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Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
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Epistemic modals and credal disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.details
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Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Indexing.Dan Zeman - 2018 - In Rob Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern & Hannah Rohde (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21. Semantics Archives. pp. 1353-1370.details
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Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities.Nate Charlow - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge. pp. 211-230.details
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Context Probabilism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - In M. Aloni (ed.), 18th Amsterdam Colloquium. Springer. pp. 12-21.details
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The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
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Epistemic Modals and Sensitivity to Contextually‐Salient Partitions.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):134-146.details
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VI-BayesianExpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.details
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A Counterexample to Modus Tollens.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):1001-1024.details
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Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.details
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An Update on Epistemic Modals.Malte Willer - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):835–849.details
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Updating on Biased Probabilistic Testimony.Leander Vignero - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):567-590.details
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Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.details
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Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):102-127.details
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The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146.details
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One's Modus Ponens: Modality, Coherence and Logic.Una Stojnić - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):167-214.details
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I know what you're probably going to say: Listener adaptation to variable use of uncertainty expressions.Sebastian Schuster & Judith Degen - 2020 - Cognition 203 (C):104285.details
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Against the Russellian open future.Anders J. Schoubye & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Mind 126 (504): 1217–1237.details
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Trivializing Informational Consequence.Paolo Santorio - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):297-320.details
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Uncertainty and Persistence: a Bayesian Update Semantics for Probabilistic Expressions.Deniz Rudin - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):365-405.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.details
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Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.details
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The epistemic significance of modal factors.Lilith Newton - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):227-248.details
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Chancy Modus Ponens.Sven Neth - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):632-638.details
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Modality, expected utility, and hypothesis testing.WooJin Chung & Salvador Mascarenhas - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-40.details
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Probability Modals and Infinite Domains.Adam Marushak - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1041-1055.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Must, knowledge, and (in)directness.Daniel Lassiter - 2016 - Natural Language Semantics 24 (2):117-163.details
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Modality, Scale Structure, and Scalar Reasoning.Daniel Lassiter - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):461-490.details
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How many kinds of reasoning? Inference, probability, and natural language semantics.Daniel Lassiter & Noah D. Goodman - 2015 - Cognition 136 (C):123-134.details
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Parentheticality, assertion strength, and polarity.Todor Koev - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (1):113-140.details
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Disjunctive antecedent conditionals.Justin Khoo - 2018 - Synthese 198 (8):7401-7430.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Complex probability expressions & higher-order uncertainty: Compositional semantics, probabilistic pragmatics & experimental data.Michele Herbstritt & Michael Franke - 2019 - Cognition 186 (C):50-71.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
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Probabilistic semantics for epistemic modals: Normality assumptions, conditional epistemic spaces and the strength of must and might.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (4):985-1026.details
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Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):533-564.details
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Decision-theoretic relativity in deontic modality.Nate Charlow - 2018 - Linguistics and Philosophy 41 (3):251-287.details
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Epistemic and Deontic Should.Fabrizio Cariani - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):73-84.details
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Attitudes, Deontics and Semantic Neutrality.Fabrizio Cariani - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):491-511.details
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Contextualism about Evidential Support.Jessica Brown - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):329-354.details
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Fatalism and the Logic of Unconditionals.Justin Bledin - 2018 - Noûs 54 (1):126-161.details
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Disposition Ascriptions.Simona Aimar - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1667-1692.details
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