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Valid thinking

New York,: Odyssey Press (1962)

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  1. Coping with ambiguity and uncertainty in patient-physician relationships: II.Traditio argumentum respectus. [REVIEW]Charles B. Rodning - 1992 - Journal of Medical Humanities 13 (3):147-156.
    A methodology of argumentation and a perspective of incredulity are essential ingredients of all intellectual endeavor, including that associated with the art and science of medical care.Traditio argumentum respectus (tradition of respectful argumentation) as a principled system of assessing the validity of beliefs, opinions, perceptions, data, and knowledge, is worthy of practice and perpetuation, because assessments of validity are susceptible to incompleteness, incorrectness, and misinterpretation. Since the latter may lead to ambiguity, uncertainty, anxiety, and animosity among the individuals (patients and (...)
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  • When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?Kevin C. Klement - 2002 - Argumentation 16 (4):383-400.
    Attempts to evaluate a belief or argument on the basis of its cause or origin are usually condemned as committing the genetic fallacy. However, I sketch a number of cases in which causal or historical factors are logically relevant to evaluating a belief, including an interesting abductive form that reasons from the best explanation for the existence of a belief to its likely truth. Such arguments are also susceptible to refutation by genetic reasoning that may come very close to the (...)
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  • Affirming the consequent.George Bowles - 1996 - Argumentation 10 (4):429-444.
    The thesis of this paper is that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its premises at all favorably relevant to its conclusion. In support of this thesis I assume two premises and argue for a third. My two assumptions are these: (1) that an argument's possessing the form of affirming the consequent does not suffice to make its conclusion certain relative to its premises (this is widely, if not universally, acknowledged by writers (...)
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