Immanuel Kant can be regarded as a philosopher related to the Baltic region. This paper, however, is not a historical study of the Baltic reception of Kant’s philosophy, but of Kant’s concept of proper science, which is analyzed by comparing it to a theoretical model of science—φ-science—developed within the context of practical realism. The issues of realism and practice in philosophy of science—as well as their relations to Kant’s philosophical legacy—have been centrally important in the Baltic-Nordic region. According to Kant, (...) only quantified sciences, exemplified by physics, are proper sciences, because mathematics provides a priori principles for cognizing physical laws, thus affording apodictically certain knowledge. This conception is rooted in transcendental idealism. In this paper it is shown how Kant’s transcendental idealism and apriorism as the basis for properly scientific—apodictically certain—knowledge can be overcome within the practical realist position. (shrink)

THIS PAPER ARGUES FOR THE CLAIM THAT ALTHOUGH COLOUR WORDS LIKE 'RED' ARE, ESSENTIALLY, 'PHENOMENAL-QUALITY' WORDS—I.E., WORDS FOR PROPERTIES WHOSE WHOLE AND ESSENTIAL NATURE CAN BE AND IS FULLY REVEALED IN SENSORY EXPERIENCE, GIVEN ONLY THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER THAT THAT EXPERIENCE HAS—STILL 'RED' CANNOT BE SUPPOSED TO BE A WORD THAT PICKS OUT OR DENOTES ANY PARTICULAR PHENOMENAL QUALITY. THE ARGUMENT RESTS ESSENTIALLY ON THE SUPPOSITION, OFTEN DISCUSSED UNDER THE HEADING OF THE 'COLOR-SPECTRUM INVERSION ARGUMENT', THAT TWO PEOPLE COULD POSSIBLY (...) AGREE IN ALL THEIR COLOUR-JUDGEMENTS WHILE DIFFERING IN THEIR COLOUR EXPERIENCE. (shrink)

У статті розглядаються особливості взаємозв’язку екзистенціалізму, феноменології, герменевтики та християнської думки в поглядах Мерольда Вестфаля. Аналізується проблема сприйняття американським феноменологом Бога, звільненого від ланцюгів онто-теологічного розуміння, перейнята і переосмислена ним із праць Мартіна Гайдеґґера. Досліджується специфіка тлумачення та застосування М. Вестфалем ідей Аврелія Августина, Іммануїла Канта, Сьорена К’єркеґора, Фрідріха Ніцше, використана для «аргументації постмодерністської віри» та інтерпретації «постмодерністської самості». Простежується еволюція поглядів М. Вестфаля від екзистенціальної феноменології релігії до «радикальної герменевтики», побудованої на «герменевтиці скінченності» та «герменевтиці підозри», які уможливлюють «позитивний (...) постмодернізм» та модернізацію християнства, віднаходження справжньої віри. (shrink)

У статті розглядаються особливості взаємозв’язку екзистенціалізму, феноменології, герменевтики та християнської думки в поглядах Мерольда Вестфаля. Аналізується проблема сприйняття американським феноменологом Бога, звільненого від ланцюгів онто-теологічного розуміння, перейнята і переосмислена ним із праць Мартіна Гайдеґґера. Досліджується специфіка тлумачення та застосування М. Вестфалем ідей Аврелія Августина, Іммануїла Канта, Сьорена К’єркеґора, Фрідріха Ніцше, використана для «аргументації постмодерністської віри» та інтерпретації «постмодерністської самості». Простежується еволюція поглядів М. Вестфаля від екзистенціальної феноменології релігії до «радикальної герменевтики», побудованої на «герменевтиці скінченності» та «герменевтиці підозри», які уможливлюють «позитивний (...) постмодернізм» та модернізацію християнства, віднаходження справжньої віри. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a "relativized a priori" played a central role in Rudolf Carnap's, Hans Reichenbach's and other logical empiricists' thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the level of establishing norms for empirical inquiry and the level (...) of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn's thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap's theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine's holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a "new Kant" in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach's work, arguing that while Reichenbach criticized "transcendentalism", he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn's views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn can be reinterpreted as a Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism, still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny. (shrink)

A number of philosophers, going back at least to Kierkegaard, argue that to have faith in something is, in part, to have a passion for that thing—to possess a lasting, formative disposition to feel certain positive patterns of emotion towards the object of faith. I propose that (at least some of) the intellectual dimensions of faith can be modeled in much the same way. Having faith in a person involves taking a certain perspective towards the object of faith—in possessing a (...) lasting, formative disposition for things to seem as though the object of faith is worthy of one’s trust. After developing the view, I briefly discuss its epistemic implications. I suggest that, by systematically reorienting how one experiences the world, faith can actually change one’s total body of evidence (or perhaps even how one weighs that evidence), thereby altering what one is justified in believing about the object of faith. (shrink)

Recent research has defended the surprising thesis that in many cases the search for truth is better off if the information exchanged between the members of an epistemic community is limited. This is what one may call the limited information thesis. There is, however, the possibility of an even more radical position than this: the thesis that any communication between peers has zero epistemic value and that the search for truth is better off if the truth-inquirer does not take into (...) consideration the truth-claims of her peers. This can be called the solitude thesis. The paper defends the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis with respect to metaphysical inquiry. The defense is facilitated by means of interpreting textual evidence found in Descartes’ essays Discourse on the Method, The Search for Truth and the Meditations on First Philosophy. (shrink)

In Minkowski spacetime, because of the relativity of simultaneity to the inertial frame chosen, there is no unique world-at-an-instant. Thus the classical view that there is a unique set of events existing now in a three dimensional space cannot be sustained. The two solutions most often advanced are that the four-dimensional structure of events and processes is alone real, and that becoming present is not an objective part of reality; and that present existence is not an absolute notion, but is (...) relative to inertial frame; the world-at-an-instant is a three dimensional, but relative, reality. According to a third view, advanced by Robb, Capek and Stein, what is present at a given spacetime point is, strictly speaking, constituted by that point alone. I argue here against the first of these views that the four-dimensional universe cannot be said to exist now, already, or indeed at any time at all; so that talk of its existence or reality as if that precludes the existence or reality of the present is a non sequitur. The second view assumes that in relativistic physics time lapse is measured by the time co-ordinate function; against this I maintain that it is in fact measured by the proper time, as I argue by reference to the Twin Paradox. The third view, although formally correct, is tarnished by its unrealistic assumption of point-events. This makes it susceptible to paradox, and also sets it at variance with our normal intuitions of the present. I argue that a defensible concept of the present is nonetheless obtainable when account is taken of the non-instantaneity of events, including that of conscious awareness, as that region of spacetime comprised between the forward lightcone of the beginning of a small interval of proper time t and the backward lightcone of the end of that interval. This gives a serviceable notion of what is present to a given event of short duration, as well as saving our intuition of the “reality” or robustness of present events. (shrink)