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  1. Searching for the holy in the ascent of Imre Lakatos.John Wettersten - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):84-150.
    Bernard Lavor and John Kadvany argue that Lakatos’s Hegelian approach to the philosophy of mathematics and science enabled him to overcome all competing philosophies. His use of the approach Hegel developed in his Phenomenology enabled him to show how mathematics and science develop, how they are open-ended, and that they are not subject to rules, even though their rationality may be understood after the fact. Hegel showed Lakatos how to falsify the past to make progress in the present. A critique (...)
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  • Problems and meaning today: What can we learn from Hattiangadi's failed attempt to explain them together?John Wettersten - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4):487-536.
    Philosophers have tried to explain how science finds the truth by using new developments in logic to study scientific language and inference. R. G. Collingwood argued that only a logic of problems could take context into account. He was ignored, but the need to reconcile secure meanings with changes in context and meanings was seen by Karl Popper, W. v. O. Quine, and Mario Bunge. Jagdish Hattiangadi uses problems to reconcile the need for security with that for growth. But he (...)
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  • The Formal and the Informal.William Berkson - 1978 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978 (2):296-308.
    I became acquainted with Lakatos’s work in 1965 when I started studying at London School of Economics—where Lakatos taught. As his work was developed over the succeeding years until his death in 1974, one thing always puzzled me: his work seemed to contain such conflicting tendencies. He would continue developing his ideas along a progressive line, and suddenly would insert an element which appeared to me quite reactionary. By ‘reactionary’, I should hasten to add, I mean imbued with the spirit (...)
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  • How Do We Learn from Argument?: Toward an Account of the Logic of Problems.Terry M. Goode & John R. Wettersten - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (4):673-689.
    From the pre-Socratics to the present, one primary aim of philosophy has been to learn from arguments. Philosophers have debated whether we could indeed do this, but they have by and large agreed on how we would use arguments if learning from argument was at all possible. They have agreed that we could learn from arguments either by starting with true premises and validly deducing further statements which must also be true and therefore constitute new knowledge, or that we could (...)
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