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  1. Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers.Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 40.
    • An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (i) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ii) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (iii) are neurobiologically realized.2 • The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanadum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness (...)
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  • Enactive Subjectivity as Flesh.John Jenkinson - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):931-951.
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of embodiment has been widely adopted by enactivists seeking to provide an account of cognition that is both embodied and embedded. Yet very little attention has been paid to Merleau-Ponty’s later works. This is troubling given that in The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty revises his conception of embodied subjectivity because he came to the realization that understanding consciousness through the concepts of subject and object imposed a dualistic framework that he was trying to escape. To overcome (...)
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  • Killing the Straw Man: Dennett and Phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):21-43.
    Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative (...)
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  • The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character: A Phenomenological Critique.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.
    According to a currently popular approach to the analysis of phenomenal character, the phenomenal character of an experience is entirely determined by, and is in fact identical with, the experience's representational content. Two underlying assumptions motivate this approach to phenomenal character: (1) that conscious experiences are diaphanous or transparent, in the sense that it is impossible to discern, via introspection, any intrinsic features of an experience of x that are not experienced as features of x, and (2) that the immediate (...)
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  • Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2013 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. Springer. pp. 259--269.
    According to David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists of explaining how and why qualitative experience arises from physical states. Moreover, Chalmers argues that materialist and reductive explanations of mentality are incapable of addressing the hard problem. In this chapter, I suggest that Chalmers’ hard problem can be usefully distinguished into a ‘how question’ and ‘why question,’ and I argue that evolutionary biology has the resources to address the question of why qualitative experience arises from brain states. From this (...)
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  • The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Neurophenomenology – The Case of Studying Self Boundaries With Meditators.Aviva Berkovich-Ohana, Yair Dor-Ziderman, Fynn-Mathis Trautwein, Yoav Schweitzer, Ohad Nave, Stephen Fulder & Yochai Ataria - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • Plural Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness and the Problem of the Body.Richard Weir - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):204-220.
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  • From the Embodied Self to the Embodied Person.Francesca Forlè - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (36).
    In this paper, I will focus on the process of constitution of oneself as an embodied being and, more precisely, on the specific way in which one can experience oneself not just as an embodied self, but rather as the actual embodied person he/she is. I will start by describing the most basic way in which our embodied self is constituted, that is as a felt-feeling body and as the zero-point of orientation of all our sensations and perceptions. Then, I (...)
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  • Posłuszne Klucze, Chodliwe Aparaty.Łukasz Afeltowicz & Witold Wachowski - 2013 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 4 (1).
    The authors' commentary on Bruno Latour's "Technology is society made durable" provides the reader with an opportunity to become acquainted with actor-network theory.
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  • Spontaniczność świadomości.Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson - 2010 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1).
    It is now conventional wisdom that conscious experience — or in Nagel’s canonical characterization, “what it is like to be” for an organism — is what makes the mind-body problem so intractable. By the same token, our current conceptions of the mind-body relation are inadequate and some conceptual development is urgently needed. Our overall aim in this paper is to make some progress towards that conceptual development. We first examine a currently neglected, yet fundamental aspect of consciousness. This aspect is (...)
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  • Selfhood Triumvirate: From Phenomenology to Brain Activity and Back Again.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 86:103031.
    Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts et al., 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this (...)
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  • The "Conscious" Dorsal Stream: Embodied Simulation and its Role in Space and Action Conscious Awareness.Vittorio Gallese - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
    The aim of the present article is three-fold. First, it aims to show that perception requires action. This is most evident for some types of visual percept . Second, it aims to show that the distinction of the cortical visual processing into two streams is insufficient and leads to possible misunderstandings on the true nature of perceptual processes. Third, it aims to show that the dorsal stream is not only responsible for the unconscious control of action, but also for the (...)
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  • A New Framework for Enactivism: Understanding the Enactive Body Through Structural Flexibility and Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology of Flesh.John Jenkinson - unknown
    The enactive approach to cognition and consciousness offers a valuable alternative to the standard approaches dominant in the sciences of mind. As an embodied account, enactivism incorporates theoretical perspectives on the body from phenomenology, cognitive science, and biology, which provides a unique interpretation of embodiment with critical insight into the embodied nature of cognition and consciousness. Nonetheless, I argue that several revisions are required to make enactivism viable within the context of the sciences of mind. The enactive account of subjectivity (...)
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  • Persistent Operational Synchrony Within Brain Default-Mode Network and Self-Processing Operations in Healthy Subjects.Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts - 2011 - Brain and Cognition 75 (2):79-90.
    Based on the theoretical analysis of self-consciousness concepts, we hypothesized that the spatio-temporal pattern of functional connectivity within the default-mode network (DMN) should persist unchanged across a variety of different cognitive tasks or acts, thus being task-unrelated. This supposition is in contrast with current understanding that DMN activated when the subjects are resting and deactivated during any attention-demanding cognitive tasks. To test our proposal, we used, in retrospect, the results from our two early studies ([Fingelkurts, 1998] and [Fingelkurts et al., (...)
     
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  • The Embodied Self-Awareness of the Infant: A Challenge to the Theory-Theory of Mind.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim (...)
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  • Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness.Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):133-162.
    Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed. Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain.
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  • Alterations in the Three Components of Selfhood in Persons with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms: A Pilot qEEG Neuroimaging Study.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2018 - Open Neuroimaging Journal 12:42-54.
    Background and Objective: Understanding how trauma impacts the self-structure of individuals suffering from the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms is a complex matter and despite several attempts to explain the relationship between trauma and the “Self”, this issue still lacks clarity. Therefore, adopting a new theoretical perspective may help understand PTSD deeper and to shed light on the underlying psychophysiological mechanisms. Methods: In this study, we employed the “three-dimensional construct model of the experiential selfhood” where three major components of selfhood (...)
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  • Self, Me and I in the Repertoire of Spontaneously Occurring Altered States of Selfhood: Eight Neurophenomenological Case Study Reports.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - forthcoming - Cognitive Neurodynamics.
    This study investigates eight case reports of spontaneously emerging, brief episodes of vivid altered states of Selfhood (ASoSs) that occurred during mental exercise in six long-term meditators by using a neurophenomenological electroencephalography (EEG) approach. In agreement with the neurophenomenological methodology, first-person reports were used to identify such spontaneous ASoSs and to guide the neural analysis, which involved the estimation of three operational modules of the brain self-referential network (measured by EEG operational synchrony). The result of such analysis demonstrated that the (...)
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  • Mathematical Naturalism: Origins, Guises, and Prospects. [REVIEW]Bart Van Kerkhove - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (1-2):5-39.
    During the first half of the twentieth century, mainstream answers to the foundational crisis, mainly triggered by Russell and Gödel, remained largely perfectibilist in nature. Along with a general naturalist wave in the philosophy of science, during the second half of that century, this idealist picture was finally challenged and traded in for more realist ones. Next to the necessary preliminaries, the present paper proposes a structured view of various philosophical accounts of mathematics indebted to this general idea, laying the (...)
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  • The Bodily Social Self: A Link Between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood.Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):125-144.
    The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS is defined and its potential for (...)
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  • Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
    The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interaction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments by O'Regan, Noë, and (...)
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  • The Phenomenological Underpinning of the Notion of a Minimal Core Self: A Psychological Perspective.Nini Praetorius - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):325-338.
    The paper argues that Zahavi’s defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. “identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena”, and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object “feels” like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-reflective minimal (...)
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  • Me, Myself and I: Sartre and Husserl on Elusiveness of the Self.Pierre-Jean Renaudie - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (1):99-113.
    In his early essay on transcendence of the ego, Sartre attempted to follow Husserl’s Logical Investigations and to draw the consequences of his phenomenological criticism of subjectivity. Both authors have emphasized the elusiveness of the self as a result of intentionality of consciousness. However, Sartre’s analysis of ego led him quite far from Husserl’s philosophical project, insofar as it was somehow already raising the question about the moral nature of the self, and was thus establishing the basis of the conception (...)
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  • On the Nature of Persons; Persons as Constituted Events.Mohammad Reza Tahmasbi - 2021 - Metaphysica 22 (1):45-61.
    The diachronic question of persons deals with personal identity over time: “In virtue of what conditions is a person, P1, at t1, the same person, P2, at t2?” To answer the question, I suggest expanding the constitution theory from a static definition to a dynamic definition. ‘Life’ is an event and the stream of consciousness is an event too. Reflective self-consciousness—which I take to be definitive of persons—is an event. Persons are irreducible constituted events who remain the same through time (...)
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  • Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness, and Language.Andrea Schiavio - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):735-739.
  • Neurophenomenology.Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.
    _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper (...)
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  • Phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - manuscript
    In Moran, D. (ed.): Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge, 2008.
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  • Embodied Simulation: From Neurons to Phenomenal Experience. [REVIEW]Vittorio Gallese - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.
    The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode (...)
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  • ¿Tiene la autoconciencia un fundamento lingüístico? Ernst Tugendhat y la Escuela de Heidelberg.José Luis López de Lizaga - 2013 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 46:78-101.
    La aclaración de la estructura de la autoconciencia es crucial en el debate entre los partidarios del “giro lingüístico” y los defensores de la “filosofía de la conciencia”, pues si quedase probado que la autoconciencia tiene un fundamento lingüístico, el lenguaje se infiltraría hasta la raíz misma de la subjetividad. Teniendo presente esta pregunta fundamental, este artículo examina la polémica entre Ernst Tugendhat y los autores de la Escuela de Heidelberg (dieter Henrich y Manfred Frank). Tugendhat concibe la autoconciencia como (...)
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  • Later Nishida on Self-Awareness: Have I Lost Myself Yet?Yuko Ishihara - 2011 - Asian Philosophy 21 (2):193 - 211.
    In this paper, I argue that later Nishida's analysis of self-awareness (jikaku) provides a new perspective on the nature of self-awareness as understood in the philosophical literature today. I argue that the contemporary literature deals with two kinds of self-awareness; the higher-order theory understands self-awareness to be an objectified awareness and the phenomenological tradition generally understands self-awareness to be, at least primarily, a non-objectified awareness. In light of this, I first give an account of Nishida's ?acting-intuition? with reference to the (...)
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  • Eichberg’s ‘Phenomenology’ of Sport: A Phenomenal Confusion.Irena Martínková & Jim Parry - 2013 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 7 (3):331 - 341.
    This paper defends philosophical phenomenology against a hostile review in the previous issue of this journal. It tries to explain what philosophical phenomenology is, and the possibilities for its empirical application; whilst also showing that Eichberg?s method is idiosyncratic, problematic and not interested in philosophical phenomenology at all. It presents the phenomenological concept of phenomenon, which is neither concrete nor abstract, and contrasts it to Eichberg?s understanding of empirical concrete phenomena. Finally, the paper scrutinises Eichberg?s empirical method, which has deep (...)
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  • Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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