Paolo Diego Bubbio's Sacrifice in the Post-Kantian Tradition offers a valuable and insightful discussion of the place of sacrifice plays in nineteenth century European philosophy, setting the stage for its emergence as a central theme in subsequent continental thought. Bubbio offers a strong case for the claim that the foundational move of the post-Kantian tradition is a fundamentally kenotic one. Bubbio is also critical of certain excesses in the way sacrifice is discussed in more recent work. However, the case of (...) Kierkegaard in particular suggests kenosis is not so easily kept within the comfortable boundaries Bubbio prescribes for it: its excesses may be an integral part, rather than a hyperbolic distortion, of the logic of sacrifice. (shrink)

This paper explores Kierkegaard's recurrent use of mirrors as a metaphor for various aspects of moral imagination and vision. While a writer centrally concerned with issues of self-examination, selfhood and passionate subjectivity might well be expected to be attracted to such metaphors, there are deeper reasons why Kierkegaard is drawn to this analogy. The specifically visual aspects of the mirror metaphor reveal certain crucial features of Kierkegaard's model of moral cognition. In particular, the felicity of the metaphors of the "mirror (...) of possibility" in Sickness Unto Death and the "mirror of the Word" in For Self-Examination depend upon a normative phenomenology of moral vision, one in which the success of moral agency depends upon an immediate, non-reflective self-referentiality built into vision itself. To "see oneself in the mirror" rather than simply seeing the mirror itself is to see the moral content of the world as immediately "about" oneself in a sense that goes beyond the conceptual content of what is perceived. These metaphors gesture towards a model of perfected moral agency where vision becomes co-extensive with volition. I conclude by suggesting directions in which explication of this model may contribute to discussions in contemporary moral psychology. (shrink)

Helping more than “a little”: recent books on Kierkegaard and philosophy of religion Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-16 DOI 10.1007/s11153-012-9345-6 Authors J. Aaron Simmons, Department of Philosophy, Furman University, 3300 Poinsett Hwy, Greenville, SC 29613, USA Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Online ISSN 1572-8684 Print ISSN 0020-7047.

Merold Westphal’s method often consists in recontextualizing, or appropriating, various sources in order to either make his own argument or to make other’s arguments seem self-evident. This method is especially noteworthy in his use of Aufhebung, a term which he initially discovers in his early work on Hegel. Westphal will eventually appropriate this term and, as this article will show, utilize it throughout his other academic works, particularly in his reading of Kierkegaard, for many an ‘anti-dialectical’ thinker. This article further (...) explores Westphal’s use of the term in order to reveal that his utilization of the term extends beyond Hegel’s own original intention and that, in doing so, Westphal creates something quite unique and separate from the term itself: a ‘Westphalian Aufhebung.’. (shrink)

Occupying a seemingly minor role in the authorship of Kierkegaard, the concept of “the sublime” has not received much attention in the reception, compared to that of other more prominent concepts. This could essentially imply one of two things: either that the sublime is not an important theme for Kierkegaard, or that it is so pervasively present, that the reader does not know how to conceive it, let alone get a hold of a tangible definition of it. Proceeding from the (...) latter assumption, this article expounds in what sense the sublime occupies a pivotal role in Kierkegaard’s philosophy mediating between the aesthetic and the religious sphere. Using the Kantian conceptual framework of the sublime as my continual point of reference, I wish to show how Kierkegaard both remains loyal to certain aspects of this heritage, and at the same time transports the sublime to an entirely new plateau. Setting the stage for a modern discourse of the sublime will enable us to see in what sense the sublime enters a central position in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, being the feeling that awakens the individual from his social immurement and propels him into his path of self-realization. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that racism’s subtle and insidious reach should lead us to prefer an account of religious experience that is capable of reckoning with that reach, an account that, I shall argue, appears in the work of St. John of the Cross. The paper begins with an analysis of race and racism and the way in which the latter can have existential and even spiritual effects. The argument is then applied particularly to white people and the deleterious (...) effects racism has on their intellects, wills, and even memories, not merely inwardly but also as a result of what Charles Mills famously calls an epistemology of ignorance. Notably, intellect, will, and memory are the key sites for union in St. John’s discussion. In the last main section, I discuss how progress in the mystical life can be hindered by racism’s effects even while it is possible for there to be “touches of union” on the way. Another result of this inquiry is that it shows how a widely-used schema, such as St. John’s, will require spiritual aspirants to deal with racism, both in themselves and in the world. (shrink)

The experience of feeling safe even in the midst of trials and temptations seems to be a central feature of the Christian faith. In this article I will try to solve some possible difficulties in understanding this kind of absolute safety by discussing some problems noted by philosophers in connection with the related statements by Socrates that a good man cannot be harmed, and by Wittgenstein that he sometimes feels absolutely safe, that nothing can injure him whatever happens. First, I (...) will investigate whether there is an invalid prediction implied in this feeling of absolute safety: how can someone know that nothing will hurt him or her? Second, I will examine whether this experience of complete safety is dependent upon impossible requirements, such as to be a good man or an impeccable Christian. Third, I will consider the character of the people who claim absolute safety as portrayed by different philosophers: do these people really need to be so cold and inhumanly detached from the world for them to be able to say that nothing can hurt them? I will argue that if, instead of asking how someone can claim absolute safety, we ask to what someone commits him- or her-self in making this claim, these difficulties disappear. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair in The Sickness unto Death receives welcome, complementary illustrations in the novelistic efforts, respectively, of Franz Kafka and J.M. Coetzee. Both Kafka and Coetzee succeed in fashioning dramatic settings in which their protagonists may be seen and understood to suffer from the sickness unto death. In both cases, moreover, the distinctly spiritual character of despair is on display, as the protagonists in question slowly come to the realization that their cognitive faculties and resources will afford them (...) no protection against, or immunity from, the despair they see in others. Finally, both Kafka and Coetzee succeed in depicting the first-personal experience of despair as that of a progressively suffocating claustrophobia. (shrink)

This essay argues that there are concrete emotion regulation practices described, but not developed, in Kierkegaard’s Christian Discourses. These practices—such as attentiveness to emotion, attentional deployment, and cognitive reappraisal—help the reader to regulate her emotions, to get rid of negative, unwanted emotions such as worry, and to cultivate and nourish positive emotions such as faith, gratitude, and trust. An examination of the Discourses also expose Kierkegaard’s understanding of the emotions; his view is akin to a perceptual theory of the emotions (...) that closely connects emotions and concerns. In particular, this analysis unearths two main regulatory strategies located in the Discourses, strategies that closely resemble present-day psychological accounts of emotion regulation. I conclude that contemporary research reinforces Kierkegaard’s philosophical analysis of emotions and emotion-regulation strategies. Drawing on this research provides the most persuasive interpretation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the emotions and emotion-regulation strategies. Additionally, present-day research clarifies the otherwise elusive, opaque strategies he describes. Finally, my analysis demonstrates that Kierkegaard’s work can uniquely contribute to the present-day psychological research by emphasizing the need for diachronic regulation strategies, while the contemporary literature overwhelmingly focuses on synchronic strategies. (shrink)

The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) conceived of himself as the Socrates of nineteenth century Copenhagen. Having devoted the bulk of his first major work, *The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates*, to the problem of the historical Socrates, Kierkegaard maintained at the end of his life that it is to Socrates that we must turn if we are to understand his own philosophical undertaking: "The only analogy I have before me is Socrates; my task is a Socratic (...) task." The overall aim of my dissertation is to examine and critically assess this claim, and ultimately to argue that the Socratic nature of Kierkegaard's endeavor finds its fullest expression in the activity and writings of one of his best-known literary creations, Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of *Philosophical Fragments* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. The first part of my dissertation addresses Kierkegaard's own status as a Socratic figure. I examine Kierkegaard's claim that his refusal to call himself a Christian--in a context where it was the social norm to do so--is methodologically analogous to Socrates' stance of ignorance. I also consider how the use of a pseudonymous manner of writing allows Kierkegaard to employ a Socratic method. In the second part of my dissertation I focus on Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus and his claim that his contemporaries suffer from a peculiar kind of ethical and religious forgetfulness. I argue that Climacus adopts two Socratic stances in order to address this condition. In *Philosophical Fragments* he adopts the stance of someone who has intentionally "forgotten" the phenomenon of Christianity, whereas in the *Postscript* he adopts the stance of someone who openly declares that he is not a Christian. In the process, he develops a conception of philosophy that places a premium on self-restraint and an individual's ability to employ the first personal "I." As Climacus emerges as Kierkegaard's Socratic pseudonym par excellence, we obtain two significant results: a deeper understanding of Kierkegaard's conception of Socrates and Socratic method, and a compelling conception of philosophy rooted in Greek antiquity. (shrink)

This dissertation presents an in-depth investigation into the notion of paradox and its significance for Christian existence in the thought of the Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard. The primary aim of the study is to explore and to develop various expressions of paradox in Kierkegaard’s authorship in order to demonstrate the manner by which Kierkegaard employs paradox as a means of challenging his Christendom contemporaries to exist as authentic Christians, and more specifically to enter into the existential state I (...) am identifying in this project as living within the sacred tension. With this aim in mind, I begin with a discussion of Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task in response to his Christendom culture and I provide a broad characterization of the notion of sacred tension as the telos of this task. For the majority of the study I then focus on four different expressions of paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought. These four expressions are: paradox that is associated with the faith of Abraham (as presented in Fear and Trembling), paradox that is associated with the nature of the self and the task of selfhood (as presented in The Sickness unto Death), paradox that is associated with the God-man (as presented in Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and Practice in Christianity), and paradox that is associated with Christian love (as presented in Works of Love). In addition to arguing that Kierkegaard employs these expressions of paradox to help usher his contemporaries into a state of sacred tension, I also argue that such sacred tension can be understood in terms of various concrete Christian virtues. In this respect, I claim that Kierkegaard’s ethico-religious task is not merely negative or deconstructive in nature, but rather it is infused with the robust positive content associated with Kierkegaard’s particular understanding of Christianity. Viewing Kierkegaard’s thought and writings in this manner helps to reaffirm the significance of the notion of paradox in Kierkegaard’s thought and to highlight the value of the notion of sacred tension for a reassessment of both Kierkegaard’s existentialism and its contemporary implications. (shrink)

There is an uncanny agreement between the queer rejection of marriage, which resists affirming the legal recognition of same-sex relationships on the grounds that it codifies and normalizes non-heterosexual desire, and the religious objections to gay rights in North America, which oppose legal recognition on the grounds that it compromises the meaning of marriage and family. This article examines the relevance of Kierkegaard’s religious existentialism for the broader queer project of undermining the “normal” and moving beyond identity politics. It offers (...) a religious corrective of heteronormative versions of Christianity, exploring Kierkegaard's import for queer and critical theory. (shrink)