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Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy

In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 101-122 (1998)

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  1. A Peculiaridade E Contingência da Introspecção de Crença.Leandro De Brasi - 2015 - Filosofia Unisinos 16 (2):100-118.
    O modelo causal de introspecção tem recebido muitas críticas e, de fato, nos últimos anos, tem caído em desuso no mundo filosófico. Neste artigo defendo o modelo e sustento que ele é um excelente candidato, dado um compromisso realista para com o mental, para explicar o nosso acesso introspectivo peculiar, mas contingente, às crenças.
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  • Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.
    This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...)
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  • Disjunctive Luminosity.Drew Johnson - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):118-126.
    Williamson's influential anti-luminosity argument aims to show that our own mental states are not “luminous,” and that we are thus “cognitively homeless.” Among other things, this argument represents a significant challenge to the idea that we enjoy basic self-knowledge of our own occurrent mental states. In this paper, I summarize Williamson's anti-luminosity argument, and discuss the role that the notion of “epistemic basis” plays in it. I argue that the anti-luminosity argument relies upon a particular version of the basis-relative safety (...)
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  • How Would You Answer This Question? Can Dispositional Analyses of Belief Account for First-Person Authority?Nicole Rathgeb - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):204-219.
    In the last decade, various analyses of beliefs in terms of dispositions have been advanced. One principled objection against dispositional accounts of belief is that they cannot accommodate first-...
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  • Agents of Change: Temporal Flow and Feeling Oneself Act.Nick Young - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2619-2637.
    Here, I put forward a new account of how experience gives rise to the belief that time passes. While there is considerable disagreement amongst metaphysicians as to whether time really does pass, it has struck many as a default, ‘common sense’ way of thinking about the world. A popular way of explaining how such a belief arises is to say that it seems perceptually as though time passes. Here I outline some difficulties for this approach, and propose instead that the (...)
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  • Discursive Integrity and the Principles of Responsible Public Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (2).
    This paper articulates a general distinction between two important communicative ideals—expressive sincerity and discursive integrity—and then uses it to analyze problems with political debate in contemporary democracies. In the context of philosophical discussions of different forms of trustworthiness and debates about deliberative democracy, self-knowledge, and moral testimony, the paper develops three arguments for the conclusion that, although expressive sincerity is valuable, we should not ignore discursive integrity in thinking about how to address problems with contemporary political debate. The paper concludes (...)
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  • Perception, Evidence, and Our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.Anil Gomes - 2019 - In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), Knowing Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    ‘How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were?’ So asks Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse. It is this question, rather than any concern about pretence or deception, which forms the basis for the philosophical problem of other minds. Responses to this problem have tended to cluster around two solutions: either we know others’ minds through perception; or we know others’ minds through a form of inference. In the (...)
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  • Towards Collective Self-Knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1153-1173.
    We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? (...)
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  • Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    -/- Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves (...)
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  • Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Which “Key to All Mythologies”* About the Self?—A Note on Where the Illusions of Transcendence Come From and How to Resist Them.Annalisa Coliva - 2013 - In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge, Regno Unito:
    It is a striking feature of philosophical reflection on the self that it often ends up being revisionary of our commonsensical intuition that it is identical to a living human being with, intrinsically, physical and psychological properties. As is well known, Descartes identified the self with a mental entity, Hume denied the existence of such an entity and Kant reduced it to a transcendental ego—to a mere condition of possibility for experience and thought. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein followed Kant —or, (...)
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  • First-Person Authority Through the Lens of Experimental Philosophy.Joanna Komorowska-Mach & Andrzej Szczepura - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):209-227.
  • Avowals: Expression, Security, and Knowledge: Reply to Matthew Boyle, David Rosenthal, and Maura Tumulty. [REVIEW]Dorit Bar-On - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (1):47-63.
    In my reply to Boyle, Rosenthal, and Tumulty, I revisit my view of avowals’ security as a matter of a special immunity to error, their character as intentional expressive acts that employ self-ascriptive vehicles (without being grounded in self-beliefs), Moore’s paradox, the idea of expressing as contrasting with reporting and its connection to showing one’s mental state, and the ‘performance equivalence’ between avowals and other expressive acts.
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  • On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case of (...)
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  • El conocimiento de la propia mente: Donald Davidson sobre autoridad de la primera persona, externalismo y racionalidad.Marc Jiménez Rolland - 2012 - Dissertation, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas
    In this thesis, I elaborate and defend Donald Davidson's account of knowing one's own mental states that exhibit first-person authority. To that end, I place Davidson's account among others in the philosophical landscape concerning self-knowledge. Next, I examine his response to philosophical challenges that arise from mental content externalism and self-deception. Finally, I draw some insights froms Davidson's account to the broader aims of epsitemology.
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  • The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.
    Philosophers and psychologists generally hold that, in light of the empirical data, a subject lacks infallible access to her own mental states. However, while subjects certainly are fallible in some ways, I show that the data fails to discredit that a subject has infallible access to her own occurrent thoughts and judgments. This is argued, first, by revisiting the empirical studies, and carefully scrutinizing what is shown exactly. Second, I argue that if the data were interpreted to rule out all (...)
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  • On Knowing One's Own Resistant Beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):212-225.
    Influential views on self-knowledge presuppose that we cannot come to know a resistant belief in a first-personal way. Two theses support this supposition: if a belief self-ascription is grounded in the evidence of the person holding the belief, it is third-personal and we cannot have first-personal knowledge of beliefs we do not control. I object to both of these theses and argue that we can introspect on beliefs of which we lack control even though we cannot assent to their content.
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  • Becoming Aware of One’s Thoughts : Kant on Self-Knowledge and Reflective Experience.Renz Ursula - 2015 - In .
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  • Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):430-55.
    Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There.
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  • A Self for the Body.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia), (...)
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  • Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated.Peter Carruthers - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter (...)
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  • Self‐Knowledge: Expression Without Expressivism.Lucy Campbell - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):186-208.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  • Introspection, d? ploiement et simulation.Jérôme Dokic - 2005 - Philosophiques 32 (2):383-397.
    Selon une théorie cognitiviste de l’auto-attribution, je peux parvenir à la connaissance directe, non-inférentielle de mes propres croyances. Cette théorie a été traditionnellement associée à la notion d’introspection conçue comme source de connaissance interne. On sait que le recours à cette notion compromet l’application à soi-même d’un concept unifié de croyance, valable également pour autrui. Dans cet essai, j’explore une autre méthode d’auto-attribution, également envisagée par Wittgenstein , que j’appelle « méthode de déploiement ». Selon cette méthode, je parviens à (...)
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  • ‘‘In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15).
    It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I (...)
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  • Itsetuntemus, ekspressivismi ja Wittgenstein.Tero Vaaja - 2017 - Ajatus 74 (1):9-40.
    Tämä artikkeli esittelee ekspressivististä itsetuntemuksen teoriaa erityyppisten itsetuntemuksen teorioiden kontekstissa. Artikkelin viimekätinen tavoite on arvioida erityisesti ekspressivistisen teorian suhdetta Wittgensteinin mielenfilosofiaan, joka usein mainitaan teorian lähteenä, ja tarkastella teorian kehitystarpeita ja -mahdollisuuksia muiden itsetuntemuksen teorioiden valossa. Osassa 1 esitetään eräitä käsitteellisiä selvennyksiä. Osa 2 käsittelee itsetuntemuksen oletettuja filosofisesti kiinnostavia erityispiirteitä, joiden ymmärtäminen on itsetuntemuksen teorioiden arvioimisen kannalta olennaista. Osa 3 esittää itsetuntemuksen teorioiden karkean tyypittelyn sen mukaan, pitävätkö ne itseilmaisuja empiirisesti muodostettuina väittäminä, rationaaliseen toimijuuteen olennaisesti liittyvinä sitoutumina vai ekspressiivisinä lausumina. (...)
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  • Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):319-346.
    Many recent discussions of self-consciousness and self-knowledge assume that there are only two kinds of accounts available to be taken on the relation between the so-called first-order (conscious) states and subjects' awareness or knowledge of them: a same-order, or reflexive view, on the one hand, or a higher-order one, on the other. I maintain that there is a third kind of view that is distinctively different from these two options. The view is important because it can accommodate and make intelligible (...)
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  • Color, Externalism and Switch Cases.David Bain - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):335-362.
    I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject’s wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving (...)
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  • Extending Introspection.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - In Robert William Clowes, Klaus Gärtner & Inês Hipólito (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem - Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artifacts. Springer. pp. 231-251.
    Clark and Chalmers propose that the mind extends further than skin and skull. If they are right, then we should expect this to have some effect on our way of knowing our own mental states. If the content of my notebook can be part of my belief system, then looking at the notebook seems to be a way to get to know my own beliefs. However, it is at least not obvious whether self-ascribing a belief by looking at my notebook (...)
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  • An Expressivist Solution to Moorean Paradoxes.Wolfgang Freitag & Nadja-Mira Yolcu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5001-5024.
    The paper analyzes the nature and scope of Moore’s paradox, articulates the desiderata of a successful solution and claims that psychological expressivism best meets these desiderata. After a brief discussion of prominent responses to Moore’s paradox, the paper offers a solution based on a theory of expressive acts: a Moorean utterance is absurd because the speaker expresses mental states with conflicting contents in commissive versions of the paradox and conflicting states of mind in omissive versions. The paper presents a theory (...)
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  • Immunity to Wh-Misidentification.Aidan McGlynn - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2293-2313.
    This paper responds to arguments due to Joel Smith and Annalisa Coliva that try to show that James Pryor’s notion of wh-misidentification is philosophically uninteresting, and perhaps even spurious. It also proposes definitions of wh-misidentification and immunity to wh-misidentification which try to improve in various ways on the characterisations that standardly figure in the literature, and explores the relationship between misidentification and the epistemic structures characteristic of some kinds of Gettier cases.
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  • Self-Knowledge, Agency and Force.Lucy O’Brien - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580-601.
  • Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force.Lucy O’Brien - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580–601.
    My aim in this paper is to articulate further what may be called an agency theory of self-knowledge. Many theorists have stressed how important agency is to self- knowledge, and much work has been done drawing connections between the two notions.<sup>2</sup> However, it has not always been clear what _epistemic_ advantage agency gives us in this area and why it does so. I take it as a constraint on an adequate account of how a subject knows her own mental states (...)
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  • Self-Knowledge in a Predictive Processing Framework.Lukas Schwengerer - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):563-585.
    In this paper I propose an account of self-knowledge based on a framework of predictive processing. Predictive processing understands the brain as a prediction-action machine that tries to minimize error in its predictions about the world. For this view to evolve into a complete account of human cognition we ought to provide an idea how it can account for self-knowledge – knowledge of one’s own mental states. I provide an attempt for such an account starting from remarks on introspection made (...)
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  • Basic Self-Knowledge and Transparency.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):679-696.
    Cogito-like judgments, a term coined by Burge, comprise thoughts such as, I am now thinking, I [hereby] judge that Los Angeles is at the same latitude as North Africa, or I [hereby] intend to go to the opera tonight. It is widely accepted that we form cogito-like judgments in an authoritative and not merely empirical manner. We have privileged self-knowledge of the mental state that is self-ascribed in a cogito-like judgment. Thus, models of self-knowledge that aim to explain privileged self-knowledge (...)
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  • Three Questions About Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Giovanni Merlo - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):603-623.
    It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what does it take to explain the fact (...)
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  • Rule-Following and Consciousness: Old Problem or New?Alexander Miller & Ali Saboohi - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):171-178.
    It has recently been claimed that there is a “new hard problem” for physicalism. The new hard problem, according to Goff, is based on “semantic phenomenology”, the view that conscious perceptual experience represents linguistic expressions as having determinate meanings. Goff argues that Kripke’s rule-following argument demonstrates that it is particularly difficult for a physicalist to account for semantic phenomenology. In this paper, we argue that Goff’s discussion of semantic phenomenology fails to uncover a “new” hard problem for physicalism and there (...)
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  • Can Imagination Give Rise to Knowledge?Madeleine Hyde - 2021 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    My thesis centres on the question of whether imaginative states can give rise to knowledge - including whether, and the extent to which, imaginative states can justify beliefs. Across seven chapters, I answer that imaginative states can indeed give rise to knowledge. The first and final chapters introduce and summarise the thesis. In the second chapter, I ask both what different cases of imagining have in common and what sets them apart from other kinds of mental states. In the third (...)
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  • Autorytet pierwszoosobowy i samowiedza w koncepcji Crispina Wrighta.Ida Miczke - 2020 - Filozofia Nauki 28 (3):111-130.
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  • The World as I Found It. A Subjectivist Metaphysics of the Mental.Giovanni Merlo - 2015 - Dissertation, Universitat de Barcelona
    The first part of this thesis articulates and defends the Subjectivist View of the Mental. According to this view, my mental states are essentially different from the mental states of everyone else, but the fact that they are is a subjective fact, rather than an objective one. Chapter 1 explains what it takes for a fact to be subjective, what kind of difference holds between my mental states and everyone else's mental states and what kind of intuitions lead me to (...)
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  • Introspective Misidentification.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1737-1758.
    It is widely held that introspection-based self-ascriptions of mental states are immune to error through misidentification , relative to the first person pronoun. Many have taken such errors to be logically impossible, arguing that the immunity holds as an “absolute” necessity. Here I discuss an actual case of craniopagus twins—twins conjoined at the head and brain—as a means to arguing that such errors are logically possible and, for all we know, nomologically possible. An important feature of the example is that (...)
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  • De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.
    I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a deflationary account of the latter—the Simple Account, due to Evans —will not do; a more robust one based on an account of de se thoughts is required. I will then sketch such an alternative account, based on a more general view on singular thoughts, and show how it can deal with the problems I (...)
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  • Is There Anything to the Authority Thesis?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:125-143.
    Many philosophical theories of self-knowledge can be understood as attempts to explain why self-ascriptions enjoy a certain kind of authority that other-ascriptions lack (the Authority Thesis). The aim of this paper is not to expand the stock of existing explanations but to ask whether the Authority Thesis can be adequately specified. To this end, I identify three requirements that must be met by any satisfactory specification. I conclude that the search for an adequate specification of the Authority Thesis leads to (...)
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  • A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
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  • Mental Attribution in Interaction: How the Second Person Perspective Dissolves the Problem of Other Minds.Antoni Gomila Benejam & Diana Pérez - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 75.
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  • Introspection and Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):355-372.
    In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism.
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  • Algorithmic Iteration for Computational Intelligence.Giuseppe Primiero - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (3):521-543.
    Machine awareness is a disputed research topic, in some circles considered a crucial step in realising Artificial General Intelligence. Understanding what that is, under which conditions such feature could arise and how it can be controlled is still a matter of speculation. A more concrete object of theoretical analysis is algorithmic iteration for computational intelligence, intended as the theoretical and practical ability of algorithms to design other algorithms for actions aimed at solving well-specified tasks. We know this ability is already (...)
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  • Kant and the Problem of Self-Identification.Luca Forgione - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (2):178-198.
    Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless selfascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least (...)
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  • How to Tell Universals From Particulars.Philipp Keller - unknown
    I reassess the famous arguments of Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1925) against the tenability of the distinction between particulars and universals and discuss their recent elaboration by Fraser MacBride. I argue that Ramsey’s argument is ambiguous between kinds and properties and that his sceptical worries can be resolved once this distinction is taken into account. A crucial role in this dissolution is a notion of what is essential to a property. I close by some epistemological considerations.
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  • Belief as an Act of Reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.
    Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s (...)
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  • Self-Knowledge and Commitments.Annalisa Coliva - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):365 - 375.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive (...)
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