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  1. Construal level and free will beliefs shape perceptions of actors' proximal and distal intent.Jason E. Plaks & Jeffrey S. Robinson - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:135664.
    Two components of lay observers’ calculus of moral judgment are proximal intent (the actor’s mind is focused on performing the action) and distal intent (the actor’s mind is focused on the broader goal). What causes observers to prioritize one form of intent over the other? The authors observed whether construal level (Studies 1-2) and beliefs about free will (Studies 3-4) would influence participants’ sensitivity to the actor’s proximal versus distal intent. In four studies, participants read scenarios in which the actor’s (...)
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  • The Impact of Human–Robot Synchronization on Anthropomorphization.Saskia Heijnen, Roy de Kleijn & Bernhard Hommel - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Theory of Mind experience sampling in typical adults.Lauren Bryant, Anna Coffey, Daniel J. Povinelli & John R. Pruett - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):697-707.
    We explored the frequency with which typical adults make Theory of Mind attributions, and under what circumstances these attributions occur. We used an experience sampling method to query 30 typical adults about their everyday thoughts. Participants carried a Personal Data Assistant that prompted them to categorize their thoughts as Action, Mental State, or Miscellaneous at approximately 30 pseudo-random times during a continuous 10-h period. Additionally, participants noted the direction of their thought and degree of socializing at the time of inquiry. (...)
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  • Attribution of mind: A psychologist's contribution to the consciousness debate.Christian Kaernbach - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):66-82.
    Could computers ever be conscious? Will they ever have ideas that one could attribute to them and not to the programmer? Will robots be able to 'feel pain', instead of processing bits from sensors informing about danger? Will they have true emotions? These questions may never be answered, but it makes sense to ask whether humans will ever attribute mind to artifacts. This paper suggests introducing a third level of claims regarding artificial intelligence (AI), which is in between 'weak AI' (...)
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