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Philosophical Books 13 (1):35-36 (1972)

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  1. Facts and Empirical Truth.Frederick Suppe - 1973 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):197 - 212.
    Recently a number of philosophers have maintained that the meanings of terms in a scientific language are “theory-laden” or determined by the theory in which they occur, and thus that if the same term occurs in different theories, it will take on different meanings in the different theories; so the theories are incommensurable. An often-stated corollary to this doctrine is the claim that possessors of different theories cannot express or possess the same facts since they attach different meanings to the (...)
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  • ‘True’ and Truth.Avrum Stroll & Henry Alexander - 1975 - Philosophy of Science 42 (4):384-410.
    In Parts I, II, and III of the paper, the authors show that an argument essential to Alan White's defense of the Correspondence Theory of truth is unsuccessful. They argue that some of the premises of White's argument are false, and others incoherent. They show, further, that certain widely accepted assumptions in the philosophy of language, which underlie White's argument, must also be abandoned. In Part IV, they attempt to say something new about 'true', 'false', truth and falsity, and related (...)
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  • Truth without People?Hans-Johann Glock - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (279):85 - 104.
    There is a venerable tradition according to which the concept of truth is totally independent of human beings, their actions and beliefs, because truth consists in the correspondence of mind-independentpropositions to a mind-independent reality. For want of arespect. One way of doing so is relativism, the idea that whether a belief is true or false depends on the point of view of individuals or communities. A closely related position is a consensus theory of truth, according to which a belief is (...)
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  • Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes Wrong.Hans-Johann Glock - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (1):5-29.
    The debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism, which treats them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism, which insists that they exist independently of individual minds. The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor's RTM. The Fregean charge against subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different individuals can share the same concepts. Proponents of RTM have accepted shareability as a ‘non-negotiable constraint’. At the same (...)
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  • Farewell to states of affairs.Julian Dodd - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):146 – 160.