Resumo: Arthur Schopenhauer ficou conhecido como o pensador do “pessimismo filosófico”. Tratase de uma doutrina que, em linhas gerais, apresenta uma determinada interpretação acerca do valor do mundo, mas que, em seu sentido ainda mais básico, questiona a possibilidade de atribuição de valor ao todo da existência: há “justificação” para a existência? A partir da resposta a essa pergunta, o filósofo alemão desenvolve sua “metafísica da vontade” e, como seu desdobramento, sua teoria da “redenção”, ou soteriologia. Entretanto, o “filósofo do (...) pessimismo” também afirma, em sua obra, que há uma “ordenação moral de mundo” e um “significado moral da existência”, o que parece ir na direção oposta ao “pessimismo”. O presente artigo analisa o significado das noções de ordenação moral de mundo e justificação da existência no pensamento de Schopenhauer, a fim de demonstrar em que medida significado moral da existência e pessimismo filosófico se relacionam no pensamento do autor.: Arthur Schopenhauer is known as the thinker of “philosophical pessimism”. It means, in general lines, the doctrine that presents a certain worldview, but in its more basic sense, it questions the possibility of giving a meaning to the whole of existence: is there “justification” for the existence? By answering this question the German philosopher develops his “metaphysics of the will” and, as its unfolding, his theory of “redemption”, or soteriology. However, the “philosopher of pessimism” also asserts in his work that there is a “moral ordinance of world” and a “moral meaning of existence”, which seems to go on the opposite direction of what is claimed by the “pessimism”. The present paper analyses the sense of the notions of moral ordinance of world and justification of existence in Schopenhauer’s thought, in order to demonstrate how far moral meaning of life and philosophical pessimismo interact in his thought. (shrink)

ABSTRACT As has long been recognized, Arthur Schopenhauer’s intellectual encounter with the Orient represents a departure from previous Western philosophers’ approaches to it. What has been less appreciated, however, is that this encounter also marks a pivotal moment in the modern critique of systematic philosophies of history. Since Schopenhauer doubted that there was any logic in history, either in the form of a providential plan or a rationally intelligible structure, he impugned both history’s scientific status and its significance for an (...) understanding of the human condition. Rejecting both Christian eschatology and the modern theory of progress, he opted instead for a transhistorical perspective. This denigration of history, which had far-reaching repercussions in the latter half of the nineteenth century, must be understood in light of Schopenhauer’s engagement with non-Western philosophy. Schopenhauer’s devaluation of the significance of historical difference, in stark opposition to the philosophers of history who preceded him, contributed to his receptivity to non-Western thought; and his belief in the affinity between his own transhistorical perspective and the teachings of Hinduism and Buddhism informed his antagonism to contemporary historical narratives and theories. (shrink)