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  1. Validity Curry Strengthened.Lionel Shapiro - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):100-107.
    Several authors have argued that a version of Curry's paradox involving validity motivates rejecting the structural rule of contraction. This paper criticizes two recently suggested alternative responses to “validity Curry.” There are three salient stages in a validity Curry derivation. Rejecting contraction blocks the first, while the alternative responses focus on the second and third. I show that a distinguishing feature of validity Curry, as contrasted with more familiar forms of Curry's paradox, is that paradox arises already at the first (...)
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  • On Heck's New Liar.Julien Murzi - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):258-269.
    Richard Heck has recently drawn attention on a new version of the Liar Paradox, one which relies on logical resources that are so weak as to suggest that it may not admit of any “truly satisfying, consistent solution”. I argue that this conclusion is too strong. Heck's Liar reduces to absurdity principles that are already rejected by consistent paracomplete theories of truth, such as Kripke's and Field's. Moreover, the new Liar gives us no reasons to think that (versions of) these (...)
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  • ‘True’ as Polysemous.Andy Yu - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):542-569.
    In this paper, I propose that 'true’ is polysemous, and thus ambiguous. I suggest that the semantic paradoxes both motivates taking 'true’ to be polysemous and shows that the concept truth is indefinitely extensible. In doing so, I explain that 'true’ is polysemous between the meanings corresponding to the subconcepts of the concept truth generated by such indefinite extensibility. I conclude that the proposal provides satisfying solutions to the semantic paradoxes.
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  • Naive Structure, Contraction and Paradox.Lionel Shapiro - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):75-87.
    Rejecting structural contraction has been proposed as a strategy for escaping semantic paradoxes. The challenge for its advocates has been to make intuitive sense of how contraction might fail. I offer a way of doing so, based on a “naive” interpretation of the relation between structure and logical vocabulary in a sequent proof system. The naive interpretation of structure motivates the most common way of blaming Curry-style paradoxes on illicit contraction. By contrast, the naive interpretation will not as easily motivate (...)
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  • Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox.Douglas Patterson - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
    It is argued that a certain form of the view that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are "inconsistent" provides the best response to the semantic paradoxes. After extended discussions of the views of Kirk Ludwig and Matti Eklund, it is argued that in its strongest formulation the view maintains that understanding a natural language is sharing cognition of an inconsistent semantic theory for that language with other speakers. A number of aspects of this approach are discussed and a (...)
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  • Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 339-354.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the basic framework (...)
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  • Paradox and Logical Revision. A Short Introduction.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):7-14.
    Logical orthodoxy has it that classical first-order logic, or some extension thereof, provides the right extension of the logical consequence relation. However, together with naïve but intuitive principles about semantic notions such as truth, denotation, satisfaction, and possibly validity and other naïve logical properties, classical logic quickly leads to inconsistency, and indeed triviality. At least since the publication of Kripke’s Outline of a theory of truth , an increasingly popular diagnosis has been to restore consistency, or at least non-triviality, by (...)
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  • Consistency in the Sartrean Analysis of Emotion.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):ant084.
  • The Inexpressibility of Validity.Julien Murzi - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):65-81.
    Tarski's Undefinability of Truth Theorem comes in two versions: that no consistent theory which interprets Robinson's Arithmetic (Q) can prove all instances of the T-Scheme and hence define truth; and that no such theory, if sound, can even express truth. In this note, I prove corresponding limitative results for validity. While Peano Arithmetic already has the resources to define a predicate expressing logical validity, as Jeff Ketland has recently pointed out (2012, Validity as a primitive. Analysis 72: 421-30), no theory (...)
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  • Paradoxes of Logical Equivalence and Identity.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Topoi (1):1-10.
    In this paper a principle of substitutivity of logical equivalents salve veritate and a version of Leibniz’s law are formulated and each is shown to cause problems when combined with naive truth theories.
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  • Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox.Jc Beall & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
    In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: c-Curry, the standard conditional-Curry paradox, and v-Curry, a validity-involving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving c-curry. A unified treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a unified treatment of both c-Curry and v-Curry. If, as is often thought, c-Curry paradox is to be solved via non-classical logic, then v-Curry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity relation itself.
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  • Fragmented Truth.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    This thesis comprises three main chapters—each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate “true” either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. -/- In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truth-characterizing principles. On behalf of pluralists, I propose an account of logic (...)
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  • Fusion and Confusion.Graham Priest - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):55-61.
    IntroductionCurry’s paradox is well known.See, e.g., Priest , ch. 6. It comes in both set theoretic and semantic versions. Here we will concentrate on the semantic versions. Historically, these have deployed the notion of truth. Those who wish to endorse an unrestricted T-schema have mainly endorsed a logic which rejects the principle of Absorption, \\models A\rightarrow B\). High profile logics of this kind are certain relevant logics; these have semantics which show how and why this principle is not valid. Of (...)
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  • Non-Classical Metatheory for Non-Classical Logics.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):335-355.
    A number of authors have objected to the application of non-classical logic to problems in philosophy on the basis that these non-classical logics are usually characterised by a classical metatheory. In many cases the problem amounts to more than just a discrepancy; the very phenomena responsible for non-classicality occur in the field of semantics as much as they do elsewhere. The phenomena of higher order vagueness and the revenge liar are just two such examples. The aim of this paper is (...)
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  • Principles for Object-Linguistic Consequence: From Logical to Irreflexive.Carlo Nicolai & Lorenzo Rossi - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):549-577.
    We discuss the principles for a primitive, object-linguistic notion of consequence proposed by ) that yield a version of Curry’s paradox. We propose and study several strategies to weaken these principles and overcome paradox: all these strategies are based on the intuition that the object-linguistic consequence predicate internalizes whichever meta-linguistic notion of consequence we accept in the first place. To these solutions will correspond different conceptions of consequence. In one possible reading of these principles, they give rise to a notion (...)
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  • Disarming a Paradox of Validity.Hartry Field - 2017 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58 (1):1-19.
    Any theory of truth must find a way around Curry’s paradox, and there are well-known ways to do so. This paper concerns an apparently analogous paradox, about validity rather than truth, which JC Beall and Julien Murzi call the v-Curry. They argue that there are reasons to want a common solution to it and the standard Curry paradox, and that this rules out the solutions to the latter offered by most “naive truth theorists.” To this end they recommend a radical (...)
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  • A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof.Massimiliano Carrara - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    In the 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel asserted his famous dichotomy, where the notion of informal proof is at work. G. Priest developed an argument, grounded on the notion of naïve proof, to the effect that Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem suggests the presence of dialetheias. In this paper, we adopt a plausible ideal notion of naïve proof, in agreement with Gödel’s conception, superseding the criticisms against the usual notion of naïve proof used by real working mathematicians. We explore the connection between (...)
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  • Dialetheism and the Problem of the Missing Difference.Gregory Scott Moss - 2018 - SATS 19 (2):89-110.
    Journal Name: SATS Issue: Ahead of print.
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  • Trivializing Sentences and the Promise of Semantic Completeness.J. Beall - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):573-584.
    This paper challenges defenders/advocates of the semantic-completeness route towards gluts to explain, in simple and plausible terms, why the ‘trivializer paradox’, framed in terms of closure relatives on theories, fails to undermine their argument.
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  • There is No Paradox of Logical Validity.Roy T. Cook - 2014 - Logica Universalis 8 (3-4):447-467.
    A number of authors have argued that Peano Arithmetic supplemented with a logical validity predicate is inconsistent in much the same manner as is PA supplemented with an unrestricted truth predicate. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, there is no genuine paradox of logical validity—a completely general logical validity predicate can be coherently added to PA, and the resulting system is consistent. In addition, this observation lead to a number of novel, and important, insights into the nature (...)
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