Abstract.Legal philosophy must consider the way in which laws function as reasons for action. “Simple positivism” considers laws as merely reasons in the balance of reasons. Joseph Raz, as a representative of “sophisticated positivism,” argues that laws are exclusionary reasons for action, not merely reasons in the balance of reasons. This paper discusses Raz's arguments for his view. The Functional Argument provides no more reason for positivism than against it. The Phenomenological Argument is best supported by an account of how (...) character traits function in explaining behaviour. But then the distinction between exclusionary reasons and expressive reasons is obliterated. Legal positivism cannot absorb laws as expressive reasons for action. Raz's positivism implies the correctness of an anti‐positivistic legal theory. (shrink)

This paper aims to identify the main points that Peter Winch makes, or reminders that he offers, about understanding ourselves and others. It would no doubt be possible to construct a theory out of these ideas, but I try to avoid giving the impression that Winch does so. Instead, the most Wittgensteinian approach to the subject is, as Winch does, to describe, remind and thereby clarify, without putting forward any kind of questionable hypothesis. Winch's work brings out the fact that (...) understanding people is importantly connected to both wisdom and practical being in tune with others, but identical with neither. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the certainty about the wrongness of killing must not be considered as a universal, but as a local one. Initially, I show that there exist communities in which the wrongness of killing innocents is not a moral certainty and that this kind of case cannot be justified by arguing that such people are psychopaths. Lastly, I argue that universal certainties do not admit of exceptions: thus, the fact that some exceptional cases affect the certainty (...) that killing innocents is wrong, leads me to conclude that it is a local certainty. (shrink)