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  1. Transparência, reflexão e vicissitude.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - 2011 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 52 (123):213-236.
    This article discusses the notion of transparency condition proposed by Richard Moran in Authority and Estrangement (2001). According to this notion the question in the first-person present tense about our own belief ("Do I believe in p?") is answered in reference with the same reasons that justify the answer to a corresponding question about the world (about the truth of p). Transparency, in this sense, is the fundamental characteristic of self-knowledge in the context of common experience. Understanding this idea helps (...)
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  • Social and Justified Legal Normativity: Unlocking the Mystery of the Relationship.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (3):409-433.
    Can Hart's non-cognitivism be reconciled with his rejection of the predictive and sanction-based explanations of law? This paper analyses Hart's notion of the internal point of view and focuses on the notion of acceptance of a rule along the lines of a non-cognitivist understanding of intentional actions. It is argued that a non-cognitivist analysis of acceptance of rules is incomplete and parasitic on a more basic or primary model of acceptance that does not involve mental states. This basic or primary (...)
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  • Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
    You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
    I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is (...)
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