- Wilfried Sieg. Hilbert's Programs and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. ISBN 978-0-19-537222-9 ; 978-0-19-970715-7 . Pp. xii + 439†. [REVIEW]Oran Magal - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):417-423.details
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Review of Timothy Childers. Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. ISBN: 978-0-19-966182-4 ; 978-0-19-966183-1 . Pp. xviii + 194. [REVIEW]Donald Gillies - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):413-417.details
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Bertrand’s Paradox and the Principle of Indifference.Nicholas Shackel - 2024 - Abingdon: Routledge.details
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EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.details
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Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Indexing.Dan Zeman - 2018 - In Rob Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern & Hannah Rohde (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21. Semantics Archives. pp. 1353-1370.details
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The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable.Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-15.details
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The structure of epistemic probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3213-3242.details
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Justifying the principle of indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.details
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Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle.Nicholas Shackel & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):505-523.details
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Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
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The A Priori Without Magic.Jared Warren - 2022 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.details
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David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems.Sven Ove Hansson (ed.) - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-25.details
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Why Frequentists and Bayesians Need Each Other.Jon Williamson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):293-318.details
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Bruno de Finetti. Philosophical Lectures on Probability. Collected, edited, and annotated by Alberto Mura. Translated by Hykel Hosni. Synthese Library; 340. [REVIEW]Jon Williamson - 2010 - Philosophia Mathematica 18 (1):130-135.details
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One philosopher's modus ponens is another's modus tollens: Pantomemes and nisowir.Jon Williamson - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):284-304.details
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Mechanistic Theories of Causality Part II.Jon Williamson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (6):433-444.details
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Models in Systems Medicine.Jon Williamson - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (47):429-469.details
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How Uncertain Do We Need to Be?Jon Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1249-1271.details
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How Can Causal Explanations Explain?Jon Williamson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):257-275.details
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From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic.Jon Williamson - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):468-486.details
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Direct inference and probabilistic accounts of induction.Jon Williamson - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (3):451-472.details
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Calibration for epistemic causality.Jon Williamson - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):941-960.details
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An Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View.John E. Wilcox - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):65-87.details
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Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):841-850.details
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Lines of Descent: Kuhn and Beyond.Friedel Weinert - 2014 - Foundations of Science 19 (4):331-352.details
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The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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Goals and the Informativeness of Prior Probabilities.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2017 - Erkenntnis:1-24.details
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The new Tweety puzzle: arguments against monistic Bayesian approaches in epistemology and cognitive science.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1407-1435.details
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Hybrid Impermissivism and the Diachronic Coordination Problem.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):267-285.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss.Katie Steele - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):427-444.details
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The objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):539-558.details
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Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.details
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Kuhn vs. Popper on criticism and dogmatism in science, part II: How to strike the balance.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (2):161-168.details
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Identification in Games: Changing Places.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):197-206.details
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Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.details
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How can representationalism accommodate degrees of belief? A dispositional representationalist proposal.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8943-8964.details
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How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.details
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Empirical evidence claims are a priori.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2821-2834.details
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The logic of probabilistic knowledge.Patricia Rich - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1703-1725.details
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The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity.Patricia Rich - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9669-9698.details
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What's Wrong With Our Theories of Evidence?Julian Reiss - 2014 - Theoria 29 (2):283-306.details
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Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3801-3832.details
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A Battle in the Statistics Wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13689-13748.details
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Evidence: wanted, alive or dead.Stathis Psillos - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):357-381.details
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How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Episteme:1-25.details
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The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.details
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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2009 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.details
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