The crucial problem in the philosophy of psychiatry is to determine under which conditions certain behaviors, mental states, and personality traits should be regarded as symptoms of mental illnesses. Participants in the debate can be placed on a continuum of positions. On the one side of the continuum, there are naturalists who maintain that the concept of mental illness can be explained by relying on the conceptual apparatus of the natural sciences, such as biology and neuroscience. On the other side (...) of the continuum, there are normativists who maintain that the appropriate characterization of the concept of mental illness cannot avoid reference to epistemic, moral and other social values. Although, this article is primarily an introduction to the debate, we stress the importance of the normativist positions. (shrink)

Implicitly or explicitly, youth work practitioners, scholars and advocates typically invoke a set of egalitarian values to explain, justify and promote the ethical basis of their work. Despite such commitments, there exists conceptual ambiguity surrounding equality across much of the youth work literature which has significant consequences for how youth work is framed and defended. This article introduces the interdisciplinary field of Equality Studies and argues that an Equality Studies approach provides a means to (i) clarify equality-related normative goals within (...) the youth work field and (ii) enhance radically orientated youth work by strengthening the conception of equality at its core. It analyses three areas of conceptual ambiguity within the youth work literature with respect to the value of equality, in each case demonstrating how an Equality Studies approach can help remedy the problem. These areas are: (i) the assumption that equality means ‘sameness’; (ii) the limits of equality of opportunity and anti-discrimination; and (iii) the relationship between equality and other values. It then evaluates the concept of ‘equity’, arguing that it is a vague, inadequate and unnecessary vehicle for capturing egalitarian concerns. The article concludes with some comments on the feasibility of radically egalitarian youth work. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Avner de-Shalit has devised a methodology for coming closer to a settled view in political philosophy which he calls ‘public reflective equilibrium’, extending ideas of John Rawls and Michael Walzer. De-Shalit proposes that the philosopher should come to an understanding of views outside the academy through extended interaction with members of the public. These discussions can and do lead to changes in the philosophical theory, from the introduction of new concepts, to new framings of issues or even novel research (...) questions. De-Shalit and I used this approach in our work Disadvantage. Reflecting on our work, I raise five questions: Who speaks for the public? How do you know you are asking the right questions? How should the theorist respond to judgements based on false empirical beliefs? What should be done when the public do not speak with one voice? Is equilibrium a reasonable aspiration? (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 249-270, June 2022.

The world is undeniably full of injustice. Many feel that much political philosophy is practically impotent and engaged instead in overly abstract theorising insufficiently sensitive to the realities of the world. One response to this concern is David Miller’s influential model of evidence-based political philosophy, which claims to be sensitive to empirical evidence from the social sciences, takes seriously people’s opinions, and defends the role of facts in grounding normative principles. Using various examples from the field of global justice, one (...) of Miller’s key areas of work, I show that Miller’s method is unconvincing on two levels. His theoretical argument for fact-dependence is flawed, and his practical argument for an opinion-sensitive political theory is either guilty of status quo bias or, in an attempt to escape it, becomes self-defeating. While the paper is primarily critical, I endeavour also to draw out the implications of my critiques for the role of the ‘real world’ in theorising. (shrink)

Ovaj je zbornik nastao kao rezultat istraživanja provedenog unutar istoimenoga znanstveno-istraživačkoga projekta na kojemu su urednici istovremeno bili i glavni istraživači, a ostali autori članovi istraživačke skupine. Kao svjedoci različitih vrsta otklona od prevladavajućeg, uobičajenoga, normalnoga, pozitivnog ili ponašanja koje se karakterizira kao asocijalno, zapitali smo se – što postojeće čini normom, treba li odstupanje od norme nužno smatrati devijacijom i kakvi su poželjni društveni odgovori na odstupanja od normi. Često se smatra ispravnim upravo ono što je prevladavajuće, a ono (...) što predstavlja otklon označava se kao devijacija u negativnome značenju onoga što nije ispravno, nije posve ispravno, ili čak onoga što treba sankcionirati. Naš je početni stav bio da ono što prevladava ne smije biti neupitna norma, kao što ni ono što je otklon nije po automatizmu devijacija. Međutim, ne smatramo ni da prevladavajuću normu, samom tom činjenicom što je prevladavajuća, nužno treba kritizirati te da je svaki otklon po sebi poželjan. Cilj našeg istraživanja bio je istražiti različite oblike deficita i devijacijau u domeni formiranja vjerovanja individualnih, grupnih, kolektivnih i institucijskih epistemičkih aktera (socijalna epistemologija) i u domeni društvenog i institucijskoga djelovanja (filozofija politike i filozofija psihijatrije). Nastavno na to, pokušali smo identificirati vrijednosti postojećih normi, koliko odgovaraju poželjnim vrijednostima te koji su poželjni društveni odgovori na otklone od normi. (shrink)

I would like to begin by expressing my sincere and profound thanks to all those who suggested criticism and comments to my paper. As I write this reply, like many around the world, I am at home, in...

ABSTRACT In a democracy what people think matters. Political philosophers are mostly democrats. They often justify deliberative and participatory democracy. And yet when it comes to philosophizing they often turn a blind eye to what people think; they sometimes even express profound doubts about what people think and about consulting the public. I call this the political philosophy gap. It has been justified in several ways. In this paper I first consider and dismiss the most common justifications. I then suggest (...) a democratic and an epistemological reason why political philosophers should consider what people think when they formulate their theories. I put forward a proposal for a method of doing so, which I call public reflective equilibrium, and which consists of four stages of research and philosophy. Finally, I suggest that not only is it doable, but it has a potential to contribute a lot to contemporary political philosophy. It should not come instead of traditional ways of conducting political philosophy but as an additional, perhaps more political, method of political philosophy. (shrink)

The transgenerational community is based on moral similarity between contemporary and future people, referring to an ongoing moral deliberation across generations. It justifies obligations of justice towards the not yet born. Prioritarianism gives extra weight to the wellbeing of the least advantaged. I argue that both sentiments are egalitarian, and ask whether there is any tension between them. If we assume economic growth, and/or technological improvements and/or inflation, then prioritarianism prima facie implies that we should prefer to spend any dollar (...) on today’s disadvantaged than on future generations, hence is in tension with the demands of the transgenerational community. Analyzing four ways of meeting this challenge, I argue that the two principles are not in tension. (shrink)