I argue that Schopenhauer’s ascription of (moral) rights to animals flows naturally from his distinctive analysis of the concept of a right. In contrast to those who regard rights as fundamental and then cast wrongdoing as a matter of violating rights, he takes wrong (Unrecht) to be the more fundamental notion and defines the concept of a right (Recht) in its terms. He then offers an account of wrongdoing which makes it plausible to suppose that at least many animals can (...) be wronged and thus, by extension, have rights. The result, I argue, is a perspective on the nature of moral rights in general, and the idea of animal rights in particular, that constitutes an important and plausible alternative to the more familiar views advanced by philosophers in recent decades. (shrink)

The concept of rights is now so dominant in the language of politics that it is becoming difficult to identify its use with any particular approach to the solution of social problems or to gain a clear picture of its significance, its advantages and its disadvantages as a way of conceptualizing and resolving contentious political issues. None the less there is a perceptible shift towards an emphasis on rights in contemporary politics which many welcome and encourage and others question and (...) even reject, a shift which is matched in jurisprudence by the renewed stress which many theorists place on rights as a basic legal concept despite recurrent problems associated with the concept as a tool for legal analysis and moral justification. Conflicting theories of legal rights are canvassed and this in turn feeds into the debate concerning the reality or significance of non-legal rights, for the process of law reform is often presented as a matter of giving legal embodiment to the rights which various interested categories of people are asserted to possess already. (shrink)

The concept of rights is now so dominant in the language of politics that it is becoming difficult to identify its use with any particular approach to the solution of social problems or to gain a clear picture of its significance, its advantages and its disadvantages as a way of conceptualizing and resolving contentious political issues. None the less there is a perceptible shift towards an emphasis on rights in contemporary politics which many welcome and encourage and others question and (...) even reject, a shift which is matched in jurisprudence by the renewed stress which many theorists place on rights as a basic legal concept despite recurrent problems associated with the concept as a tool for legal analysis and moral justification. Conflicting theories of legal rights are canvassed and this in turn feeds into the debate concerning the reality or significance of non-legal rights, for the process of law reform is often presented as a matter of giving legal embodiment to the rights which various interested categories of people are asserted to possess already. (shrink)

A polemical account of Australian philosophy up to 2003, emphasising its unique aspects (such as commitment to realism) and the connections between philosophers' views and their lives. Topics include early idealism, the dominance of John Anderson in Sydney, the Orr case, Catholic scholasticism, Melbourne Wittgensteinianism, philosophy of science, the Sydney disturbances of the 1970s, Francofeminism, environmental philosophy, the philosophy of law and Mabo, ethics and Peter Singer. Realist theories especially praised are David Armstrong's on universals, David Stove's on logical probability (...) and the ethical realism of Rai Gaita and Catholic philosophers. In addition to strict philosophy, the book treats non-religious moral traditions to train virtue, such as Freemasonry, civics education and the Greek and Roman classics. (shrink)

This dissertation is a critical examination and rejection of the two principal types of moral justification, the compensatory and noncompensatory, of affirmative action involving preferential treatment for blacks, Hispanics,American Indians, and women in hiring, promotions, andadmissions. Neither of these approaches to the justification of AA, I have argued, is able to defend AA successfully. AA not morally justified. Thus, succeeding compensatory arguments for AA, individualand group oriented, are unable to evade, undermine,or disarm the objections that AA violates the principles of (...) compensatory justice governing who is owed compensation, what compensation is owed, and who owes compensation, and that AA violates the principles of justice and fundamental individual moral rights governing the distribution of such social goods or benefits as desirable and valuable positions. The principles of justice and moral rights violated by AA govern the distribution of social benefits, including desirable positions, and burdens and systematize, unify, and explain correct moral judgments about the injustice of actions, policies, and practices in a variety of contexts of distribution. Moreover, backward-looking or compensatory arguments for AA have the implication that unjust and morally unacceptable compensatory policies that are morally similar to AA would be justified in contexts other than hiring, promotions, and admissions. Furthermore, the noncompensatory justifications of AA, including meritocratic and utilitarian forward-looking arguments, are unable to evade or to undermine the objection that AA violates principles of justice and fundamental individual moral rights and the objection that these attempted justifications of AA have the implication that unjust and morally unacceptable noncompensatory, forward-looking policies that are morally similar to AA would also be justified in contexts other than the standard ones. (shrink)