The aim of this paper has been to contribute to the ongoing discourse on skill, know-how, and expertise in the sporting world by posting an alternative view, one that explores the meaningfulness of difference from the outlook of difference. Hence, my ambition was to put focus on how we look at difference in the sporting world and, subsequently, to set the stage for expanding the analytical framework we use in exploring sports today. Essentially, my argument is based on an assumption (...) that the prevailing paradigm of sports is constructed and continuously redeveloped on the grand narrative of modernity emphasizing sameness over difference, and consequently, leaving sportification as its evolutionary footprint. Accordingly, in pursuit of an alternative, I have utilized a postmodern outlook with emphasis on emancipation, deconstruction, vocabulary, dialog, diversity, and aesthetics as the analytical framework in constructing a narrative of difference, rather than sameness. More so, as to frame the argu... (shrink)

In this paper I take up John Searle's account of ?Background capacities? to render intelligible the presupposed and hidden aspects of the background conditions that enable the performance of skilled movement. The paper begins with a review of Searle's initial account of Background capacities and how this picture can be applied to account for skilled movement in sport. Then an objection to this picture is addressed, claiming that Searle's initial picture might ?overrepresentationalise? background conditions. Moreover, this objection prompts how Searle (...) has modified his initial picture of background conditions in accordance with his more recent ?connection principle?. Searle's recent account of background conditions is then elaborated and discussed in the second half of the paper. The discussion emphasises three distinct levels of analysis in Searle's framework necessary to a full understanding of his background conditions: (i) the neurophysiological level; (ii) the descriptive higher-order practical skill level; and (iii) the logical level of integration. It is argued that Searle's logical framework is found plausible, but that more work is needed to better understand the background conditions of skilled movement in terms of neurophysiological capacities and practical skills from both scientific and philosophical perspectives. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion of expertise and skilled movement in sport by analysing the bodily practice of learning a new movement at a high level of skill in parkour. Based on Sennett’s theory of craftsmanship and an ethnographic field study with experienced practitioners, the analysis offers insight into the skilful, contextual and unique practice of parkour, and contributes to the renewed discussion of consciousness in sport at a high level of skill. With Sennett’s (...) concept of craftsmanship, it is possible to describe and grasp important aspects of obstacles put up, repetitions and material consciousness in developing perceptual and physical skills in parkour. The parkour craftsmen conduct a constant dialogue between concrete, material practices and thinking. It is argued in the article that Sennett’s ideas about craftsmanship are, in many ways, similar to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ concept of mastery, but are less elitist and exclusive than the theory of skill acquisition... (shrink)

According to a view defended by Hubert Dreyfus and others, elite athletes are totally absorbed while they are performing, and they act non-deliberately without any representational or conceptual thinking. By using both conceptual clarification and phenomenological description the article criticizes this view and maintains that various forms of conscious thinking and acting plays an important role before, during and after competitive events. The article describes in phenomenological detail how elite athletes use consciousness in their actions in sport; as planning, attention, (...) thinking, decision, and monitoring of performance. Elite athletes do not act as zombies. It is concluded that qualia and phenomenal consciousness are important phenomena in elite sport. (shrink)

In the Concept of Mind from 1949 Gilbert Ryle distinguished between knowing how and knowing that. What was Ryle’s basic idea and how is the discussion going on in philosophy today? How can sport philosophy use the idea of knowing how? My goal in this paper is first to bring Ryle and the post-Rylean discussion to light and then show how phenomenology can give some input to the discussion. The article focuses especially on the two main interpretations of knowing how, (...) intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. In the second part of the article I discuss how views from phenomenology and philosophy of mind can enrich and widen our understanding of what knowing how means in relation to sport practices. It is argued that knowing how is not limited to athletic abilities but includes knowledge of how the environing world operates in relation to athletic action. (shrink)

Philosophers of sport seem to have lived happily with the idea that the knowledge in sporting skills is knowing how. In traditional epistemology, knowing how does not qualify to be knowledge proper since knowledge is a question of whether a belief is true and justified. Unless knowing how is a special case of knowing that, it is not knowledge. The argument for such an identification arises saying that a former expert in tennis has tennis know-how, although she cannot perform skillfully. (...) If we do not need ability to perform a skill and still have know-how, it seems reasonable to say that know-how is a type of knowing that. With such a move, skills are perhaps not identical to know-how. Are we then left with the idea that there isn’t any knowledge in sporting skills? If we stick with the idea that a fine forehand is indeed an able forehand, the question of what knowledge skills contain remains. This article aims to discuss and shed light on issues related between knowledge, knowing h... (shrink)