The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused (...) the idea of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. In this classical view, an intellectually autonomous explorer of knowledge must not depend on a belief that is obtained from another’s testimony, until one can justify it to oneself. However, accompanying the growing focus on the importance of social dimensions of acquiring knowledge and understanding, recent epistemologists have doubted the classical view and have since reconsidered intellectual autonomy from distinct approaches such as social and virtue epistemology. This paper propounds an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy. First, it is argued that thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers is an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Second, it is demonstrated that with particular cognitive features inherent within us, an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning in necessary situations. This interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy can conceptually enrich intellectual autonomy by considering its relationship with not only responsibility but also with vulnerability. Specifically, regarding responsibility, an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout questioning processes. Regarding vulnerability, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability in the plastic control of the questioning processes. (shrink)

This thesis examines Jung's relation to Buddhism, in particular, the Tibetan and Zen Buddhist traditions from a hermeneutic perspective. It addresses the way Jung attempted to make a dialogue between Analytical Psychology and Buddhism and the extent to which he was successful. Jung's approach to Buddhism is sometimes affected by Eurocentric prejudices, which led him to misunderstand some of the concepts of Buddhism. Moreover, from the standpoint of a psychologist, Jung had a tendency to reduce Buddhist thought to its psychological (...) aspects, and not to pay sufficient attention to its traditional meanings. Jung was also highly selective in his use of Buddhist texts and focussed on those texts which appeared to confirm, or conform to, his psychological thinking, but dismissed other Buddhist materials which had no common base with his psychology. To contrast his approach, this thesis examines the theory of the phenomenology of religion, which emphasises the recognition of the irreducibility of religious phenomena and claims that we must understand religion within its own cultural context. From the perspective of the phenomenology of religion, Jung's methodology lacks objectivity and fails to exercise epoche, which means a suspension of one's own judgement or the exclusion of every possible presupposition. Rather, Jung seems to over-emphasise eidetic vision, which is a form of subjectivity that implies an intuitive grasp of the essentials of a situation in its wholeness. There are important achievements in Jung's engagement with Buddhism and indeed Jung should be regarded as a pioneer in this field of research. Jung's writings on Buddhism had a major influence on later studies of the various Buddhist traditions and meditation in relation to Western psychology and its therapeutic techniques. From this more positive perspective, this thesis explores in detail the strengths and shortcomings of Jung's engagement with the different Buddhist traditions, in order to assess its potential contribution to the contemporary dialogue between East and West. (shrink)