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  1. Theroy of Mind in Non-Verbal Apes: Conceptual Issues and the Critical Experiments: Andrew Whiten.Andrew Whiten - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:199-223.
    It is now over twenty years since Premack and Woodruff posed the question, ‘Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?’—‘by which we meant’, explained Premack in a later reappraisal, ‘does the ape do what humans do: attribute states of mind to the other one, and use these states to predict and explain the behaviour of the other one? For example, does the ape wonder, while looking quizzically at another individual, What does he really want? What does he believe? What (...)
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  • The Dynamics of Thought.Peter Gardenfors - 2005 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    This volume is a collection of some of the most important philosophical papers by Peter Gärdenfors. Spanning a period of more than 20 years of his research, they cover a wide ground of topics, from early works on decision theory, belief revision and nonmonotonic logic to more recent work on conceptual spaces, inductive reasoning, semantics and the evolutions of thinking. Many of the papers have only been published in places that are difficult to access. The common theme of all the (...)
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  • Rhesus Monkeys Are Radical Behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.
    The data reviewed in Barresi & Moore's treatment of social understanding is recast in terms of a model of social intelligence that was advanced some time ago. When it comes to their analysis of the behavior of other individuals, most primates appear to function as radical behaviorists, whereas chimpanzees and older infants show evidence of becoming primitive cognitive psychologists.
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  • Kinesthesia: An Extended Critical Overview and a Beginning Phenomenology of Learning.Maxine Sheets-Johnstone - 2019 - Continental Philosophy Review 52 (2):143-169.
    This paper takes five different perspectives on kinesthesia, beginning with its evolution across animate life and its biological distinction from, and relationship to proprioception. It proceeds to document the historical derivation of “the muscle sense,” showing in the process how analytic philosophers bypass the import of kinesthesia by way of “enaction,” for example, and by redefinitions of “tactical deception.” The article then gives prominence to a further occlusion of kinesthesia and its subduction by proprioception, these practices being those of well-known (...)
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  • Studies in Ecological Rationality.Ralph Hertwig, Christina Leuker, Thorsten Pachur, Leonidas Spiliopoulos & Timothy J. Pleskac - 2022 - Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (3):467-491.
    Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 467-491, July 2022.
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  • Deception as a Derived Function of Language.Nathan Oesch - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Animals and Humans, Thinking and Nature.David Morris - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):49-72.
    Studies that compare human and animal behaviour suspend prejudices about mind, body and their relation, by approaching thinking in terms of behaviour. Yet comparative approaches typically engage another prejudice, motivated by human social and bodily experience: taking the lone animal as the unit of comparison. This prejudice informs Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s comparative studies, and conceals something important: that animals moving as a group in an environment can develop new sorts of “sense.” The study of animal group-life suggests a new way (...)
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  • Intentional Schema Will Not Do the Work of a Theory of Mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.
    Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.
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  • Understanding That Looking Causes Knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.
    Barresi & Moore provide an impressive account of how the coordination of first and third person information about the self and other could produce an account of intentional relations. They are less explicit as to how the child comes to understand the basic epistemic relation between experience and knowledge, that is, how informational access causes belief. We suggest one route.
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  • Knowing Thyself, Knowing the Other: They're Not the Same.Jonathan Schull & J. David Smith - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):166-167.
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  • Communication and Representation Understood as Sender–Receiver Coordination.Ronald J. Planer & Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (5):750-770.
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  • Adaptations for Nothing in Particular.Simon J. Hampton - 2004 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (1):35–53.
    An element of the contemporary dispute amongst evolution minded psychologists and social scientists hinges on the conception of mind as being adapted as opposed to adaptive. This dispute is not trivial. The possibility that human minds are both adapted and adaptive courtesy of selection pressures that were social in nature is of particular interest to a putative evolutionary social psychology. I suggest that the notion of an evolved psychological adaptation in social psychology can be retained only if it is accepted (...)
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  • Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy.Cognitive Evolution Group, Since Darwin, D. J. Povinelli, J. M. Bering & S. Giambrone - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (3):509-541.
    Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at (...)
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  • Movement: What Evolution and Gesture Can Teach Us About Its Centrality in Natural History and Its Lifelong Significance.Maxine Sheets-Johnstone - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 44 (1):239-259.
    Midwest Studies In Philosophy, Volume 44, Issue 1, Page 239-259, December 2019.
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  • How Language and Human Altruism Evolved Hand in Hand — The Backchannel Hypothesis.Till Nikolaus von Heiseler - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    This paper contributes to two debates: the debate about language evolution and the debate about the foundations of human collaboration. While both cooperation and language may give the impression of being adaptations that evolved for the “good of the group,” it is well established that the evolution of complex traits cannot be a direct result of group selection. In this paper I suggest how this tension can be solved: both language and cooperation evolved in a unique two-level evolutionary system which (...)
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  • The Analysis of the Borders of the Social World: A Challenge for Sociological Theory.Gesa Lindemann - 2005 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (1):69–98.
    In order to delimit the realm of social phenomena, sociologists refer implicitly or explicitly to a distinction between living human beings and other entities, that is, sociologists equate the social world with the world of living humans. This consensus has been questioned by only a few authors, such as Luckmann, and some scholars of science studies. According to these approaches, it would be ethnocentric to treat as self-evident the premise that only living human beings can be social actors. The methodological (...)
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  • Language and Levels of Selection.Lee Alan Dugatkin & David Sloan Wilson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):701-701.
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  • Social Cognition, Language Acquisition and the Development of the Theory of Mind.Jay L. Garfield, Candida C. Peterson & Tricia Perry - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (5):494–541.
  • How the Eyes Tell Lies: Social Gaze During a Preference Task.Tom Foulsham & Maria Lock - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7):1704-1726.
    Social attention is thought to require detecting the eyes of others and following their gaze. To be effective, observers must also be able to infer the person's thoughts and feelings about what he or she is looking at, but this has only rarely been investigated in laboratory studies. In this study, participants' eye movements were recorded while they chose which of four patterns they preferred. New observers were subsequently able to reliably guess the preference response by watching a replay of (...)
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  • Animal Concepts: Content and Discontent.Cecilia Heyes Nick Chater - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):209-246.
  • Animal Concepts: Content and Discontent.Nick Chater & Cecilia Heyes - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):209-246.
  • Beliefs as Signals: A New Function for Belief.Eric Funkhouser - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):809-831.
    Beliefs serve at least two broad functions. First, they help us navigate the world. Second, they serve as signals to manipulate others. Philosophers and psychologists have focused on the first function while largely overlooking the second. This article advances a conception of signals and makes a prima facie case for a social signaling function for at least some beliefs. Truth and rational support are often irrelevant to the signaling function. If some beliefs evolved for a signaling function, then we should (...)
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  • Omitting the Second Person in Social Understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.
    Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.
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  • Intentionality: How to Tell Mae West From a Crocodile.David Premack - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):522.
  • Competence Models Are Causal.David Kirsh - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.
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  • Reflective Ethology, Applied Philosophy, and the Moral Status of Animals.Marc Bekoff & Dale Jamieson - manuscript
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  • Vocal Grooming: Man the Schmoozer.David Dean - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):699-700.
  • Improving Ethical Attitudes to Animals with Digital Technologies: The Case of Apes and Zoos.Simon Coghlan, Sarah Webber & Marcus Carter - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (4):825-839.
    This paper examines how digital technologies might be used to improve ethical attitudes towards nonhuman animals, by exploring the case study of nonhuman apes kept in modern zoos. The paper describes and employs a socio-ethical framework for undermining anti-ape prejudice advanced by philosopher Edouard Machery which draws on classic anti-racism strategies from the social sciences. We also discuss how digital technologies might be designed and deployed to enable and enhance rather than impede the three anti-prejudice strategies of contact and interaction, (...)
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  • Naturalizing Darwall's Second Person Standpoint.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - forthcoming - Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Scienc.
    In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...)
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  • Animal Mindreading and the Principle of Conservatism.Tyler K. Fagan - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):189-208.
    Skeptics about nonlinguistic mindreading often use an inferential rule of thumb—the principle of conservatism—to cast doubt on purported empirical evidence of mindreading abilities in nonlinguistic creatures. This principle, if warranted, would seem to count generally against explanatory hypotheses that posit nonlinguistic mindreading, instead favoring mere behavior-reading hypotheses. Using a test case from research with chimpanzees, I show that this principle is best understood as an appeal to parsimony; that, regardless of how one conceives of parsimony, the principle is unwarranted; and (...)
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  • Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.
    I argue that we can reconcile two seemingly incompatible traditions for thinking about concepts. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists assume that the systematic redeployment of representational abilities suffices for having concepts. On the other hand, a long philosophical tradition maintains that language is necessary for genuinely conceptual thought. I argue that on a theoretically useful and empirically plausible concept of 'concept', it is necessary and sufficient for conceptual thought that a thinker be able to entertain many of the (...)
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  • From Deed to Word: Gapless and Kink-Free Enactivism.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    In their most recent book, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content, Dan Hutto and Eric Myin claim to give a complete and gapless naturalistic account of cognition, but it comes with a kink. The kink being that content-involving cognition has special properties found nowhere else in nature, making it the case that minds capable of contentful thought differ in kind, in this key respect, from more basic minds. Contra Hutto and Myin, I argue that content-involving practices are themselves simply a (...)
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  • Animal Beliefs and Their Contents.Frank Dreckmann - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (1):597-615.
    This paper investigates whether, or not, the behavior of animals without speech can manifest beliefs and desires. Criteria for the attribution of such beliefs and desires are worked out with reference to Jonathan Bennett's theory of cognitive teleology: A particular ability for learning justifies attributing such beliefs and desires. The conceptual analysis is illustrated by examinations of cognitive ethology and considers higher-order intentionality. It is argued that the behavioral evidence only supports the attribution of first order beliefs and that languageless (...)
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  • From Deed to Word: Gapless and Kink-Free Enactivism: In Memoriam John V. Canfield (1934–2017).Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):405-425.
    In their most recent book, Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content, Dan Hutto and Eric Myin claim to give a complete and gapless naturalistic account of cognition, but it comes with a kink. The kink being that content-involving cognition has special properties found nowhere else in nature, making it the case that minds capable of contentful thought differ in kind, in this key respect, from more basic minds. Contra Hutto and Myin, I argue that content-involving practices are themselves simply a (...)
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  • Tools, Techniques and Animals: The Role of Mediations of Actions in the Dynamics of Social Behaviours.Dominique Lestel & Emmanuelle Grundmann - 1999 - Social Science Information 38 (3):367-407.
    The definition of tool proposed by Beck is still the one referred to in ethology when discussing the question of tool-use in animals, and its pertinence is rarely questioned. However, observations on technical behaviours in animals have multiplied over the last 20 years, and these have profoundly altered our earlier representations. In the present article, we show that Beck's definition is insufficient and that it does not, in fact, work. More generally, we replace a theory of tools with a theory (...)
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  • Knot Tying in Great Apes: Etho-Ethnology of an Unusual Tool Behavior.C. Herzfeld - 2005 - Social Science Information 44 (4):621-653.
    The authors intend to show in this article that, unlike what is usually said, some great apes are able to tie knots. First, they give the result of a survey on the Internet whose result has been to identify twelve “knot-maker” apes: seven orangutans, three bonobos and two chimpanzees. All of them have been reared by humans and are highly accultured anthropoids living in zoos. Second, they offer an ethnography of a knot-making orangutan, Wattana, a resident of the Ménagerie of (...)
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  • The Realm of Continued Emergence: The Semiotics of George Herbert Mead and its Implications to Biosemiotics, Semiotic Matrix Theory, and Ecological Ethics.Jorge Conesa Sevilla - 2005 - Sign Systems Studies 33 (1):27-50.
    This examination of the often-inaccessible work and semiotics of George Herbert Mead focuses first on his pivotal ideas of Sociality, Consciousness, and Communication. Mead’s insight of sociality as forced relatedness, or forced semiosis, appearing early in evolution, or appearing in simple systems, guarantees him a foundational place among biosemioticians. These ideas are Mead’s exemplar description of multiple referentiality afforded to social organisms, thus enabling passing from one umwelt to another, with relative ease. Although Mead’s comprehensive semiosis is basically sound, and (...)
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  • New Elements of a Theory of Mind in Wild Chimpanzees.Christophe Boesch - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):149-150.
  • The Evolution of Foresight: What is Mental Time Travel, and is It Unique to Humans?Thomas Suddendorf & Michael C. Corballis - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):299-313.
    In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only (...)
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  • Interpretational Complexities in Developmental Research and a Piagetian Reading of the False-Belief Task.Alla Choifer - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):923-952.
    Theorizing about children’s early development is beset with interpretational complexities. I argue that there is a general tendency to over-interpret the experimental findings, and that one of the main causes of this is the difficulty of disengaging from our adult frame of reference when theorizing about the young child’s mind. One domain where this holds is children’s ability to differentiate themselves from others. In relation to this I first critically analyze some cases of interpretational complexities, and then apply my methodological (...)
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  • The Primacy of Social Over Visual Perspective-Taking.Henrike Moll & Derya Kadipasaoglu - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
  • Précis of Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):727-741.
    How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we (...)
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  • The Recursive Mind. The Origins of Human Language, Thought, and Civilization by Michael C. Corballis.Silvia Felletti - 2014 - Humana Mente 7 (27).
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  • Ethics and Primatology.A. J. Petto & K. D. Russell - 1993 - Global Bioethics 6 (3):207-209.
  • Do Dolphins Know Their Own Minds?Derek Browne - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):633-53.
    Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman animals have the capacity for this variety of self-knowledge? The question is open to empirical inquiry, which is most often conducted with primate subjects. Research with a bottlenose dolphin gives some evidence for the capacity in a nonprimate taxon. I describe the research and evaluate the metacognitive interpretation of the dolphin's behaviour. The research exhibits some of the difficulties attached to the task of (...)
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  • Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy.Daniel J. Povinelli, Jesse M. Bering & Steve Giambrone - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (3):509-541.
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  • Perspective Taking and Belief Attribution : From Piaget's Theory to Children's Theory of Mind.Pierre Mounoud - unknown
    This paper analyzes the origins and specificity of the recent research trend on the development in children of a Theory of mind which has undergone an impressive expansion over past the fifteen years. A comparison with Piaget's approach is proposed regarding the experimental data available on the coordination of perspectives as well as the epistemological foundations. The issues of the naturalization of the mind and its irreducibility are addressed within the framework of recent reductionist theories advanced by the philosophers of (...)
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  • First Person Representations Need a Methodology Based on Simulation or Theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.
    Although their thesis is generally sound, Barresi & Moore give insufficient attention to the need for a methodology, whether simulation based or theory-based, for choosing among alternative possible matches of first person and third person information. This choice must be sensitive to contextual information, including past behavior. Moreover, apart from simulation or theory, first person information would not help predict future behavior.
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  • How Do Non-Human Primates Represent Others' Awareness of Where Objects Are Hidden?Daniel J. Horschler, Laurie R. Santos & Evan L. MacLean - 2021 - Cognition 212:104658.
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  • Evidence for Teaching in an Australian Songbird.Hollis Taylor - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    Song in oscine birds relies upon the rare capacity of vocal learning. Transmission can be vertical, horizontal, or oblique. As a rule, memorization and production by a naïve bird are not simultaneous: the long-term storage of song phrases precedes their first vocal rehearsal by months. While a wealth of detail regarding songbird enculturation has been uncovered by focusing on the apprentice, whether observational learning can fully account for the ontogeny of birdsong, or whether there could also be an element of (...)
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