Three distinct models of political economy are articulated in this article to chart out the possible politico-economic futures of the Arab World. Of these, the present predicaments of the revolutionizing Arab populace are argued to have been caused by the continuance of the wrong social choices. It depended for a long time now on the alienating model of differentiation and alienation of the Arab nations by their rulers, and by their uncritical immersing in the equally debilitating globalization agenda. Two models (...) of the alienating and unfeasible types are formulated as the prevailing ones today. The arguments and empirical study of limited socioeconomic data with the examples of Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, which are considered as exemplary of the revolutionary Arab World, point out that social factors based on the demand for participation and representation, self-reliant social change, and opportunities are the overwhelming factors of politico-economic change. These factors, as opposed to the purely economic factors, must be embedded in a synergistic way with the rest in a distinctive future model of Arab political economy. Three formal models of possible political economy of the future Arab World with their evolutionary futures are formalized. Necessary social and policy implications are drawn in reference to these three evolutionary Arab futures in political economy. (shrink)

This thesis offers a naturalist revision of Alain Badiou’s philosophy. This goal is pursued through an encounter of Badiou’s mathematical ontology and theory of truth with contemporary trends in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. I take issue with Badiou’s inability to elucidate the link between the empirical and the ontological, and his residual reliance on a Heideggerian project of fundamental ontology, which undermines his own immanentist principles. I will argue for both a bottom-up naturalisation of Badiou’s philosophical approach (...) to mathematics and a top-down naturalisation. Articulating my particular understanding of what realism and naturalism should commit us to, I propose a creative fusion of Badiou’s attention to metamathematical results with a structural-informational metaphysics, proposing a ‘matherialism’ uniting the more daring speculative insights of the former with the naturalist and empiricist commitments motivating the latter. (shrink)

Einstein’s “point-coincidence argument'” as a response to the “hole argument” is usually considered as an expression of “Leibniz equivalence,” a restatement of indiscernibility in the sense of Leibniz. Through a historical-critical analysis of Logical Empiricists' interpretation of General Relativity, the paper attempts to show that this labeling is misleading. Logical Empiricists tried explicitly to understand the point-coincidence argument as an indiscernibility argument of the Leibnizian kind, such as those formulated in the 19th century debate about geometry, by authors such as (...) Poincaré, Helmholtz or Hausdorff. However, they clearly failed to give a plausible account of General Relativity. Thus the point-coincidence/hole argument cannot be interpreted as Leibnizian indiscernibility argument, but must be considered as an indiscernibility argument of a new kind. Weyl's analysis of Leibniz's and Einstein's indiscernibility arguments is used to support this claim. (shrink)