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  1. Individual and Collective Intentionality: Elaborating the Fundamentality-Question.Patrizio Ulf Enrico Lo Presti - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-21.
    This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the fundamentality-question. In a first step, I argue that it is really two questions. One is about sense and one about reference. The first is: Can one grasp or understand the concept individual intentionality and, correspondingly, individuality, on the one hand, without grasping or understanding the concept collective intentionality and, correspondingly, collectivity, on the other? The second is: Can the concept individual (...)
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  • The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2022 - Topoi 41 (1):195-205.
  • The Phenomenality and Intentional Structure of We-Experiences.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Topoi 41 (1):1-11.
    When you and I share an experience, each of us lives through a we-experience. The paper claims that we-experiences have unique phenomenality and structure. First, we-experiences’ phenomenality is characterised by the fact that they feel like ours to their subject. This specific phenomenality is contended to derive from the way these experiences self-represent: a we-experience exemplifies us-ness or togetherness because it self-represents as mine qua ours. Second, living through a we-experience together with somebody else is not to have this experience (...)
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  • Shared action: An existential phenomenological account.Nicolai Knudsen - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is sufficiently flexible to account (...)
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  • Individuality, Collectivity and the Intersubjective Constitution of Intentionality.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2020 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 11 (2).
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  • For-Me-Ness, For-Us-Ness, and the We-Relationship.Felipe León - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):547-558.
    This article investigates the relationship between for-me-ness and sociality. I start by pointing out some ambiguities in claims pursued by critics that have recently pressed on the relationship between the two notions. I next articulate a question concerning for-me-ness and sociality that builds on the idea that, occasionally at least, there is something it is like ‘for us’ to have an experience. This idea has been explored in recent literature on shared experiences and collective intentionality, and it gestures towards the (...)
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  • We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood.Dan Zahavi - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):1-20.
    The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be a we. In presenting this argument, the (...)
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  • Emotions and Challenges to Justice.Roberto Mordacci & Francesca Forlè - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-6.
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