- Unsafe reasoning: a survey.Paulo Faria - 2009 - Dois Pontos 6 (2):185-20.details
|
|
Über Sokratische Weisheit als intellektuelle Bescheidenheit.Guido Löhrer - 2018 - Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica 32:141--163.details
|
|
Numbers and Everything.Gonçalo Santos - 2013 - Philosophia Mathematica 21 (3):297-308.details
|
|
Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanne Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.details
|
|
Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.Timothy Bowen - manuscriptdetails
|
|
EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.details
|
|
Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism.Matti Eklund - 2016 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge.Daniel Cohnitz - 2012 - In Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.), New waves in philosophical logic. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
|
|
Vaghezza: confini, cumuli e paradossi.Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2012 - Roma: Laterza.details
|
|
Index of Subjects Discussed in the Journal.[author unknown] - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (12):658-663.details
|
|
Assertion, Telling, and Epistemic Norms.Charlie Pelling - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):335-348.details
|
|
Logical information and epistemic space.Mark Jago - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):327 - 341.details
|
|
Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.details
|
|
Never say never.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Topoi 13 (2):135-145.details
|
|
A Counterfactual Approach to Explanation in Mathematics.Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan & David Ripley - 2020 - Philosophia Mathematica 28 (1):1-34.details
|
|
Skepticism about Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2016 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.details
|
|
Reasons and Perception.Declan Smithies - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 631-661.details
|
|
Probability and nonclassical logic.Robert Williams - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Probability in ethics.David McCarthy - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 705–737.details
|
|
Frege’s Unmanageable Thing.Michael Price - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413.details
|
|
Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism.Jochen Briesen - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.details
|
|
Perspectival truth and color primitivism.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 1--34.details
|
|
Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
|
|
Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion.Matthew A. Benton - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 329-339.details
|
|
Fixed Points in the Hyperintensional Epistemic $\mu$-Calculus and the KK Principle.Timothy Bowen - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Objectionable thick concepts in denials.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.details
|
|
Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
|
|
Proper nouns.Samuel Cumming - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgers - New Brunswickdetails
|
|
Transcendental Idealism Without Tears.Nicholas Stang - 2017 - In K. Pearce & T. Goldschmidt (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 82-103.details
|
|
Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
|
|
Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2011 - In Petr Cintula, Chris Fermüller, Lluis Godo & Petr Hájek (eds.), Logical Models of Reasoning with Vague Information. pp. 1--19.details
|
|
Simulation Theory.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. New York: Routledge. pp. 262-273.details
|
|
Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
Perception and ordinary objects.Alex Byrne - 2018 - In Javier Cumpa & Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Lucky Math: Anti-luck Epistemology and Necessary Truth.Danilo Suster - 2017 - In Suster Danilo (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 119-133.details
|
|
Toward an algorithmic metaphysics.Steve Petersen - 2013 - In David L. Dowe (ed.), Algorithmic Probability and Friends. Bayesian Prediction and Artificial Intelligence: Papers From the Ray Solomonoff 85th Memorial Conference, Melbourne, Vic, Australia, November 30 -- December 2, 2011. Springer. pp. 306-317.details
|
|
Is Incommensurability Vagueness?John Broome - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
|
|
The Knowability Paradox in the light of a Logic for Pragmatics.Massimiliano Carrara & Daniele Chiffi - 2014 - In Roberto Ciuni, Heinrich Wansing & Caroline Willkommen (eds.), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 47-58.details
|
|
The Boundaries of the Mind.Katalin Farkas - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 256-279.details
|
|
A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy.Elizabeth Barnes & J. Robert G. Williams - 2011 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 6. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 103-148.details
|
|
Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
|
|
Modal set theory.Christopher Menzel - 2018 - In Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Modality. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Relativized metaphysical modality: Index and context.Benj Hellie, Adam Russell Murray & Jessica Wilson - 2018 - In Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Modality. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Wittgenstein, Seeing-As, and Novelty.William Child - 2015 - In Michael Beaney, Brendan Harrington & Dominic Shaw (eds.), Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty. New York: Routledge. pp. 29-48.details
|
|
Ein bisschen Embryo? Begriffliche, ontologische und normative Überlegungen zur totipotenzbasierten Legaldefinition von 'Embryo'.Geert Keil - 2014 - In Thomas Heinemann Hans-Georg Dederer & Tobias Cantz (eds.), Entwicklungsbiologische Totipotenz in Ethik und Recht. Zur normativen Bewertung von totipotenten menschlichen Zellen. V&R Unipress. pp. 251-287.details
|
|
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
|
|
An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
|
|
Dependencia ontológica y fundamentalidad.Ricardo Mena - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (166):115-134.details
|
|
Experiencia perceptual, vaguedad y realismo ingenuo.Manuel Alejandro Amado - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67:149-164.details
|
|