitudes, and actions as the flourishing of rational agents. The second considers the phenomenological tradition's identification of empathy as the experience in which we encounter others as conscious agents (...)
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  • Self and Other: From Pure Ego to Co-Constituted We.Dan Zahavi - 2015 - Continental Philosophy Review 48 (2):143-160.
    In recent years, the social dimensions of selfhood have been discussed widely. Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? These questions are explored in the following contribution.
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  • The Bodily Other and Everyday Experience of the Lived Urban World.Oren Bader & Aya Peri Bader - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology 3 (2):93-109.
    This article explores the relationship between the bodily presence of other humans in the lived urban world and the experience of everyday architecture. We suggest, from the perspectives of phenomenology and architecture, that being in the company of others changes the way the built environment appears to subjects, and that this enables us to perform simple daily tasks while still attending to the built environment. Our analysis shows that in mundane urban settings attending to the environment involves a unique attentional (...)
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  • Phenomenological Approaches to Personal Identity.Jakub Čapek & Sophie Loidolt - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):217-234.
    This special issue addresses the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological viewpoint, especially contemporary phenomenological research on selfhood. In the introduction, we first offer a brief survey of the various classic questions related to personal identity according to Locke’s initial proposal and sketch out key concepts and distinctions of the debate that came after Locke. We then characterize the types of approach represented by post-Hegelian, German and French philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We argue that whereas the (...)
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  • Towards a Phenomenology of the Unconscious: Husserl and Fink on Versunkenheit.Saulius Geniusas - 2020 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 53 (1):1-23.
    As a phenomenological concept, absorption refers to the ego's capacity to experience the world from a displaced standpoint. The paper traces the emergence and development of this concept in Husserl...
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  • Cotard Syndrome, Self-Awareness, and I-Concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...)
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  • The Veteran Reintegrated in You’Re the Worst and One Day at a Time.Renée Pastel - 2021 - Open Philosophy 5 (1):143-154.
    As the “War on Terror” continues, the national myth of veteran-as-hero has given way to a narrative shorthand of veteran-as-villain. Films and television shows depicting the reintegration of veterans tend to focus on the struggle and alienation from the homefront that veterans feel upon their return. In contrast, comedy television portrayals such as One Day at a Time and You’re the Worst, both of which slowly but successfully reintegrate their central veteran characters, do so narratively by shifting their characters’ veteran (...)
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  • Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
    In this paper, I argue that self-awareness is intertwined with one's awareness of possibilities for action. I show this by critically examining Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self. I argue that the distinction Zahavi makes among 'pre-reflective minimal', 'interpersonal', and 'normative' dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call 'pre-reflective self-understanding'. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person’s (...)
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  • Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière, Robin L. Carhart-Harris, Leor Roseman, Fynn-Mathis Trautwein & Aviva Berkovich-Ohana - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    In recent years, the scientific study of meditation and psychedelic drugs has seen remarkable developments. The increased focus on meditation in cognitive neuroscience has led to a cross-cultural classification of standard meditation styles validated by functional and structural neuroanatomical data. Meanwhile, the renaissance of psychedelic research has shed light on the neurophysiology of altered states of consciousness induced by classical psychedelics, such as psilocybin and LSD, whose effects are mainly mediated by agonism of serotonin receptors. Few attempts have been made (...)
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  • Are There Degreess of Self-Consciousness?R. Milliere - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):252-282.
    It is widely assumed that ordinary conscious experience involves some form of sense of self or consciousness of oneself. Moreover, this claim is often restricted to a 'thin' or 'minimal' notion of self-consciousness, or even 'the simplest form of self-consciousness', as opposed to more sophisticated forms of self-consciousness which are not deemed ubiquitous in ordinary experience. These formulations suggest that self-consciousness comes in degrees, and that individual subjects may differ with respect to the degree of self-consciousness they exhibit at a (...)
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  • The Therapeutic Role of Monastic Paideia for ASD Individuals: The Case of Hildegard of Bingen and Her Lingua Ignota.Janko Nešić, Vanja Subotić & Petar Nurkić - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to discuss monastic paideia in the context of providing shelter for ASD individuals in the High Middle Ages. Firstly, we will canvas the historical and conceptual shift from Ancient Greek paideitic ideas to their Christian counterparts. Then, by drawing on the recent literature in the history of medicine that traces the signs and symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in Hildegard of Bingen, a German abbess in the 12th century, we will turn to her (...)
     
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  • Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution.Raphaël Millière - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11:1-22.
    There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid (...)
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  • Never Waking into Reality: Narrative Self in the Madhyamaka.Stalin Joseph Correya - forthcoming - Sophia:1-19.
    In this paper I probe the narratively constructed self as a proper object of negation in the Madhyamaka. The paper borrows idioms and tropes from Western theories of the narrative self to illuminate and contemporize the discussion. Since Mādhyamikas reject the two-tiered interpretation of the Buddhist two truths, they are philosophically unobligated to reduce the self. Although both Mādhyamikas and Ābhidharmikas would accept the conceptually constructed self as conventionally real, they would disagree about its ontological significance. For the latter, the (...)
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  • Introduction: Double Intentionality.Michela Summa, Martin Klein & Philipp Schmidt - 2022 - Topoi 41 (1):93-109.
  • Self, Me and I in the Repertoire of Spontaneously Occurring Altered States of Selfhood: Eight Neurophenomenological Case Study Reports.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - 2022 - Cognitive Neurodynamics 16:255–282.
    This study investigates eight case reports of spontaneously emerging, brief episodes of vivid altered states of Selfhood (ASoSs) that occurred during mental exercise in six long-term meditators by using a neurophenomenological electroencephalography (EEG) approach. In agreement with the neurophenomenological methodology, first-person reports were used to identify such spontaneous ASoSs and to guide the neural analysis, which involved the estimation of three operational modules of the brain self-referential network (measured by EEG operational synchrony). The result of such analysis demonstrated that the (...)
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  • HIV Testing Autonomy: The Importance of Relationship Factors in HIV Testing to People in Lusaka and Chongwe, Zambia.Kasoka Kasoka & Matthew Weait - forthcoming - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry:1-16.
    In recent times, informed consent has been adopted worldwide as a cornerstone to ensure autonomy during HIV testing. However, there are still ongoing debates on whether the edifice on which informed consent requirements are grounded, that is, personal autonomy, is philosophically, morally, and practically sound, especially in countries where HIV is an epidemic and/or may have a different ontological perspective or lived reality. This study explores the views of participants from Zambia. In-depth and focus group discussions were conducted at various (...)
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  • The Debate on the Problem of For-Me-Ness: A Proposed Taxonomy.Alberto Barbieri - 2021 - Argumenta.
    Several philosophers claim that a mental state is phenomenally conscious only if it exhibits so-called for-me-ness, or subjective character, i.e., the fact that there is something it is like to be in a conscious state not just for everyone but only for the subject who undergoes it. Consequently, they stress, a proper explanation of consciousness requires to address the question of what the nature of for-me-ness is. This question forms what I call the problem of for-me-ness. Although the debate on (...)
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  • Schizophrenia, Temporality, and Affection.Jae Ryeong Sul - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Temporal experience and its radical alteration in schizophrenia have been one of the central objects of investigation in phenomenological psychopathology. Various phenomenologically oriented researchers have argued that the change in the mode of temporal experience present in schizophrenia can foreground its psychotic symptoms of delusion. This paper aims to further the development of such a phenomenological investigation by highlighting a much-neglected aspect of schizophrenic temporal experience, i.e., its non-emotional affective characteristic. In this paper, it denotes the type of an experience (...)
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  • Empatia moraalisen toimijuuden perustana.Erika Ruonakoski - 2019 - Ajatus 76 (1):315-330.
    Artikkelissani syvennyn Elisa Aaltolan teoksen Varieties of Empathy avaamiin kysymyksiin empatian luonteesta ja merkityksistä. Analysoin Aaltolan tapaa jakaa empatia erilaisiin muotoihin ja kysyn, tuleeko nämä muodot ymmärtää toisensa poissulkevina vai osittain päällekkäisinä kategorioina. Tämän lisäksi pohdin, missä määrin empatia voidaan jäsentää yhtäältä ”hyväksi ja hyödylliseksi” tai vaihtoehtoisesti ”pahaksi ja haitalliseksi”, ja voidaanko empatiaa ”käyttää” tahdonalaisesti, kuten kirjassa esitetään, vai onko se väistämätön ja jossakin määrin hallitsematon osa ruumiillista olemassaoloa. Kysyn myös, onko eläinten hyväksikäytössä kysymys oikeanlaisen empatian puutteesta vai sen ohella (...)
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  • Lost in the Socially Extended Mind: Genuine Intersubjectivity and Disturbed Self-Other Demarcation in Schizophrenia.Tom Froese & Joel Krueger - 2020 - In Christian Tewes & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches. Cambridge, UK: pp. 318-340.
    Much of the characteristic symptomatology of schizophrenia can be understood as resulting from a pervasive sense of disembodiment. The body is experienced as an external machine that needs to be controlled with explicit intentional commands, which in turn leads to severe difficulties in interacting with the world in a fluid and intuitive manner. In consequence, there is a characteristic dissociality: Others become problems to be solved by intellectual effort and no longer present opportunities for spontaneous interpersonal alignment. This dissociality goes (...)
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  • Free Your Mind: Buddhism, Causality, and the Free Will Problem.Christian Coseru - 2020 - Zygon 55 (2):461-473.
    The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self‐determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) (...)
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  • Personhood and First-Personal Experience.Richard E. Duus - 2017 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 37 (2):109-127.
    There is a gap between the first-person and third-person perspectives resulting in a tension experienced between psychological science, ‘experimental psychology’, and applied consulting psychological practice, ‘clinical psychology’. This is an exploration of that ‘gap’ and its resulting tension. First-person perspective is proposed as an important aspect of psychological reality in conjunction with the related perspectival aspects of second- and third-person perspectives. These three aspects taken ‘wholistically’ constitute a perspectival diffusion grate through which psychological reality is discerned. The reductionistic naturalism of (...)
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  • Empathy in Nursing: A Phenomenological Intervention.Anthony Vincent Fernandez & Dan Zahavi - 2021 - Tetsugaku 5:23-39.
    Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as emerging technologies, scientific advancements, or major political events. However, many of these reflections, while philosophically valuable, fail to contribute to those who may benefit the most from them. In this article, we discuss our own experience of engaging with nursing researchers and practicing nurses. By drawing on the field of philosophical phenomenology, we intervene in a longstanding debate over the meaning of “empathy” in nursing, which has important implications for (...)
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  • Shared action: An existential phenomenological account.Nicolai Knudsen - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is sufficiently flexible to account (...)
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  • An Inquiry on Radical Empathy and the Phenomenological Reduction in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.Elisa Magrì - 2018 - Continental Philosophy Review 51 (3):323-341.
    In this paper, I wish to explore the contribution of the phenomenological reduction to a distinct form of empathy, which has been identified and called by Ratcliffe :473–495, 2012) radical empathy. This form of empathy brings to light the sense of reality experienced by the subject rather than a mere mental state. However, I shall consider whether and how the phenomenological reduction allows different interpretations of the same experience, thereby impacting on our understanding of another’s sense of reality. Far from (...)
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  • Making Sense of Akrasia.Matthew Burch - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):939-971.
    There are two extreme poles in the literature on akrasia. Internalists hold that it's impossible to act intentionally against your better judgment, because there's a necessary internal relation between judgment and intentional action. To the contrary, externalists maintain that we can act intentionally against our better judgment, because the will operates independently of judgment. Critics of internalism argue that it fails a realism test—most people seem to think that we can and do act intentionally against our better judgment. And critics (...)
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  • Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness.Daniel D. Hutto & Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - 2018 - Topoi:1-12.
    This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of aspects of (...)
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  • Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Selfhood: A Reply to Some Critics.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):703-718.
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology has lately published a number of papers that in various ways take issue with and criticize my work on the link between consciousness, self-consciousness and selfhood. In the following contribution, I reply directly to this new set of objections and argue that while some of them highlight ambiguities in my work that ought to be clarified, others can only be characterized as misreadings.
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  • Vulnerability Under the Gaze of Robots: Relations Among Humans and Robots.Nicola Liberati & Shoji Nagataki - 2019 - AI and Society 34 (2):333-342.
    The problem of artificial intelligence and human being has always raised questions about possible interactions among them and possible effects yielded by the introduction of such un-human subject. Dreyfus deeply connects intelligence and body based on a phenomenological viewpoint. Thanks to his reading of Merleau-Ponty, he clearly stated that an intelligence must be embodied into a body to function. According to his suggestion, any AI designed to be human-like is doom to failure if there is no tight bound with a (...)
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  • Making Imagination Even More Embodied: Imagination, Constraint and Epistemic Relevance.Zuzanna Rucińska & Shaun Gallagher - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8143-8170.
    This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby complementing Amy Kind's argument for the epistemic relevance of imagination "under constraints" and Magdalena Balcerak (...)
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  • Philosophical empathy.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2021 - Continental Philosophy Review 54 (2):219-235.
    Is there a sense in which we can be said to empathize with a philosophical position and, if so, what does empathy consist of here? Drawing on themes in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I sketch an account of the relationship between philosophical language and philosophical thought, according to which the task of understanding, evaluating, and building upon an explicit philosophical position can involve engaging with the experiential world of its author. If accepted, this account has broader implications for how (...)
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  • Genuine empathy with inanimate objects.Abootaleb Safdari Sharabiani - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):831-846.
    How do we enter into empathic relations with inanimate objects? Do we indirectly infer that they possess mental states, or directly perceive them as mental things? In recent years these questions have been addressed by a number of authors. Some argue in favor of an indirect approach that involves mediatory procedures; others defend a direct approach that postulates no intermediate. In this paper I argue on the side of the latter. I show that Simulation Theory, one of the most elaborated (...)
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  • What is Neurophilosophy: Do We Need a Non-Reductive Form?Philipp Klar - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2701-2725.
    Neurophilosophy is a controversial scientific discipline lacking a broadly accepted definition and especially a well-elaborated methodology. Views about what neurophilosophy entails and how it can combine neuroscience with philosophy, as in their branches and methodologies, diverge widely. This article, first of all, presents a brief insight into the naturalization of philosophy regarding neurophilosophy and three resulting distinguishable forms of how neuroscience and philosophy may or may not be connected in part 1, namely reductive neurophilosophy, the parallelism between neuroscience and philosophy (...)
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  • Collective intentionality and the further challenge of collective free improvisation.Lucia Angelino - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):49-65.
    The kind of collective improvisation attained by free jazz at the beginning of the sixties appears interesting from the perspective of contemporary debates on collective intentionality for several reasons. The most notable of these, is that it holds a mirror up to what analytical philosophers of action identify as “the complexly interwoven sets of collective intentions” that make a group more than the sum of its parts. But at the same time, free jazz poses a challenge to these philosophical theories (...)
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  • Intercorporeity and the First-Person Plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.
    A theory of the first-person plural occupies a unique place in philosophical investigations into intersubjectivity and social cognition. In order for the referent of the first-person plural—“the We”—to come into existence, it seems there must be a shared ground of communicative possibility, but this requires a non-circular explanation of how this ground could be shared in the absence of a pre-existing context of communicative conventions. Margaret Gilbert’s and John Searle’s theories of collective intentionality capture important aspects of the We, but (...)
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  • The ‘Mimic’ or ‘Mimetic’ Octopus? A Cognitive-Semiotic Study of Mimicry and Deception in Thaumoctopus Mimicus.José Manuel Ureña Gómez-Moreno - 2019 - Biosemiotics 12 (3):441-467.
    This study discusses the mimic octopus’ acts of imitation of a banded sea-snake as an antagonistic response to enemies from a cognitive-semiotic perspective. This mimicry model, which involves very close physical resemblance and highly precise enactment, displays goal-orientedness because the octopus only takes it on when encountering damselfish, a territorial species, and not other sea animals that the octopus has been shown to imitate, such as lionfish and flounders. Based on theoretical principles and analytic tools from Mitchell’s typology of deceptive (...)
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  • Self-Stigma, Bad Faith and the Experiential Self.Karl Eriksson - 2019 - Human Studies 42 (3):391-405.
    The concept of self-stigmatization is guided by a representational account of selfhood that fails to accommodate for resilience against, and recovery from, stigma. Mainstream research on self-stigma has portrayed it only as a reified self, that is, as collectively shared stereotypes representing individuals’ identity. Self-stigma viewed phenomenologically, however, elucidates what facilitates a stigmatized self. A phenomenological analysis discloses the lived phenomenon of stigma as an act of self-objectification, as related to the experiential self, and therefore an achievement of subjectivity. Following (...)
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  • Subjectivity and Mineness.Donnchadh O’Conaill - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):325-341.
    Recent work on consciousness has distinguished between the qualitative character of an experience and its subjective character or subjectivity. It is often suggested that subjectivity is a characteristic inner awareness subjects enjoy of their own occurrent experiences. A number of thinkers have also suggested that not only is each subject aware of her own experiences, but that in having these experiences she is aware of them as her own. This is the subjectivity-mineness thesis: necessarily, an experience which is given to (...)
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  • “Seeing-in” and Twofold Empathic Intentionality: A Husserlian Account.Zhida Luo - 2018 - Continental Philosophy Review 51 (3):301-321.
    In recent years, the phenomenological approach to empathy becomes increasingly influential in explaining social perception of other people. Yet, it leaves untouched a related and pivotal question concerning the unique and irreducible intentionality of empathy that constitutes the peculiarity of social perception. In this article, I focus on this problem by drawing upon Husserl’s theory of image-consciousness, and I suggest that empathy is characterized by a “seeing-in” structure. I develop two theses so as to further explicate the seeing-in structure in (...)
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  • The ‘Meeting of Bodies’: Empathy and Basic Forms of Shared Experiences.Anna Ciaunica - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):185-195.
    In recent years there has been an increasing focus on a crucial aspect of the ‘meeting of minds’ problem :160–165, 2013), namely the ability that human beings have for sharing different types of mental states such as emotions, intentions, and perceptual experiences. In this paper I examine what counts as basic forms of ‘shared experiences’ and focus on a relatively overlooked aspect of human embodiment, namely the fact that we start our journey into our experiential life within the experiencing body (...)
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  • Biosocial Selfhood: Overcoming the ‘Body-Social Problem’ Within the Individuation of the Human Self.Joe Higgins - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    In a recent paper, Kyselo argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” ). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of (...)
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  • Emotional Sharing and the Extended Mind.Felipe León, Thomas Szanto & Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4847-4867.
    This article investigates the relationship between emotional sharing and the extended mind thesis. We argue that shared emotions are socially extended emotions that involve a specific type of constitutive integration between the participating individuals’ emotional experiences. We start by distinguishing two claims, the Environmentally Extended Emotion Thesis and the Socially Extended Emotion Thesis. We then critically discuss some recent influential proposals about the nature of shared emotions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we motivate two conditions that an account of shared emotions (...)
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