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  1. El infinitismo doxástico del joven Peirce y el problema del regreso epistémico de la justificación.Carlos Garzón-Rodríguez - 2021 - In Carlos Garzón-Rodríguez & Jorge Flórez (eds.), Peirce en Hispanoamérica. Manizalez, Colombia.: Universidad de Caldas. pp. 89-132.
    En la primera parte realizo una reconstrucción de la postura infinitista de Peirce a partir de los argumentos formulados en sus textos de juventud. En la segunda parte formulo rápidamente el problema del regreso epistémico de la justificación y reconstruyo tres objeciones clásicas: la objeción de las mentes finitas, la objeción del origen inexplicado, y la objeción de la descripción errada. En la tercera parte muestro cómo en sus textos de juventud Peirce consideró todas estas objeciones y cómo trató de (...)
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  • Does Klein’s infinitism offer a response to Agrippa’s trilemma?Stephen Wright - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1113-1130.
    The regress of reasons threatens an epistemic agent’s right to claim that any beliefs are justified. In response, Peter Klein’s infinitism argues that an infinite series of supporting reasons of the right type not only is not vicious but can make for epistemic justification. In order to resist the sceptic, infinitism needs to provide reason to think that there is at least one justified belief in the world. Under an infinitist conception this involves showing that at least one belief is (...)
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  • The preface paradox dissolved.John N. Williams - 1987 - Theoria 53 (2-3):121-140.
    The preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at least one of them must be correct, then he should give at least one of them up. Equally, if a person's belief is rational, then he has a right to hold it. Yet the preface example is prima facie a case in which a person holds an inconsistent set of beliefs each of which is rational, (...)
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  • Moorean absurdities and the nature of assertion.John N. Williams - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.
    I argue that Moore's propositions, for example, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' cannot be rationally believed. Their assertors either cannot be rationally believed or cannot be believed to be rational. This analysis is extended to Moorean propositions such as God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that this proposition is false. I then defend the following definition of assertion: anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief (...)
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  • The trouble with infinitism.Andrew D. Cling - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):101 - 123.
    One way to solve the epistemic regress problem would be to show that we can acquire justification by means of an infinite regress. This is infinitism. This view has not been popular, but Peter Klein has developed a sophisticated version of infinitism according to which all justified beliefs depend upon an infinite regress of reasons. Klein's argument for infinitism is unpersuasive, but he successfully responds to the most compelling extant objections to the view. A key component of his position is (...)
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  • The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
    I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.
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  • Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
    What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.
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