¿Es necesaria la historia para la filosofía? En tiempos de especialización disciplinaria como los actuales, parecería ésta una pregunta obvia y la respuesta, casi innecesaria. Sin embargo, lo cierto es que en la actualidad asistimos a un debate y a una fragmentación del campo filosófico en relación precisamente con el carácter contingente o necesario de la historia para la filosofía. Por ello, tomando como modelos de relación con la historia tanto el ámbito del arte como el de la ciencia, en (...) este artículo trataremos de elucidar qué papel puede cumplir la historia en el ámbito filosófico. Frente a los defensores de la historia como un elemento esencial de la filosofía, pero también distanciándonos de quienes reservan un lugar secundario a la historia en nuestra disciplina, plantearemos una tercera vía. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the shifts in Wilhelm Windelband’s ‘critical philosophy of values’ as it developed hand in hand with his understanding of relativism. The paper has two goals. On the one hand, by analyzing the role that relativism played in his philosophical project, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding of Windelband's intellectual development in the context of historicism and Neo-Kantianism. On the other hand, by highlighting Windelband’s contribution to the understanding of relativism, it sheds light on an important (...) episode in the history of that problem. The paper distinguishes between three phases in Windelband’s thinking and shows that his views about relativism changed in close connection with his conception of history. The early Windelband thought that historicism was compatible with absolute validity because he was firmly convinced of historical progress. The mature Windelband rejected progress as a means for justifying validity and put the problem of relativism into sharp relief. In response to the failure of his mature philosophy to fend off relativism, the later Windelband strengthened the role of history again. The paper concludes that Windelband’s significance lies not in his arguments against relativism, but rather in having furthered philosophical understanding of the problems at stake. (shrink)

The relationship between present-day philosophy and philosophy of the past is a fundamental issue for understanding today’s philosophical division between “analytical” and “continental” philosophy. However, the opposition doesn’t lie in the mere rejection or acceptation of philosophy’s history. In fact, both philosophical traditions conceive the possibility of a dialog with the great philosophers of the past. This paper first characterizes the relationships with past philosophy in both traditions and arguments in favor of the relevancy of philosophy’s history for philosophy.