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What is the role of the environment, and of the information it provides, in cognition? More specifically, may there be a role for certain artefacts to play in this context? These are questions that motivate "4E" theories of cognition (as being embodied, embedded, extended, enactive). In his take on that family of views, Hajo Greif first defends and refines a concept of information as primarily natural, environmentally embedded in character, which had been eclipsed by information-processing views of cognition. He continues (...) |
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The state of recent as well as older research on social ontology suggests a paradigmatic approach, according to which it is our consciousness that must provide the framework for conceptualising the social. I, however, argue that Wittgenstein’s treatment of rule-following opens up a new horizon for the ontology of the social. The fact that the rules of our language are social in nature and that we need not be aware of them in order to follow them shifts the problem to (...) No categories |
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Meinertsen’s unifier is discussed on the background of Aristotle’s distinction between four kinds of unity. It argued that Meinertsen combines two different kinds of unity that exclude each other. Only Aristotle’s first meaning of unity seems to be relevant for Meinertsen’s unifier. But this meaning applies literally only to spatial complexes. Its application to states of affairs is problematic because they are mostly not spatial. It is also problematic because unity in the first sense requires an agent. Meinertsen’s unifiers are (...) No categories |
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Quoique l'on ne trouve qu'un nombre limité de références à Nicod dans les manuscrits de la période dite « intermédiaire » de Wittgenstein, une lecture attentive de La Géométrie dans le monde sensible s'avère pourtant décisive pour comprendre la nature du projet phénoménologique de Wittgenstein de la fin des années vingt. Nous nous proposons de montrer que la prise en compte ainsi que la reformulation du problème posé par Nicod en 1924, celui de la nature de la relation d'inclusion spatiale, (...) |
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Cet article s'appuie sur la pensée de Wittgenstein pour comprendre comment des règles économiques agissent. L'étude (1993-2000) d'un Atelier de réparation de la RATP dans lequel une nouvelle règle de rendement a été introduite en 1993 met en évidence trois conclusions. Tout d'abord, dans la sélection des tâches, les opérateurs n'appliquent pas les règles de façon mécanique ; ils n'interprètent pas non plus les règles en faisant table rase des usages. Nos observations montrent que « suivre la règle est une (...) No categories |
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This paper presents a novel proof-theoretic account of dialogue coherence. It focuses on an abstract class of cooperative information-oriented dialogues and describes how their structure can be accounted for in terms of a multi-agent hybrid inference system that combines natural deduction with information transfer and observation. We show how certain dialogue structures arise out of the interplay between the inferential roles of logical connectives (i.e., sentence semantics), a rule for transferring information between agents, and a rule for information flow between (...) |
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This paper presents a novel proof-theoretic account of dialogue coherence. It focuses on an abstract class of cooperative information-oriented dialogues and describes how their structure can be accounted for in terms of a multi-agent hybrid inference system that combines natural deduction with information transfer and observation. We show how certain dialogue structures arise out of the interplay between the inferential roles of logical connectives (i.e., sentence semantics), a rule for transferring information between agents, and a rule for information flow between (...) |
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In a remarkable early paper, Wilfrid Sellars warned us that if we cease to recognize rules, we may well find ourselves walking on four feet; and it is obvious that within human communities, the phenomenon of rules is ubiquitous. Yet from the viewpoint of the sciences, rules cannot be easily accounted for. Sellars himself, during his later years, managed to put a lot of flesh on the normative bones from which he assembled the remarkable skeleton of the early paper; and (...) |
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In the Foundations of Mathematics, Ramsey attempted to amend Principia Mathematica’s logicism to meet serious objections raised against it. While Ramsey’s paper is well known, some questions concerning Ramsey’s motivations to write it and its reception still remain. This paper considers these questions afresh. First, an account is provided for why Ramsey decided to work on his paper instead of simply accepting Wittgenstein’s account of mathematics as presented in the Tractatus. Secondly, evidence is given supporting that Wittgenstein was not moved (...) |
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Wittgenstein’s “machines-as-symbols” are considered with respect to their historical sources and their symbolic and logical nature. Among these sources and precursors, along with Leonardo’s drawings of machines, there are illustrated “machine books”, a kind of book published in the period from the 16th to the 18th centuries which consist of pictures and descriptions of a variety of mechanical devices. Most probably, these books were one of Wittgenstein’s inspirations for his view of machines as components of language-games. The picture of homo (...) |
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The paper analyzes the ontological meaning of mood in Heidegger’s conception of Attunement, in order to relate this notion of Stimmung specifically to our “attunement” to a form of life, as conceived in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. It claims that moods spell out the constitutive impossibility to grasp and found the human experience as such. However, this impossibility is not a lack of human knowledge, but rather corresponds to the necessary opacity, indeterminability and groundlessness of every human experience, which make (...) No categories |
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The paper contains a general argument for linguistic idealism, which it approaches by way of some considerations relating to the unity of the proposition and Tractarian metaphysics. Language exhibits a function–argument structure, but does it do so because it is reflecting how things are in the world, or does the relation of dependence run in the other direction? The paper argues that the general structure of the world is asymmetrically dependent on a metaphysically prior fact about language, namely that it (...) |
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I provide an interpretation of Wittgenstein's much criticized remarks on Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem in the light of paraconsistent arithmetics: in taking Gödel's proof as a paradoxical derivation, Wittgenstein was right, given his deliberate rejection of the standard distinction between theory and metatheory. The reasoning behind the proof of the truth of the Gödel sentence is then performed within the formal system itself, which turns out to be inconsistent. I show that the models of paraconsistent arithmetics (obtained via the Meyer-Mortensen (...) $99.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.com Direct download (3 more)  7 citations |
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This book is a synthesis of more than three decades of research into the concept of time and its semiotic nature. If traditional philosophy – and philosophy of time should be no exception – in the shadow of advancing biology can be said to have reached an impasse, one important reason for this, in harmony with Wittgenstein’s vision, appears to have been its lack of appropriate tools for explicating language. The present theory of time proceeds, accordingly, from the exploration of (...) |
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RESUMO Ainda que Tomás de Aquino não usasse o termo intencionalidade frequentemente, ele tem uma teoria que explica como nós, enquanto sujeitos, nos referimos intencionalmente aos objetos. Nossa referência funciona quando há uma "identidade formal" entre a forma no ato de percepção ou conhecimento do sujeito e a forma do objeto. Na literatura secundária, "identidade formal" é muitas vezes o nome usado para chamar essa teoria. Nosso artigo visa o fato de que, em Tomás, a tese da identidade formal não (...) No categories |
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In this article, we consider Wittgenstein’s approach to non-inferential knowledge, its relation to special propositions, and the nature of the justification of these propositions. According to Wittgenstein, there is a kind of non-inferential knowledge whose rational status is not the result of basic beliefs (in a foundational sense) that justify it. In Wittgenstein’s rule-following analysis, Frege’s theory is criticized. This theory is based on the idea that having a conceptual repertoire prior to the understanding of any rule, requires having grasped (...) |
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By a seemingly strange twist of fate, the formalist approach to language became popular after Hilbert’s project of providing a formalist foundation for mathematics foundered on G¨odel’s famous incompleteness theorems. Even in September 1930, during the congress in K¨onigsberg, where G¨odel presented his results for the first time, Carnap still defended logicism against the intuitionist and formalist views on the foundations of mathematics. Furthermore in linguistics, the formalist approach to syntactic issues had only become disseminated in the 1930s, due to (...) No categories |
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Starting from the sixties of the past century theory change has become a main concern of philosophy of science. Two of the best known formal accounts of theory change are the post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude (PPV for short) and the AGM theory of belief change (AGM for short). In this paper, we will investigate the conceptual relations between PPV and AGM and, in particular, we will ask whether the AGM rules for theory change are effective means for approaching the truth, (...) |
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The wantok system in the Solomon Islands and the Melanesian countries more broadly, strongly links to the practices of group identity and belonging, reciprocity, and caring for one’s relatives. It is a term used to express patterns of relationships that link people in families, tribes, islands, provinces, nationality and even more superficially at greater Melanesian sub-regional aggregates. Various aspects of the wantok system are called different names by distinct language groups in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Nevertheless, the (...) No categories |
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In this essay I set out to problematize the concepts of intersubjectivity and interaction in the theories of Germany's two foremost social philosophers: Jiirgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann. To do so, I shall briefly reconstruct Husserl's phenomenological concept of intersubjectivity and its relationship with rational horizons and lifeworlds. I shall then demonstrate the importance of Husserl's thought in the theory of (rational) communicative action in Habermas. The third section deals with the radical rethinking of the subject (and hence intersubjectivity) in (...) |
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