What can Hannah Arendt's writings offer to current thinking on the environment? Although there are some obvious connections between her work and current issues in environmental ethics, not very much has been written on the topic. This article argues that Arendt's philosophy is particularly fruitful for environmental thinking because she explicitly links the material and biological conditions of human existence with the political conditions of human freedom. This is articulated in the article as the requirement of both constrained consumption and (...) unconstrained deliberation. The article elaborates these notions before concluding that Arendt's philosophy uniquely combines the existential task of self-understanding with the practical task of confronting our environmental challenges. (shrink)

Amidst a worsening climate crisis, there is growing public discourse theorising the possible colonisation of outer space to secure a sustainable future for humanity. In the face of these escapist fantasies, political discussion on humanity's relation to the universe is notably limited and primarily frames space exploration as a dangerous Promethean endeavour. While I do not contest this claim, I argue that humanity's technological capabilities and acquired knowledge of the universe can alternatively facilitate an Earth-centred engagement with the Cosmos as (...) a sublime aesthetic experience. I frame the sublime Cosmos and its infinite expanse of dynamic material forces, as a site of resistance against Promethean visions of human mastery and colonisation. I then theorise how the sublime Cosmos can be productively engaged as a source of political imagination and spiritual elevation. Recovering a spiritual attachment to Earth is necessary, for we are irrevocably tied to this rapidly destabilising planet. (shrink)

This article is a conceptual contribution on how to make human habitat more sustainable. Taking Heidegger’s conception of “dwelling” as a starting point, a new form of understanding the organization of the city as a human habitat is proposed. It is argued that human habitat is today in crisis and that such crisis has its roots in a spatial understanding of human dwelling, disregarding its temporal-historical dimension. For long time, the city has been considered as a physical “place” and its (...) organization—the urban planning—has been addressed in terms of “locating”. Many of the challenges in organizing habitat are the result of reducing the organization of the city to the organization of physical space. One of these is the conflict between preservation and development, a central issue in approaching sustainability. The aim of this article is to propose a new perspective on the organization of human dwelling, which overcomes the spatial-based conception of habitat and involves its temporal dimension. The meaning of human “habitat” as a historical process for developing “habits” will be recovered, and the implications for organization of the city considered. Human habitat is above all an ethical space, constituted in a spatial–temporal process of developing learning and capabilities. This habitat can be shared and developed infinitely so that a pathway is opened for overcoming the logic of competition and the conflict between sustainability and development. Finally, three forms of the human habitat as an “ethical space” are proposed. (shrink)

Among those who reject the Epicurean claim that death is not bad for the one who dies, it is popularly held that death is bad for the one who dies, when it is bad for the one who dies, because it deprives the one who dies of the good things that otherwise would have fallen into her life. This view is known as the deprivation account of the value of death, and Fred Feldman is one of its most prominent defenders. (...) In this paper, I explain why I believe that Feldman’s argument for the occasional badness of death fails. While staying within an Epicurean framework, I offer an alternative that adequately accounts for a significant range of widely held intuitions about prudential value. My account implies that death is almost always good for the one who dies, yet often less good than not dying. Finally, I discuss some puzzles that remain for my account and hint at possible ways to address them. (shrink)