This paper proffers a dialogical theory of decision-making: decision-makers are engaged in two modes of rational decisions, instrumental and existential. Instrumental rational decisions take place when the DM views the self externally to the objects, whether goods or animate beings. Existential rational decisions take place when the DM views the self in union with such objects. While the dialogical theory differs from Max Weber’s distinction between two kinds of rationality, it follows Martin Buber’s philosophical anthropology. The paper expounds the ramifications (...) of the dialogical theory in understanding structures of exchange considering assessments of diverse thinkers. (shrink)

Probing into the fundamentals of any phenomenon, we come upon a secret in the very moment of its inception - a bond with the multiplicity of the world. If anything in our world is detached from its foundations, this ontological lifeline is severed - being and Being are confounded. The ontic preexists language, it pre-empts all conceptualization. The world is in flux and lies always beyond the confines of any system; something of it always escapes. Only when this is conceded (...) can beginning begin, only then can we set about the work of phenomenalizing our world; only then is it possible to seek answers to questions such as "Who am I?", "And you?", "What is the nature of responsibility, reflection, dialogicity and intersubjectivity?" Perhaps after all some notion can be netted in. (shrink)

The paper deals with Martin Buber’s claim that responsibility “is the basic theme of my work in general.” As I show in the opening section of the article, his statement applies to the dialogical period of his work, but not the pre-dialogical. In the mystical phase of Buber’s thought there is no place for responsibility because the very nature of mysticism excludes that possibility. The incompatibility of mysticism and interpersonal responsibility is confirmed in the autobiographical fragment “conversion,” one of the (...) two biographical moments I discuss in relation to the shift in his thinking on responsibility. The second is his relationship with his wife Paula Winkler, which profoundly influenced his thinking about the importance of love and marriage for an understanding of responsibility. I then explore his view of responsibility as a doctrine, which developed along with his dialogical philosophy. Finally, I examine his critical views on four basic ways of avoiding responsibility, which highlight the close connection between freedom and responsibility: belief in fate, individualism, collectivism, and religious acosmism. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to further the conversation about the possibilities of dialogue with technology that Wegerif and Major have initiated. In their paper Wegerif and Major have argued that “constructive dialogue with technology is possible, even essential, and that this takes the form of opening a dialogic space” and they also “argue against Buber that dialogic spaces do not all take the same form, but that they take a multitude of forms depending, to a large extent, on the (...) mediating technology”. Reflecting on the paper by Wegerif and Major, the present paper attempts to highlight certain issues and possibilities for such a dialogue. In the first section of the paper, Wegerif and Major’s discussion of technology-mediated dialogue has been reflected upon. This is followed by a reflection on the possibility and challenges of engaging in a dialogue with technology as ‘other’ by referring to the case of a robot ‘Sophia’ getting citizenship in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The third section discusses certain concerns regarding the interpretation of Buber’s idea of dialogue by Wegerif and Major. The conclusive section highlights some key aspects that need to be considered while reflecting on the possibility of dialogue with technology. (shrink)