The goal of this paper is to show that a particular view of emotion sharing and a specific hypothesis on infant social perception strengthen each other. The view of emotion sharing is called “the straightforward view.” The hypothesis on infant social perception is called “the pairing account.” The straightforward view suggests that participants in emotion sharing undergo one and the same overarching emotion. The pairing account posits that infants perceive others’ embodied experiences as belonging to someone other than the self (...) through a process of assimilation to, and accommodation of, their own embodied experience. The connection between the two theories lies in the domain-general process of association by similarity, which functions both in the individuation of a unitary emotion and in the interpretation of the sensory stimulus. By elaborating on this connection, the straightforward view becomes more solid from the cognitive-developmental standpoint and the pairing account expands its explanatory power. Since the straightforward view requires minimal forms of self- and other-awareness, the paper provides a characterization of the developmental origin of the sense of us, i.e., the experience of self and other as co-subjects of a shared emotional state. (shrink)

Las Lecciones de fenomenología de la conciencia interna del tiempohan sido caracterizadas tanto por su enigmática belleza textual como por su dificultades e inconsistencias. El objetivo de esta comunicación es intentar establecer algunos puntos centrales de la teoría del tiempo husserliana en sus textos tempranos, conducido por el texto de las Leccionesyacompañado por la totalidad de escritos del período y las discusiones más relevantes que se han hecho al respecto.

I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the (...) phenomenology of experience. (shrink)

A pesar de los matices y variaciones de significado, el concepto husserliano de intencionalidad no deja de estar al servicio de la idea clásica de la verdad como adaequatio, finalmente adaptada al orden monádico de la conciencia trascendental. Veremos, sin embargo, que en los análisis de Husserl sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo se manifiesta toda la dificultad para interpretar intencionalmente la esfera pasiva de la conciencia, peligrando la peculiar vocación a la verdad de la misma intencionalidad. Intentaremos, mediante las (...) últimas ideas husserlianas sobre la constitución eidética, encontrar una génesis pasiva del sentido ideal intencional sin perder su referencia egológica. Abstract: Despite the nuances and differences of meaning, the husserlian’s concept of intentionality supplies coherently that of classic true as adaequatio, even if adapted to the monadic order of transcendental conscience. We will show how Husserl’s analysis of inner time consciousness shows all the difficulties for an intentional interpretation of the passive sphere of consciousness, altering the peculiar vocation of intentionality to truth. Through the latest husserlian ideas on constitution, we will try to find a passive genesis to the ideal meaning of intentionality without losing its egologic reference. -/- . (shrink)